

EMOTIONS IN COUNSELLING

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**A TRIBUTE TO
THE TRANSFERENCE AND
COUNTERTRANSFERENCE
EMOTIONS
IN MY COUNSELLING PRACTICE**

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EMOTIONS IN COUNSELLING**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

1	
INTRODUCTION	21
SECTION - I	
EMOTIONS IN GENERAL	24
2	
WHAT ARE EMOTIONS?	25
1. Change of highly personal significance	26
2. Objects of emotions	27
3. Characteristics of emotions	27
1) High instability	28
2) Great intensity	28
3) Partial perspective	29
4) Relative brevity	30
4. Emotions in psychopathology	30
3	
BASIC COMPONENTS OF EMOTIONS	31
1. Cognitive component	34
2. Evaluative component	35
3. Motivational component	36
4. Feeling component	37
5. Interrelatedness of the components	38
6. Individualization of emotions	39
4	
AFFECTIVE PHENOMENA	41
1. Criteria of distinguishing affective phenomena	41
2. Basic types of affective phenomena	42
3. Emotions	43
4. Sentiments	44

5. Moods	45
1) Mood-emotion comparison	46
6. Affective traits	47
7. Affective disorders	47
1) Affective Disorders-Moods comparison	48
2) Affective Disorders-Emotions comparison	48
3) Adaptive function of affective disorders	49
5	
CLASSIFICATION OF EMOTIONS	51
1. Various classifications	51
2. Aaron Ben-ze'ev's classification	52
1) Positive-Negative attitudes	53
2) Major evaluative patterns	53
3. Basic and nonbasic emotions	54
1) Development	55
2) Function	55
3) Universality	55
4) Prevalence	55
5) Uniqueness	55
6) Intentionality	56
6	
EMOTIONAL INTENSITY	57
1. Complexity of emotional intensity	57
2. Intensity variables	58
3. Impact of the event	58
1) Strength	58
2) Reality	59
3) Relevance	59
4. Background circumstances	60
1) Accountability	60
2) Readiness	60
3) Deservingness	61

7**THE EMERGENCE OF EMOTIONS**

1. Emotional states	62
2. A model of emotional development	63
3. Primary emotions	64
4. Self-conscious emotions	65
5. Self-conscious evaluative emotions	66
6. Intentionality	66
7. Desires and beliefs	66
8. Social standards	67
9. Mixed emotion	67
10. Hiding emotion	67
11. Changing emotion	68
12. Theories of emotional development	68
1) Psychoanalytic theory	68
2) Attachment theory	69
3) Discrete-emotions theory	69

8**IMAGINATION IN EMOTIONS**

1. Role of imagination in emotions	71
2. Development of mental capacities	71
3. Imagination	72
4. Counterfactual imagination	73
1) Past, present and future situation	74
2) Better or worse alternatives	74
3) Undoing a given situation	74
4) Change in one's action and those of others	74
5. Functionality of counterfactual imagination	75
6. Relationship between luck and emotions	75

9**FUNCTION OF EMOTIONS**

1. Emotions – Optimal response	77
2. Emotions – Adaptive mechanism	77

3. Basic evolutionary functions	78
4. Physiological evidence of functionality of emotions	78
5. Harmfulness of emotions	79

10**PSYCHOEVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF EMOTIONS**

1. Six-Postulate evolutionary theory	80
1) Ethological view	80
2) Genetic view	80
3) Hypothetical constructs	81
4) Complex chain of events	81
5) Three-dimensional structure	81
6) Derivative conceptual domains	82
2. Three model psychoevolutionary theory	82
1) Sequential model	82
2) Structural model	82
3) Derivatives model	83
3. Other evolutionary implications	83
1) Hierarchy	83
2) Territoriality	84
3) Identity	84
4) Temporality	84
4. Major coping issues	85

11**REASON IN EMOTIONS**

1. Reason vs. emotions	86
2. Intellectualist tradition	86
3. Rule-following vs. rule-described behaviours	86
4. Rule-described plus personal makeup	87
5. Emotions through the history of philosophy	88
1) The Greeks	88
2) The Romans	88
3) The Middle Ages	89
4) René Descartes	89
5) Baruch Spinoza	90

<i>Emotions in Counselling</i>	09
6) David Hume	90
7) Immanuel Kant	90
8) Friedrich Nietzsche	91
9) 20 th Century	91
12	
EMOTIONS IN PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT	92
1. Organization of traits and dimensions	92
2. Mechanisms and processes in emotion-personality relations	92
3. Empirical studies of emotion-personality relations	93
4. Emotions and maladaptive behaviour	93
13	
EMOTIONS IN COMMUNICATION	94
1. Emotional pretence	94
2. Usefulness of emotional pretence	95
3. Motives of emotional pretence	95
4. Disadvantages of emotional pretence	95
14	
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE	97
1. Relation between emotion and intellectual systems	97
2. Evaluative systems	98
3. Reconciliation	99
4. Intuitive cognition	99
5. EQ is expert knowledge	100
6. Domains of emotional intelligence	101
7. EQ has moderate emotional intensity	101
15	
PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC VIEW OF EMOTIONS	103
1. Psychodynamic approach	103
2. Behavioural approach	104
3. Cognitive approach	105
4. Experimental and humanistic approach	105
1) Client-centred therapy	105
2) Gestalt therapy approach	106

10	Table of Contents
5. Current views of emotion	107
6. Importance of emotions in psychotherapy	108
1) Emotion makes schemes accessible	108
2) Emotion is an orienting and meaning-producing system	109
3) Emotion is a regulatory system	109
4) Awareness of elicitors provides personal clarity & control	110
5) Emotion identifies where to focus	110
6) Emotion controls action	111
7. Affective assessment	111
1) Biologically adaptive primary affective responses	111
2) Secondary reactive emotional responses	112
3) Instrumental emotional responses	112
4) Learned maladaptive primary responses	112
8. General principles of emotionally focused intervention	113
9. Types of therapeutic intervention processes	115
1) Acknowledging emotion	115
2) Evoking and intensifying emotions	116
(1) Core cognition	116
(2) Leading to action	117
(3) Completion	117
3) Emotional restructuring	117
SECTION - II	
EMOTIONS IN PARTICULAR	119
PART - I	
FORTUNES OF AGENTS	122
A. ONESELF	
16	
HAPPINESS	123
1. Happiness as a sentiment	124
2. Happiness as an acute emotion	124

3. Background baseline	124
4. Personal makeup	125
5. Genetic stable baseline	125
6. Determinants of happiness	126
1) Objective factors	126
2) Subjective factors	127
3) Genetic factors	128
4) Subjective-Objective dilemma	128
5) Happiness – Dynamic process	129
6) Happiness from pursuit	129
7) Happiness depends on attitude	129
7. Maintaining long-term happiness	130
8. Experience of joy	131
1) Not sensory pleasure	131
2) Causes of joy	131
3) Function of joy	132

17**EXHILARATION**

1. Emotion of exhilaration	133
2. Description of exhilaration	134
1) Behaviour	134
2) Physiology	135
3) Experience	135
4) Antecedents	135
3. Elicitors of exhilaration	135
4. Function of humour	136

18**SADNESS**

1. Sorrow and sadness	137
2. Passivity in sadness	137
3. Sadness-Response to lost or unattained goal	138
4. Differential understanding	138
5. Self-focus in sadness	138
6. Functions of sadness	139

19**GRIEF**

1. Grief over the child's death	140
2. Recommended patterns of behaviour	141
3. Background circumstances	142
4. Emotional dynamics in grief	142

20**LONELINESS**

1. Message of contradiction	144
2. Loneliness and aloneness	145
3. Positive side of loneliness	145

21**HOPE**

1. Distanced object	146
2. Lesser intensity	146
3. Emotion or sentiment	147
4. Crucial role of hope	148
5. Intentional elements	149
6. Optimism	150

22**FEAR**

1. Intentional component	183
2. Interplay of fear and hope	184
3. Object of fear	184
4. Relationship with other emotions	185
5. Uncertainty in fear	186
6. Despair	186
7. Resignation	187
8. Horror	187
9. Courage	187
10. Cowardice	188

	<i>Emotions in Counselling</i>	13
11. Shyness		159
12. Anxiety		159
13. Intensity variables		160
14. Functions of fear		161
	B. OTHERS	162
	23	
	'HAPPY-FOR'	163
1. Nature of 'happy-for' emotion		163
2. Can there be happy-for emotion?		163
3. Greater fortune of others		164
	24	
	ENVY	165
1. Envy-Jealousy comparison		165
2. Object of envy		166
3. Comparative concern		166
4. Two views of envy		167
5. Resentment		167
6. Competition		168
7. Relative deprivation		168
8. Social comparison		168
9. Inferiority concern		169
10. Child-Adult envy comparison		169
11. Low self-esteem		170
12. Weak-Strong envy		170
13. Comparison of pity and envy		171
	25	
	JEALOUSY	174
1. Object of jealousy		174
2. Concern of jealousy		175
3. Exclusivity in jealousy		176
4. Jealousy and romantic love		177
5. No social comparison		177
6. Desert claim		177
7. Self-esteem concern		178

	14	Table of Contents
		26
	PLEASURE-IN-OTHERS'-MISFORTUNE	179
1. Essential factors		179
2. Deservingness		179
3. Minor setbacks		180
4. Passivity of the agent		181
	27	
	PITY	182
1. Helplessness and unwillingness		182
2. Reasons for passivity		182
3. Undeservedness		183
4. Comparison of pity and envy		183
	28	
	COMPASSION	187
1. Altruistic		187
2. Shared humanity		187
3. Strength and duration		188
4. Readiness to help		188
5. Dissatisfaction with the present		189
6. Nonvoluntariness		189
7. Desire for the other's relief		190
	29	
	MERCY	191
1. Attitude conveyed by action		191
2. Deliberative action		191
3. Nonemotional		192
4. Ability to help		192
5. Actual help		192
6. Power in mercy		193
7. Other's inferiority		193

<i>Emotions in Counselling</i>	15
8. Other's deservingness	194
9. Relationships with other emotions	195
10. Mercy and punishment	196
PART - II	
1. ACTIONS OF AGENTS	197
A. ONESELF	
30	
PRIDE	198
1. Major essential elements	198
2. Comparative concern	199
3. Public recognition	200
4. Natural Gifts	200
5. Self-ascribed gifts	201
31	
REGRET	202
1. Temporal distance	202
2. Regret-minimizing choices	203
3. Short- and long-term regrets	203
4. Reducing the pain of regrettable actions	204
5. Bolstering the pain of regrettable inactions	205
6. Remorse	206
32	
GUILT	208
1. A certain causal responsibility	209
2. Types of guilt	209
3. Causal or blameworthiness responsibility	210
4. Counterfactual imagination	210
5. Imagination in guilt	211
6. Accidental action	211
7. Responsibility of intended action	212

16	Table of Contents
	33
	EMBARRASSMENT
1. Acute self-awareness	213
2. Belief in embarrassment	213
3. Public exposure	214
4. Embarrassment about embarrassment	214
5. Behaviour display	214
6. Emergence of embarrassment	215
7. Empathic embarrassment	215
8. Intentional embarrassment	215
9. Relationships with other emotions	216
10. Responses to embarrassment	217
	B. OTHERS
	219
	34
	GRATITUDE
1. Two basic desires	220
2. Reciprocity	220
3. Conditions of gratitude	221
4. Loan–Deposit comparison	221
	35
	ANGER
	223
1. Specific undeserved offence	223
2. Specific act	225
3. Concrete threat	225
4. Boundary	226
5. Blameworthiness	226
6. Motivational component	226
7. Anger towards the dead?	227
8. Functions of anger	227

2. ACTIONS OF AGENTS & THE AGENT AS A WHOLE**A. ONESELF** 230**36****PRIDEFULNESS** 231

1. Reference to the self 231
2. A standard as baseline 232
3. Fundamental norms 232

37**SHAME** 234

1. Norms 234
2. Audience 235
3. Need to hide and disappear 236
4. Situations of shame 236
5. Shame in the young and the old 237
6. Behavioural means 237
7. Cognitive means 238
8. Evaluative means 238
9. Shame in extended self 239
10. Functions of shame 239

38**MODESTY** 240

1. Limited and unexaggerated 240
2. Four major cognitive accounts 240
3. Evaluation of similarity 241
4. Competition not significant 241
5. Humility 242
6. Character trait 242
7. Humiliation and arrogance 243

B. OTHERS 244**39****ROMANTIC LOVE** 245

1. Evaluative patterns 246
2. Visual stimuli 247

3. Interdependence of evaluative patterns	248
4. Pattern of desirability	248
5. Emotional object	249
6. Knowledge	250
7. Reciprocity	250
8. Comprehensive evaluation	250
9. Enduring attitude	251
10. Intrinsic value	251
11. Detailed perception	251
12. Moral love	252
13. Discriminative love	252
14. Love at first sight	253
15. Is love blind?	253
16. Is love replaceable and nonexclusive?	254
17. Relationships with other emotions	256
18. Passionate love	258
1) Evolution of passionate love	258
(1) Triune brain	258
(2) Love in primates	258
(3) Love in children	258
(4) Love in adults	259
2) Antecedents of passionate love	260
3) Consequences of passionate love	261
(1) Moments of exultation	261
(2) Feeling understood and accepted	261
(3) Sharing a sense of union	261
(4) Feeling secure and safe	261
(5) Transcendence	261
4) Costs of passionate love	261
5) Pleasure and pain may fuel passion	262
19. Companionate love	262
20. Intensity variables	263
21. Hurting the one we love	263

**40
HATE**

1. Specificity	266
2. Global evaluation	267
3. Threat	267
4. Intensity	268
5. Boundary	268
6. Hopefulness	269
7. Less blameworthiness	269
8. Less passivity	269
9. Subject-Object distance	270
10. Functions	270

PART - III

THE AGENT AS A WHOLE

41

SEXUAL DESIRE

1. Sexual desire is an emotion	274
2. Importance of appealingness	274
3. Sexual desire is primitive	274
4. Effortless experience	275
5. Standardized attractiveness	276
6. Boundary	276
7. Gender differences	276
8. Emotional object	277
9. Superficial companionship	278
10. Gratification vs. concern	278
11. Evaluation of limited aspects	279
12. Partial and transient	279
13. No guarantee for happiness	279
14. Superficial knowledge	280

**42
DISGUST**

1. The Meaning of disgust	282
2. Contamination	282
3. Criteria of disgust	283
4. Origin of disgust: Faeces and decay	284
5. Properties and acquisition of core disgust	284
6. Core disgust	285
7. Objects of disgust	286
8. Correlation	286
9. Negative evaluation	287
10. Disgust as a moral emotion	287
11. Functions of disgust	288
12. Protection from diseases	289
13. Protection from contamination	289
14. Cultural differences	290
15. Contamination response	290
16. Animal-origin disgust and beyond	291

43

CONTEMPT

1. Object's inferiority	292
2. Upward contempt	292
3. Agent's superiority	293
4. Contempt vs. disgust	294
5. Classical examples	294
6. Functions of contempt	295

44

CONCLUSION

Endnotes

Bibliography

281
282
282
283
284
284
285
286
286
287
287
288
289
289
290
290
291
292
292
292
293
294
294
295
296
298
319

1

INTRODUCTION

Once a client came to me for counselling. As I received her she seemed quite happy and was in a cheerful mood. We hardly sat for counselling when she burst into tears at the mention of an experience that she had the previous day. Her situation came as a surprise to me, especially the suddenness of her outburst contrasted with the mood in which she came to me. There was not a trace of sadness on her face when we started the session but within a few minutes she lost her composure and there was a tempest of emotions!

At another time it was a young adult whom I was counselling. He had bottled up a lot of anger against his father who was very authoritarian. Having been unable to speak up, he controlled all his anger and when I started the counselling I realized that the technique of Gestalt might help him since there was a lot of anger against his father. I put before him a pillow to pound and express his anger. In a matter of minutes the whole pillow was ripped to pieces and the cotton filling was strewn all over the room. The rotating fan made the situation worse. At the end of the session we had to spend some time cleaning up ourselves before we came out of the room. Fortunately I had reframed him not to hurt himself or me or break any furniture in the room. Otherwise the effect would have been disastrous.

A mother came to me for counselling. Her teenage son had committed suicide a week earlier. They used to shout at each other and on the day of his suicide he shouted at his mother that she would not see him again to which she replied that she would be happy not to see him. True to his words her son committed suicide. She sat in front of me motionless with a fixed stare. But one could feel the undercurrents of guilt churning and ravaging the core of her being.

Thus I often encounter strong emotions raging like a tempest or like still waters running deep. At one time the counsellor is caught up in the tempest, or at another he/she is in the undercurrent along with the clients. The client and the counsellor have to name and understand the tempest and the undercurrent that the clients so strongly experience.

In the ocean occasionally there will be tempests that toss the ship and even endanger its survival. Still waters run deep. Though waters may appear to be still, there could be forcible undercurrents. These imageries come to my mind as I think of counselling with its emotional manifestations. Individuals have both positive and negative emotions and some of the emotions are expressed either with great manifestations like anger for example, and in the same way there are certain emotions that are expressed not so much with outward signs of distress but all the same they are as strong as the emotions that express themselves like tempests, as for example, depression. Depression is like deep waters, powerful and strong, though apparently on the surface it seems to be still. Besides there are also clients who very well demonstrate and speak about their feelings and emotions and there are also clients who would not speak about them but counsellors are to infer from what they observe in clients.

Here I attempt to give an analysis of emotions so that counsellors are well aware of these realities as they encounter them in the counselling context. Besides, a counsellor is called upon to deal with feelings and emotions, and ignorance on the part of the counsellor may not be a welcome sign. I am also trying to explain what are emotions.

In the first place I was very curious about emotions desiring to know what they are and how they are to be identified. While reading materials on emotions, I realized what we normally use in counselling context as 'feeling' is only a part of emotion. But by using the word 'feeling' we actually mean 'emotion.' My own thirst for clarity in understanding emotion is the primary reason for undertaking to write a book on emotions. Secondly, sharing my study of emotions will be beneficial to other counsellors as well. When I started to read materials on emotions I wondered at the

amount of literature on this subject and above all I was confused at the way emotions are classified and treated by different authors. My initial difficulty was how to put them together in a coherent style first of all for my own understanding, and secondly to explain to others in an intelligible manner. I have been experiencing this difficulty all through and the reader may understand this awkward situation in my writing.

Consideration of emotion was always bound up with philosophy. History of philosophy bears witness to the complicated involvement of the theme of emotion. Because of the nature of philosophy and its concern with epistemological matters, the focus is on the conceptual structures of emotion rather than the sensory, social, or physiological aspects of emotion. At present even among the philosophers there is a reaction to the hypercognizing of emotion. Thus there has been a serious effort on the part of philosophers to join with psychologists, neurologists, anthropologists, and moral philosophers to give a more holistic theory of emotion.

I realize that much needs to be done and a lot of research is to be made to make us understand emotions. Understanding emotions is for the sake of regulating them. 'Emotions are good servants and bad masters.' I hope that understanding emotions will help us in regulating them especially in our interpersonal relationship. This I believe will enhance our life as individuals and as persons relating to one another in society. With this introduction, I would like to invite you to go through the pages. Before taking up individual emotions, it is worth having a glance at the classification of emotions. The classification is likely to give us clarity as to how to understand emotions meaningfully.

SECTION - I

EMOTION IN GENERAL

Here I would like to give an overview of the layout of the book. The whole content is divided into two sections. The first section deals with emotions in general. In this section all the general ideas or themes of emotions are dealt with. These themes usually deal with what emotions are, their components, similar manifestations of emotions, classifications, functions and how they are related to other connected fields. The scope ranges from the phenomenological experiences of emotions to their philosophical considerations. So the first section presents an overall conceptual framework for understanding emotions. Here issues of general nature of emotions are taken up. The second section will take up individual emotions one by one and deal with them rather elaborately according to the available research data.

2

WHAT ARE EMOTIONS?

A preschool boy of four years age attending kindergarten complained to his teacher that he felt hurt since a girl of his age sitting next to him in the class does not speak to him. The teacher was amused at the word 'hurt' used by her pupil. In everyday language we often speak of how sad, worried, tired, or happy we are. Knowingly or unknowingly we make use of emotional words to express our daily experiences. But we are not quite sure what these emotions are. Here in this chapter I am attempting to describe what emotions are. No doubt emotions are highly complex and subtle phenomena that are not easy to define. What are emotions cannot be directly answered giving a definition. Let us try to understand them by various descriptions.

A descriptive definition will be as follows: Emotion is a complex state of the organism, involving bodily changes of a widespread character – in breathing, pulse, gland secretion, etc. – and, on the mental side, a state of excitement or perturbation, marked by strong feeling, and usually an impulse towards a definite form of behaviour. If the emotion is intense there is some disturbance of the intellectual functions, a measure of dissociation, and a tendency towards action of an ungraded or protopathic character.

An emotion is experienced as a feeling that motivates, organizes, and guides perception, thought, and action.

There is no one single definition of emotion. Besides, each definition given by each psychologist differs in its approach and so there is no uniformity in defining emotion. All the same what we have seen above is more or less the description found in all the definitions.¹

1. CHANGE OF HIGHLY PERSONAL SIGNIFICANCE

By the term 'emotion' we mean a class of elicitors, behaviours, states, and experiences. Change of highly personal significance causes emotions. What seems to be important in emotions is a perceived significant change in our personal situation. The significance can be positive or negative but definitely only a change can cause emotions in humans. Not every change is going to create emotions in individuals. For example, there are ever so many changes taking place all round us. The season keeps changing, people may look different and landscapes may wear a different look. Philosophers said that the essence of reality is change.

But change in general is of no value in terms of generating emotions. Only when there is a significant change we can think of emotions. Of course the significance could be either positive or negative. A terminal illness in you or in the one you love will make you feel sad. Passing a test with the first rank by you or by one very close to you will make you hilarious. Therefore emotions need a high personal significance. The higher the personal significance the more intense is the emotion. For example, a natural calamity taking place around your place will automatically arouse a lot of anxiety in you but at the same time an even more devastating natural calamity taking place elsewhere in another part of the world is not going to cause you strong emotions. The reason is that your place involves your people and so it has a highly personal significance whereas people out there suffering may not have such a high degree of personal significance.

The concept of personal significance implies that it is the subject who determines the significance. It is not the question of objective significance, which in the case of a natural calamity in a far off place is really severe but it is the subject who determines the significance in subjective terms. An emotional change is always related to a certain personal frame of reference against which its significance is evaluated. The change relevant to the generation of emotions is a perceived change whose significance is determined by us.²

2. OBJECTS OF EMOTIONS

The object of emotions is typically human beings. Either we ourselves or other human persons are the objects of emotions. Though we usually have human persons as the object of emotions it is also possible that our emotions are directed at a whole group of agents. Take for example, hating a group of people who may belong to a certain ethnic group. All racial discriminations are emotions directed at a whole group of agents. Not only a group of people but even an agent belonging to the group can induce emotions. It is also known that emotions are typically directed toward agents who are capable of enjoyment and suffering. Because of the similarity we perceive with other human persons by way of identifying, we experience either positive or negative emotions.

Have you ever realized how much you love your cat or dog or any pet animal? The more the animals or birds are perceived to be similar to human beings, the greater is the emotional intensity toward them. Therefore it is clear that the closer the animal is to us the more intense our emotions towards it. I have witnessed people mourning inconsolably for a pet dog. Not only is the dog perceived in some sense as being similar to human beings but it is also closer to the individual concerned.

Emotions are also directed at objects, which are actually not agents but are at least construed to have such properties of agents. A housewife was vacuuming her house when suddenly the machine stopped functioning at which she got angry at the vacuum cleaner, took a hammer and smashed the appliance. She was ferociously angry as though the vacuum cleaner was an intelligent agent like herself and that it did not function on purpose, thus attributing some responsibility to the machine. Anyway only if we ascribe some life or feeling to the inanimate thing, as does a little girl to her doll, can we have emotions towards inanimate objects.³

3. CHARACTERISTICS OF EMOTIONS

It is perceived that there are four characteristics for every hot emotion, which are typical intense emotions. (Moderate emotions and affective experiences such as moods, affective disorders, and sentiments may lack some of the characteristics.) The characteristics

are 1. High instability, 2. Great intensity, 3. A partial perspective and 4. Relative brevity.

1) High Instability

The idea of high instability is in tune with what we considered as causing emotions. Emotions are caused by changes that are personally significant. Therefore change characterizes the very nature of emotions. When people are in the grip of an emotion, they are in a transition in which the preceding context has changed, but no new context has yet been stabilized. Thus there is the probability of instability and some agitation that is intense, occasional and of limited duration. Psychologists compare emotional states to a fire. Philosophers too have symbolized change by fire. In a fire there is neither a stable state nor a stable form. It keeps changing every moment. It is precisely this instability one experiences in an emotional state especially when it is a hot emotion or a typical emotion. We notice instability both in the mental as well as the physiological system. When you are in a fit of anger, you tremble; when you are anxious and nervous, you do not sign your name properly.⁴

2) Great Intensity

There was an old lady bedridden at home. Her only daughter saw to her needs and then left for work every day. It so happened that one day a thief entered the house. The old lady lying down on her bed perceived that the thief was in the next room. Knowing fully well that in no time he would be there in front of her, she got out of her bed in fright. She ran from the room, leapt into the street and sat there! The emotion of fear made the old lady mobilize all her energy and resources and rush to the street. If you have fallen in love or if you have been infatuated with someone, you will know what 'great intensity' is. Many waters cannot quench your love neither can the floods drown it. By nature emotions are of intense reaction. Since individuals are confronted with a change, their mental systems are not adapted to the given change and we know that the change requires the mobilization of many resources. One of the basic evolutionary functions of emotions is that of immediate mobilization of resources (for which a great intensity of emotion is required). Emotions usually impel people to action and

thus by nature emotions are given great intensity in order to mobilize all available resources.

Actually speaking, low-intensity states are not typically emotional; they are nonemotional and atypical. It is rather difficult to delineate between emotional intensities. But all that we do know is that typical emotions should have a great intensity. We need to distinguish between the intensity experienced in normal emotions and those like anxiety and depressions, experienced in anxiety disorders and mood disorders, which are pathological states. Though the intensity of emotions influences our normal functioning they do not disable us completely as in the case of affective disorders. That is the difference between normal anxiety and depression and pathological anxiety and depression.

One does not speak of minor concern in emotions. In emotions everything is magnified. Small things are blown up and are experienced as great events. This in fact is the intensity of emotions.⁵

3) Partial Perspective

Think of the close friends you have or the people you are in love with. You cannot be romantically in love with a number of people. You may be attracted to a number of people but romantic love is directed to only one person at a time with great intensity. The number is not unlimited but rather a small number. Our emotions are focused on one or a few persons. Emotions are partial since our attention is focused on a narrow target or they express a personal and interested perspective. One cannot be interested in a vast number of people. One may generally be interested in people as a love for humanity but to be emotional one has to narrow down one's target of love concretely. And in this sense emotions are partial.

Our psychic energy is limited. Notwithstanding the fact that one may be an extrovert, the extrovert cannot have infinite number of lovers or friends. Though an extrovert may have more friends or lovers than an introvert, in the ultimate analysis the number has to be limited if it has to be emotional. Emotions do express our values and preferences and so they cannot be indiscriminate.

Besides, those in emotions may not be circumspective since their attention is narrowed down to some limited target. For example, take lovers in a society where external manifestations of love may be frowned at; the lovers may try to express their love to each other in public even though they know that doing so they might land up with difficulty. Here the lovers are partial in their perspective. Because of the partial nature of emotions we usually do not pay attention to the whole circumstances and the consequences of our actions. For example, when we are in anger we say things and act in such a way that we later regret. This is another example of the partial perspective of emotions.⁶

4) Relative Brevity

When a change disturbs a system, the system will not tolerate the change for too long. The system will immediately want to restore its homeostasis. If the changed situation continues to persist, then the system adapts itself to the changed situation, which becomes a normal way of life. After a while, the system construes the change as the normal and stable situation. Since emotions are transient, they are adaptive in nature.

When we say that emotions are transient, we do not mean that they cannot last more than a few seconds. The typical temporal structure of emotions involves a swift rise-time, taking less than half a minute in most cases, followed by a relatively slow decline. The typical features of emotion are present for a short while – typically a matter of seconds. The exact duration of emotions is a matter of seconds, not minutes, hours, or days. For example if you observe the duration of both expressive and physiological changes, you will notice that most adult facial expressions last from approximately half a second to four seconds. When people report that they are having emotions for longer periods they are only reporting discrete emotion episodes.⁷

4. EMOTIONS IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

We come across psychopathology in the lives of people and in ourselves. There have been many interrelated descriptions of psychopathology. Richard Lazarus (1991) says that we can identify three classes of people with psychopathology. The first group denotes 'dysfunctional neuroses.' This group has obsessions, anxiety,

phobias, and depression. The second group is called 'existential problems' characterized by vague feelings of unhappiness, boredom, and lack of meaning in life. The third group lacks skills of handling such adaptational issues as bereavement, divorce, illness, and handicaps. According to Lazarus psychopathology means some kind of failure in appraisal and coping, which results in emotional states, ego defences, and self-deception.

I have seen clients come for counselling complaining that they experience some emotions too often or too strongly like depression, anxiety, or anger. There are also others who complain that they experience certain emotions too weakly and infrequently. Take for example people who cannot express their love to another person. There are people who cannot cry. These people need to have stronger emotions and more frequently. Counsellors come across clients who complain of difficulty in interpersonal style. They cannot get on with others like spouses, parents, children, friends, superiors or subordinates. When we analyse these problems we find underneath the problem of emotions that they either feel too strongly or too weakly, or have them inappropriately. Are we not aware of two or more different emotions being aroused simultaneously, producing severe conflict and possible immobilization of action? For example we may want to be independent of our spouses but at the same time long to be taken care of. Teenagers usually feel this tension of independence and dependence. A neurotic character, no doubt, has been called a personality in conflict. Thus we find that the base of psychopathology is the problem of emotions. That is why the study of emotions is in place, all the more because of the counselling or psychotherapeutic context in which we relate with our clients.⁸

In our attempt to understand what emotions are, we have traversed the path of describing the characteristics of emotions. Thus we have some basic understanding of emotions. Emotions are by nature complex and subtle realities and that is why it is rather difficult to give a precise definition. Here, I am spelling out their descriptions to enable a common understanding. With this information, let us look into other implications of emotions and finally at what the individual emotions are.

3

BASIC COMPONENTS OF EMOTIONS

We have already seen in the previous chapter the typical characteristics of emotions, which are instability, intensity, partiality and brevity. In this chapter we are going to study what the components of emotions are. The difference between the characteristics and the components is that characteristics are properties of the emotional experience, and components are a conceptual division of the elements of this experience. The components are cognition, evaluation, motivation and feeling.

Basic Components of Emotion	1. Intentionality (Intentional Dimension)	1. Cognition 2. Evaluation 3. Motivation
	2. Feeling (Feeling Dimension)	1. Feeling

The first three components (namely cognition, evaluation, and motivation) can be grouped under the heading intentionality. Thus intentionality and feeling are two basic mental dimensions. Whereas intentionality refers to a subject-object relation, feeling refers to the subject's own state of mind. When we encounter a thief at night we are afraid, which is a feeling dimension; the knowledge of the thief, the evaluation of the attributes of the thief and the desire to run away are considered intentional dimension. The intentional dimension involves our cognitive ability to separate ourselves from the surrounding stimuli in order to have a meaningful subject-object relation. The object can be a person, a thing, a general situation or an abstract concept.

The feeling dimension is said to be a primitive mode of consciousness. It does not have any cognitive content like higher levels of awareness found in perception, memory, and thinking. The feeling dimension expresses our own state, but is not in itself directed at this state or at any other object. The feeling dimension is a mode of consciousness and so we are conscious of it and so there cannot be unfelt feelings. At the level of intentionality we are active but at the feeling level, feeling just seems to surface, and can even overcome us when it is intense.

As we have already seen, the intentional dimension has three components: cognition, evaluation, and motivation. The cognitive component is said to be having information about the given person, thing, situation or concept; the evaluative component assesses the personal significance of this information; the motivational component addresses our desires, or readiness to act. For example if a man loves a woman, he has knowledge about the woman, evaluates her attributes and desires to move toward her.

We should not think that the four components of emotions are separate entities or states; neither are they four different activities. All the four components are four distinct aspects of a typical emotional experience. We experience them as one emotional experience. Thus typical mental states in human beings consist of both intentional and feeling dimensions. It is known that the intentional and feeling dimensions are, to a certain extent, dependent upon each other in such a way that when one of them is predominant the other recedes to the background. Once I was riding a bike on a mud road in a hilly area on a rainy day. As I was negotiating a turn, the bike wobbled and I fell with the bike. Of course the silencer was on my right calf and burnt it severely. As it was getting late in the evening and the possibility of rain was looming large and I was far away from home, I mobilized all my energy and continued my journey until I reached home. Till I reached home the pain was not a big deal, but on reaching home I felt the pain so acutely and I wondered where the pain had been while I trekked back home for about an hour. This is an example to illustrate that one or the other dimension could be in the forefront at a given time. If the feeling dimension were to overtake me, I would not have come home that evening and would not have had

medical assistance immediately. Since intentionality and feeling are not two separate mental entities but rather distinct dimensions of a mental state, their relation is not one of causality but one of accompanying or complementing each other.¹

1. COGNITIVE COMPONENT

For the generation of an emotion the cognitive component supplies the required information about a given person, thing, situation or concept. The information could be either true or false. But somehow there should be some information whatsoever. It is likely that the cognitive component in emotions is often distorted due to several related features like partiality, closeness, and an intense feeling dimension. In emotional experience one may not see the whole picture and so distorted claims may be adopted since at that time only a limited knowledge was available. The aspect of partiality goes hand in hand with the aspect of closeness. We need a distance to judge a thing properly. The more we are involved with the thing to be judged, the less objective will be our judgement. That is why we usually do not counsel people who are close to us or with whom we have dual relationship like being a father and counsellor at the same time. When feelings are intense, our intellect hardly works.

If cognition is one of the components of emotion, can there be an 'unconscious emotion'? Perhaps in the so-called 'unconscious' emotions we are not aware of all the four components. What is unconscious or rather unknown, not realized, or mistakenly identified, is the nature of the emotional state, that is, our basic evaluative stand expressing our focus of concern. Thus an unconscious emotion is an emotion whose nature is unclear, while some of its components are known. Is there an 'unfelt feeling'? There is no such thing as an 'unfelt feeling.' The mere presence of feeling cannot be wrongly indicated because feeling is a mode of awareness. We will identify the mere presence of a feeling since feeling is a mode of awareness but we may wrongly identify the kind of feeling we are experiencing. Identifying an emotion is a cognitive activity, which often involves perception, memory, imagination, and thought and such activities may result in error.²

2. EVALUATIVE COMPONENT

By cognition we have information, which is assessed by the evaluative component in terms of its implication for personal well-being. If there is no evaluation, we are in a state of indifference. But in emotions we are neither neutral nor indifferent, but have a significant personal stake. For example, we see a snake and cognitively understand what a snake is, but in evaluation we understand that it is dangerous and so we are afraid. When we evaluate someone positively we have love towards that person.

There are two types of evaluations. One is a deliberative and the other is schematic. Imagine last week you had been insulted by your colleague. Now as you are quietly sitting in your room at home, you remember that incident of insult and you feel angry with your colleague. Thus deliberative evaluations involve slow and conscious process, which are largely under voluntary control. Such a process usually functions on verbally accessible, semantic information and it operates in largely linear, serial mode. You went for a walk and met someone and immediately fell in love with that person – love at first sight. You never thought that you would fall in love with that individual. Before you could deliberately think about the person you are already drawn towards that person. It is schematic evaluation.

Schematic activity is usually typically fast, automatic, and with little awareness. It is assumed that this type of evaluation is based on readymade structures or schemes of appraisal, which have already been set during evolution and personal development. The evaluative patterns are part of our psychological constitution and so we do not need time to create them. When there is the right circumstance it gets automatically activated. Thus schematic evaluation occurs outside of focal awareness, can occur using minimal attentional resources, and is not wholly dependent on verbal information.

One might wonder if all emotions involve schematic evaluations or some are the result of deliberative processes alone. As we know, emotions are typically generated when we confront a sudden and significant change. Since emotions are generated suddenly, it is reasonable to suppose that most of them involve

schematic evaluations, which do not require lengthy process of deliberation. But there is also deliberative thinking that causes emotions. Negative thoughts are related to negative moods and likewise positive thoughts are related to positive moods. Deliberative thinking may prepare the system for the activation of schematic evaluations. The emotional system has the ability to react almost instantaneously to significant events and yet draw fully upon the power and flexibility of complex cognitive and evaluative capacities.³

3. MOTIVATIONAL COMPONENT

When you know a dog is approaching you and you assess that the dog is dangerous, you automatically take to flight. You act upon your knowledge and evaluation. This acting part refers to the motivational component of emotion. Thus the motivational component refers to the desire or readiness to maintain or change present, past, or future circumstances. We may also consider passionate emotions and dispassionate emotions. Passionate emotions are such as anger and sexual desire in which case the desire is typically manifested in overt behaviour whereas in dispassionate emotions such as envy and hope, the behaviour element is less in evidence and appears merely as a desire. We know that emotions are not theoretical states; they involve a practical concern with a readiness to act. As emotions are evaluative attitudes of either positive or negative nature, they involve taking action or being disposed to act in accordance with the evaluation. The readiness to act is not neutral but it is a desire expressing our favourite attitude toward a particular course of action. That is why when we are indifferent to a particular individual, we have no emotion and no tendency to act for or against that person.

The connection between motivational component and actual behaviour can be in three different ways: 1. a full-fledged desire, which is expressed in actual behaviour; 2. a desire or want, which is not expressed in actual behaviour because of external constraints; 3. a mere wish, which is not intended to be translated into actual behaviour. While counselling a couple I heard the husband find fault with his wife saying that if she really loved him, she would have defended him. In a relationship of love one is expected to act in a particular way. Love needs to be shown in action. This is an example for a full-fledged desire, which has to be expressed in actual

behaviour. You are terribly angry with your boss and you would like to attack him but you would not do so lest he should fire you. Yet, the readiness to act in this situation is still there. Out of prudence, you do not translate your desire into behaviour. An ordinary man on the street wants to marry a famous film actress. This desire cannot be realized due to the impossibility of the situation. All the same the emotional tendency toward action is expressed in mental motions, that is, we go through the motions in our mind. We can safely say that the motivational component of emotions is more strictly related to 'action tendency' than to actual behaviour.⁴

4. FEELING COMPONENT

In our everyday language we use the term 'feeling' quite often and we may mean many things. It could mean awareness of tactile qualities, bodily sensations, emotions, moods, awareness in general and the like. Scientifically 'feeling' will mean modes of awareness, which express our own state and are not directed at a certain object. In all likelihood, life started in its evolutionary process with feeling – a succession of agreeable and disagreeable sensations. Much later in evolution, when intentional capacities have developed, the feeling dimension became a part of a complex mental state with intentional dimension. We may not find a pure feeling without intentionality or pure intentionality without feeling. In fact all mental states are complex experiences, which typically include both feeling and intentionality. Often we describe emotions as feelings, and feelings as emotions. For example, when I say I feel guilty it is equal to saying that I am having the emotion of guilt. It is not merely a sensation of feeling but also there is the element of intentionality.

Because of the urgency and exceptional nature of emotional situations, feelings are more noticeable and intense in emotions than in most other mental states. For our own survival and well being, it is very important that we are aware of the sudden changes associated with emotions, and so feelings which are part of emotions play a crucial role in this respect. It would amount to a mistake to equate feeling with emotion since emotions have the intentional components besides the feelings. Psychologists usually make this point by pointing out the difference between sexual pleasure and sexual desire. Sexual pleasure is basically a feeling that indicates the

pleasant situation while having sex, imagining having sex, or artificially stimulating the physiological basis underlying sexual activity. On the contrary, sexual desire is a complex emotion having intentional components directed at a certain object. Mere feelings are more localized in space and time and are not intentional. They are more passive states than emotions. Thus we may experience and identify feelings typical of a certain emotion without experiencing the emotion itself. It is proved that although many emotions include a variety of feelings within their scope, their range is generally restricted to a particular set of characteristic feelings. We should also remember that not every feeling could be linked with every emotion.

Some might understand feelings as having an evaluative component, with pain involving a negative evaluation; and pleasure, a positive evaluation. Let us take the example of pain experience, which includes affective attitudes, such as fear, anxiety, and hostility, which are intentional since they involve a certain evaluation. But feelings themselves are not intentional: feelings do not have cognitive content describing a certain state; feelings are merely an initial expression of our current state. Pain or pleasure is an inherent property of feeling. The painful sensation of a physical hurt on the leg does not mean that the hurt is an intentional state evaluating the condition of the hurt. It is one's self-perception of the condition of the hurt, which includes a negative evaluation of the situation. Even though feeling is understood as value-laden, it is not an intentional state in the sense of having inherently a certain evaluation.⁵

5. INTERRELATEDNESS OF THE COMPONENTS

One wonders what comes logically first among the various components. Definitely, cognition should come first. There can be no evaluation without information (cognition) and no motivation without evaluation. To evaluate we need certain information. Evaluation is in terms of positive or negative and is likely to be expressed by a certain motivation. But the feeling component is understood to have no logical connection with the intentional components, but is associated with them in typical emotions. The connection between cognition and other components is contingent in the sense that the one and the same

cognitive content may give rise to different evaluations, motivations, and feelings. But the link (between the evaluative and the motivational and feeling components) appears to be more rigid since these three components are correlated with the positive or negative nature of the emotion. To illustrate what we have so far said would be to take the example of meeting a person. We perceive the individual and have information about the individual. This knowledge may be evaluated in different ways. We may evaluate the person as a potential sexual partner or a hostile enemy. Accordingly our motivation will follow: in the former case we approach the person, and in the latter we attack the person. Depending upon what evaluation we had and what course of action we have taken, we will have a corresponding feeling. In the former we have a pleasant feeling and in the latter unpleasantness. Thus we realize that cognition comes first and is not very strictly connected to the other three components; and the other three components are closely linked with the evaluative component taking the lead followed by the motivational component and the feeling component.⁶

6. INDIVIDUALIZATION OF EMOTIONS

Let us consider what the most important component in emotions is. Even though cognition is prior to all the rest, it does not constitute the most important component. The quality of emotion is determined by the evaluative component. Perception is a cognitive state. When we perceive something we are said to be aware of a particular content. Although an emotion involves some type of awareness, it is not merely a mode of awareness in the same way as perception. We know for certain that only changes generate emotions and the significance of change is determined by evaluation. Therefore reference to the cognitive content is not sufficient for the distinction between different emotions. It is the evaluative component that distinguishes or individualizes emotions.

It is the cognitive component that allows for the greatest variation concerning the nature of the given emotion since the same piece of information can evoke different emotions. If you take the motivational and feeling components, they can specify the positive or negative nature of a given emotion better than the cognitive component but they may not specify the unique nature

of a given emotion. The motivational and feeling components can only indicate the positive or the negative nature of an emotion. It is the evaluative component that specifies even the least variation and thus determines the uniqueness of a given emotion. It might happen that over a long period of time a certain emotion may be changed, as for example, once you loved your friend but now you dislike him/her. Definitely there should have been an evaluative change in you, otherwise there is no reason why your love should change into dislike. The evaluative component is necessary only for the identification of the nature of emotion. Although we need all the four basic components, they do not constitute sufficient condition for generating emotions, for even when these four are present no emotion may yet be generated because these components are not of the required intensity, or some other characteristic(s) of emotions are not present. An emotion is a complex state and it includes a subtle equilibrium of all the components and characteristics. Every emotional factor is said to be having a certain weight. Any increase in any one of the factors may unbalance the subtle emotional equilibrium. It is also possible that we evaluate some aspects of a given situation positively and some other aspects negatively. Therefore we may not always have the global correlation between evaluation, motivation, and feelings. In this case we may have a mixed feeling. A client I was counselling in a mental hospital was happy and excited to leave the hospital and go home and at the same time she was unhappy to leave her companions with whom she had lived a few years.⁷

4

AFFECTIVE PHENOMENA

Affective phenomena include emotions, sentiments, moods, mood disorders and affective traits. We have already seen what emotions are in the first two chapters. Now let us consider the other affective phenomena of human life. We intend to clarify the differences among affective phenomena.

Whenever we deal with the affective reality we need to keep in mind the two basic mental dimensions of intentionality and feeling. Thus the affective phenomena we are about to deal with have an inherent positive or negative evaluation (intentionality) and a significant feeling component. What distinguishes an affective phenomenon from a nonaffective one, are intentionality and feeling. We have already seen that intentionality and feeling distinguish not only affective from nonaffective phenomena but also the various phenomena within the affective realm.¹

1. CRITERIA OF DISTINGUISHING AFFECTIVE PHENOMENA

Affective phenomena can be understood in terms of 1. the specific or general type of evaluation involved and 2. the occurrent or dispositional nature of the given phenomena. If you take the first pair, there will be difference in the degree of specificity of the intentional object. Some evaluations focus on a specific object, and others may be more diffuse, having quite a general intentional object. A mental state can be distinguished by occurrent (actual) and dispositional (potential) properties. Many mental features of our life are not actualised at any given moment and so they are unconscious. They are known to be dispositional in the sense they represent tendencies to become occurrent states (actual) of a certain kind in a given circumstance. The difference between occurrent and dispositional is like act and potency in philosophy. When a particular circumstance is materialized, the dispositional state is actualised. Even if the mental dispositions are not actualised, they

nevertheless have an actual supportive neural basis. The disposition may also be expressed in actual mental features, although the presence of these features does not as yet constitute the actualised state pertaining to this disposition.

Beliefs and desires, which are intentional states, can be dispositional in the sense that even if at the moment one does not attend to this belief or desire, one is said to be still having it. But feeling is not dispositional; either I have, or do not have a feeling. When sentiments or affective traits are described as dispositional, it means that a certain individual having a sentiment need not have an occurrent state of that sentiment. In such dispositional attitudes, we are easily disposed to reach an attitude with an occurrent feeling dimension.²

2. BASIC TYPES OF AFFECTIVE PHENOMENA

When we combine the criteria for distinguishing the various affective phenomena (specific or general type of evaluation and occurrent or dispositional nature), we get four possible combinations, which can be considered as the basic types of affective phenomena: 1. specific intentionality, occurrent state = emotions, such as envy, anger, guilt, and sexual desire; 2. specific intentionality, dispositional state = sentiments, such as enduring love or grief; 3. general intentionality, occurrent state = moods, such as being cheerful, satisfied, 'blue,' and gloomy; and 4. general intentionality, dispositional state = affective traits, such as shyness and enviousness. In general we can say that emotions and moods, which are occurrent states, are relatively short, whereas sentiments and affective traits, which are essentially dispositional, last for a longer period. Thus emotions last a few minutes. Moods last for hours, days, weeks, and sometimes even for months. Sentiments however last for weeks, months, or even many years. But affective traits can last for a lifetime. Thus we find that the shortest period of experience is for emotion and it gradually increases to moods, sentiments and affective traits. If we take feelings, they do not have evaluative component. Pain and pleasure are inherent properties of feeling, but they are not said to be intentional states evaluating the condition of our body. Therefore feelings are components in affective attitudes; but they are not as such attitudes in themselves. Mood disorders such as depression and anxiety disorders do not clearly fit in either group

of affective phenomena in the sense their intentionality is not typically specific or general and likewise they are not typically dispositional or occurrent. They come in between.³

Basic Types of Affective Phenomena			
Affective Phenomena	Intentionality	State	Examples
1. Emotions	Specific intentionality	Occurrent state	Envy, anger, guilt, and sexual desire
2. Sentiments	Specific intentionality	Dispositional state	Enduring love or grief
3. Moods	General intentionality	Occurrent state	Being cheerful, satisfied, 'blue,' and gloomy
4. Affective Traits	General intentionality	Dispositional state	Shyness and enviousness

3. EMOTIONS

To summarize what we have hitherto learned about emotions: Emotions are characterized by specific intentionality and occurrent (actual) nature, partial in the sense that they are focused on specific objects like one person or a very few individuals, occurrent states, and their feeling dimension is intense and acute. If there is a low intensity of the feeling dimension then it expresses neutral or indifferent states, which are the opposite of emotional states.

Because of the specific intentionality and intense nature, emotions typically last for a brief period. Since in emotion we focus on one specific object, the focusing cannot go on for a long period. By nature it has to reach a climax and decline. But how to understand when people report that they entertain anger, fear or joy for a long time, say, for hours and even a day? We need to understand that in principle emotions cannot last long. But emotional episodes can last longer in the sense emotional episodes are experienced intermittently and can go on for a long time. The successive phases are felt by people as belonging to the one and the

same emotion (continuously). In fact they are intermittent states of the same feeling and they are separate emotional episodes, which are felt as one single emotion.⁴

4. SENTIMENTS

When emotional episodes are extended we have sentiments. Emotional experiences and emotional episodes too belong to the same category. But when the emotional episodes get prolonged then they are known as sentiments. As we notice on the chart of emotional phenomena, what distinguishes emotions from sentiments is the dispositional state. Both emotions and sentiments have specific intentionality but emotions are occurrent and sentiments are dispositional. When compared to affective traits, which are general dispositions having usually some innate basis, sentiments have more specific dispositions since sentiments are generated and maintained by a specific object or event. Even though sentiments and emotions have specific intentionality, sentiments have their intentional object more general than the emotions. Thus sentiments, which are more stable states than emotions, are related more to ongoing processes than to specific transient events.

To understand the difference between affective traits, sentiments and emotions, it is good to think of their nature. Emotions are particular, sentiments are general, and affective traits are more general. Let us take for example jealousy. A tendency to jealousy, which is an affective trait, is the disposition to become jealous irrespective of the situation or persons. The individual is prone to jealousy in any situation or with any person. Jealousy toward someone, which is a sentiment, is the disposition to become jealous with one particular person whether that person possessed or did not possess anything to provoke jealousy. Jealousy to someone who possessed something one does not have is an example of an emotion. If we want to understand them in terms of intensity: emotions are intense, sentiments are less intense and affective traits are least intense. Emotions and sentiments are similar in mainly two respects. Both of them are caused by significant changes and both of them have typical objects such as a human being or more generally a living creature. Their differences can be understood by studying this table.⁵

1) Sentiment-Emotion Comparison

Sentiment-Emotion Comparison		
	Sentiment	Emotion
Intensity	Less	More
Duration	Long	Short
Components	Three components: cognition, evaluation and motivation	Four components: cognition, evaluation, motivation and feeling
Responses	Responses to situations of long duration	Responses to temporary situations

Sometimes people report that their love, grief or regret grows more intense as time goes by. First of all we should remember that they are not emotions but sentiments. Secondly there could be many other reasons for their increase in intensity; as for example, certain sentiments increase because of familiarity; changes could have generated different evaluative perspective; and emotional object could have gained different meaning. Nevertheless the increase in the intensity of a given sentiment does not contradict the brief nature of emotions. We also speak of emotional people and sentimental people. Emotional people are those who frequently experience intense emotions. Their sensitivity is focused on their immediate environment and so everything in that environment is perceived as very urgent, whereas sentimental people may be calmer in the short run, but their emotional ties are deeper.⁶

5. MOODS

In popular parlance 'mood' may mean many things, perhaps embracing the entire feeling continuum. But strictly speaking moods are general background frameworks of the feeling dimension. Feelings are localized like headaches and toothaches and not intentional, but moods are intentional but not localized. Nevertheless the intentionality of moods is not as complex and specific as that of emotions. It is so primitive a type that the intentional object is diffuse and difficult even to specify. It is not

surprising that moods seem to be objectless. However diffuse it is, there exists some degree of intentionality, which is absent from feelings. This intentionality expresses the subject's own situation and in this sense moods are similar to feelings. Thus the subject-object relationship that is a major concern in emotions is not that important in moods. Because of the less specific nature of moods, they are relatively longer and milder in intensity than emotions. Therefore moods have to do with larger, longer-lasting issues about the individual's life as compared with the more specific events generating emotions. Since larger issues are involved in moods, they are not effecting a significant change in one's situation and so they do not generate intense emotions. That is why while emotions have unique facial expressions, moods do not have any particular facial expression that is universally accepted. If we consider the affective cause, the typical cause of emotion is a specific change that is unexpected and urgent whereas for the moods it is less specific and less urgent, occurring over a slower time course. In this way, weather can often affect mood: a rainy day can produce a depressed mood. It is also possible that moods are generated in a cumulative fashion over a period of time: small doses of mild negative interactions will cumulatively produce a negative mood over the course of a day.⁷

1) Mood-Emotion Comparison

Mood-Emotion Comparison		
	Mood	Emotion
Intentionality	Primitive type, intentional object is diffuse and difficult to specify	Complex and specific
Intensity	Less	More
Issues about (concern)	Larger issues	More specific events
Intensity	Less	More
Facial expressions with signal value	No such universally accepted facial expressions	Unique facial expressions

Cause	Less specific and urgent, occurring over a slower time course	Specific significant change which is usually unexpected and urgent
Subject-object distinction	Less important, seems objectless	Important
Duration	Longer lasting	Short

2) Mood-Feeling Comparison

Mood-Feeling Comparison		
	Mood	Feeling
Localization	Non-localized	Localized like headache and toothache
Intentionality	Intentional	Non-intentional

6. AFFECTIVE TRAITS

Affective traits are known to be those aspects of personality which can last a lifetime; they indicate a tendency to behave in an affective manner. For example: shyness, enviousness, and benevolence are affective traits. They are like personality traits but not all personality traits are affective traits like achievement-striving, self-discipline and dutifulness. Some personality theories refer to neuroticism, extroversion, openness and agreeableness as affective traits. Affective traits differ from emotions in not being so responsive to contextual features and they last longer than any other affective phenomenon. For example, the affective trait of shyness implies a tendency to social anxiety or fear and it accompanies the person all through.⁸

7. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS

Affective disorders such as depression, mania, and anxiety are extreme, or even pathological, instances of the four basic types

of affective phenomena (emotions, sentiments, moods and affective traits). In terms of intentionality and the occurrent or dispositional nature, affective disorders have less specific intentionality than emotions, but are more specific than moods. They are less dispositional than sentiments and affective traits, but are considered more dispositional than emotions and moods. Mood and affective disorders are closer to each other. Yet there are some differences like affective disorders lasting longer and being more intense and pervasive. Moods provide the affective background or tone of experiences, which are relatively stable, but affective disorders are at the very centre of the affective experience.⁹

1) Affective Disorders-Moods Comparison

Affective Disorders-Moods Comparison		
	Affective Disorders	Moods
Intensity	More Intense	Short
Duration	Longer	Brief
Nature	They are at the very centre of the affective experience	Provides affective background or tone of experiences which remain relatively stable

2) Affective Disorders-Emotions Comparison

Affective Disorders-Emotions Comparison		
	Affective Disorders	Emotions
Intensity	More intense	Less intense
Duration	Long-term state	Short-term state
Overall magnitude	Higher	Low
Intentional&Feeling Dimensions	The feeling dimension is dominant in such a way that it reduces the scope and complexity of intentional components	There is a balance between the intentional and feeling dimension

Effect on our conditions	Pervasive having profound and far-reaching effects on our conditions	Not pervasive and has less far-reaching effects on our conditions
Stability	They express higher stability of the system (but this stability is pathological since it involves a highly intense and pervasive feeling component)	Express some instability of the mental system
Changes	They are usually longer-lasting affective attitudes resisting further changes and interruptions	They are associated with changes and interruptions
Maintenance	They can be maintained over a longer period without apparent connection to external events	They can be maintained only for a while with apparent connection to external events

3) Adaptive Function of Affective Disorders

When we take into account the adaptive function of affective disorders we may find that there are three possibilities: 1. exaggerations of normal affective responses such as emotions or moods, 2. subspecialized adaptations, or 3. pathological states unrelated to normal emotions. The more exaggerated the response, the more pathological is the state. Because of the intense feeling component or an excessive focus on one issue typical of emotional disorders, normal functioning is impeded. The feeling component, which is more pervasive and more intense than in emotions and also longer lasting, indicates its pathological nature.¹⁰

To recapitulate what we have seen about affective disorders, we can say that the cause of affective disorders is less associated with specific changes than the cause of emotions. The focus of concern is less comparative and social; it refers more to personal, existential issues. Since their intentional dimension is more diffuse, the object of affective disorders is more problematic to define. They are more stable, more intense, and more general and of longer duration compared to emotions. The feeling component is by far more dominant than the intentional one.

5

CLASSIFICATION OF EMOTIONS

For greater understanding of the nature of emotions, it is good to classify them. There are many classifications of emotions. Classification is required for the sake of reducing the varieties of emotions. The classification should clarify the nature of each emotion and its relationship to others. In this chapter I would like to follow a comprehensive classification done by Aaron Ben-Ze'ev.

1. VARIOUS CLASSIFICATIONS

One of the classifications is by referring either to 1. our own state, or 2. the emotional object. When we classify emotions in terms of our own state, we are doing it by the feeling dimension. In this case we may classify emotions by virtue of their being species of joy or sorrow, by dividing them into calm and violent emotions or by the proportion they contain of the two main aspects of the feeling dimension which are pleasure-displeasure and arousal-calmness. Here definitely the intentional dimension, which will refer to the emotional object, is missing. Therefore several attempts were made taking into account the emotional object and thus they contain the intentional components of emotions.

One such classification categorizes emotions into 'backward-looking' (anger and shame) and 'forward-looking' (fear and hope). Most emotions are of course backward-looking emotions in that the eliciting event has already occurred. Forward-looking emotions focus on the future event. But emotions like love and sexual desire contain elements of both groups and cannot be said to belong to one particular category. Therefore one classification categorized emotions as retrospective, immediate and prospective emotions. This classification though good in itself is limited because the temporal criterion used is not central to emotional experience. What is more important in emotions is the eliciting event with significance.¹

2. AARON BEN-ZE'EV'S CLASSIFICATION

The classification of emotions ²									
Emotional evaluations of									
	Fortunes of agents (desirability of)				Actions of agents (praiseworthiness of)				The agent as a whole (appealingness of)
	Oneself		Others		One-self	Others	The agent as a whole (appealingness of)		
	Actual	Possible	Good	Bad			One-self	Other agents	
Positive:	Happiness	Hope	Happy-for	Pleasure-in-others' -misfortune	Pride	Gratitude	Pride-fulness	Love	Sexual desire
Negative:	Sadness	Fear	Envy	Pity	Regret	Anger	Shame	Hate	Disgust

Note: Love, hate, pridefulness and shame are not only influenced by actions of agents (praiseworthiness of) but also by the agent as a whole (appealingness of). They are conjointly produced by the praiseworthiness and appealingness of the agent.

The classification I present here is that of Aaron Ben-Ze'ev. It comprises features referring to both our own state and the emotional object based on the distinguishing components of emotions, that is, the evaluative component. Here two distinguishing features of emotional evaluations are used: 1. their positive or negative nature, and 2. their object. Thus the first feature expresses the evaluation of our own state, and the second describes different types of emotional objects.

Since we are involved in emotions and in what is going on, emotions cannot be neutral. They must be either positive or negative. This reflects our basic attitude in evaluating a given

situation when we make a positive-negative distinction. Thus positive emotions express a favourable evaluation, a positive desire, and an agreeable feeling. The negative emotions express an unfavourable attitude, a negative motivation and a disagreeable feeling. Therefore all emotions are in a way described as liking or disliking of something. The positive-negative polarity of emotional states as shown in the table does not constitute diametrical opposites, as for example, anger is not the opposite of gratitude. This division is made merely by the basic evaluation underlying the emotion and not necessarily connected with the distinction of emotions according to their functional or moral value.³

1) Positive-Negative Attitudes

The classification presented here is not only determined by one's positive or negative attitude but also by the multiple types of objects characteristic of emotional evaluations. The emotional object is an actual or fictional agent who may be another person (or another living creature in general), or the individual experiencing the emotion. Since the agents are the emotional objects, emotions may be sorted into three groups according to 1. fortunes of agents, 2. actions of agents, and 3. the agent as a whole. Each of these groups can be further divided into emotions directed at other agents and at oneself.

These groups are supposed to express three basic patterns involved in evaluating agents: 1. desirability of the agent's situation; 2. praiseworthiness of the agent's specific actions; 3. appealingness of the agent. These three evaluative patterns are sometimes interdependent. Desirability may depend on praiseworthiness and appealingness; appealingness sometimes may depend on desirability. Not only the nature of the emotion in question but also its intensity is determined by these three basic evaluative patterns.⁴

2) Major Evaluative Patterns

The major evaluative pattern in the group of emotions directed at the fortune of agents is the desirability of the given situation. This is again divided into emotions directed at others and those directed at oneself, and again divided into those directed at the bad or good fortune of others and those directed at actual or possible

fortunes for ourselves. These can be either positive or negative emotions. The major evaluative pattern in the second group of emotions directed at specific actions of agents deals with the approval or disapproval (praiseworthiness of these actions). Again they can be the ones directed towards oneself or others and they in turn can be either positive or negative. The major evaluative pattern in the third group of emotions directed at the agent as a whole is its attractiveness or repulsiveness. This group of emotions includes comprehensive evaluation of the agent. Here again they can be divided into emotions directed at oneself or others, which in turn are divided into positive or negative. Another subgroup of emotions directed at the agent as a whole is supposed to be more primitive emotions, which are mere attraction and repulsion.⁵

3. BASIC AND NONBASIC EMOTIONS

Classification into basic and nonbasic emotions is seen as central by many theorists. 'Basic' means simple, as opposed to complex. Any emotion is a simple irreducible emotion, or it can be analysed as a simple emotion plus 'something,' where 'something' is either another emotion or some nonemotional element. For example, embarrassment might be analysed as fear plus anger or, alternatively, fear plus the self-evaluation of being the object of unwanted attention. Criteria for simple or basic emotions vary from one theory to another. Nevertheless the following list shows representative criteria for considering some emotions as basic:

1. development – early emergence in human evolutionary or individual development;
2. function – possession of functional value related to basic forms of action tendencies in individual and reproductive survival;
3. universality – universality among humans;
4. prevalence – most frequent occurrence as compared to other emotions;
5. uniqueness – possession of unique features of physiology, expression, phenomenology;
6. intentionality – occurrence without specific intentional objects.

1) Development

According to the developmental criterion, emotions developed gradually in the sense that the basic emotions appeared before nonbasic ones. On account of evolution there had been creatures with hardly more than sensitivity to pleasure and painful elicitors to those with several basic emotions, such as enjoyment, sadness, anger, fear, and disgust, and (in mammals) the emotions of attachment. Even in our individual development we have a comparable progression. At birth, infants have general distress and general pleasure; disgust is also noticed in the first few days of life. The emergence of sadness is at the age of three months. Then come anger and fear. The nonbasic emotions that appear first like embarrassment, envy, and empathy emerge only in the later half of the second year of life.

2) Function

The functional criterion is closely related to the developmental criterion. Because of the important and recurring situational demands, the basic emotions developed first in evolution.

3) Universality

According to the universality criterion, basic emotions should be present in all humans. If an emotion were to be universal, what makes it universal is its presence in all humans.

4) Prevalence

According to the prevalence criterion basic emotions occur most frequently, as compared to other emotions. The reason is rather clear that at the early stages of development, basic emotions were in practice the only emotional reactions and so they had to appear quite frequently.

5) Uniqueness

The fact that emotions have unique manifestations in several realms is the uniqueness criterion. They express in physiology, facial expression, and phenomenology. Primitive emotional reactions to specific emotional requirements are hard-wired and expressed in some unique ways. The purpose of these reactions is to provide a quick and readymade response to certain situations. The speed is

achieved by having a somewhat rigid response. Thus basic emotions (having a simpler structure) express a more rigid pairing of a specific stimulus with a specific response. But more complex emotions, which are developed later, express a more flexible and a less rigid emotional response.

6) Intentionality

The criterion of intentionality suggests that emotions can have an elaborate intentional structure. Intentionality is the ability of a cognitive agent to separate itself from immediate stimuli and to create a meaningful subject-object relation. Complex intentionality such as thinking and complex types of imagination is only typical of nonbasic emotions. Basic emotions may have more primitive forms of intentionality. Thus, emotional development proceeds from a state of general excitement to one of more specific emotions. When we are born, most affective attitudes of ours were undifferentiated. It takes time for the process of differentiation and integration to take place. Therefore a criterion for an emotion to be basic is that it can occur without intentional content. For example, happiness, sadness, anger, and fear can occur without any object and they are basic. By contrast, complex emotions such as envy are always intentional based on complex comparison, and developed more recently in evolution.⁶

6

EMOTIONAL INTENSITY

In our day-to-day language we make use of words that indicate the intensity of emotions. One may say that one is deeply in love with another or terribly anxious. Let us clarify what ‘emotional intensity’ means and what makes it.

1. COMPLEXITY OF EMOTIONAL INTENSITY

When we analyse the various features of emotional intensity, they are focused on two basic aspects: magnitude (peak intensity) and temporal structure (mainly duration). If for example, your love for your beloved is strong but lasts only a few minutes, we need to conclude that your love is weak compared to love of a similar magnitude lasting for a longer duration. The two basic aspects of emotional intensity, namely peak intensity, and duration are understood in each of the four basic emotional components: cognition, evaluation, motivation and feeling. Therefore, when we speak of peak intensity and duration of an emotion, we do it in terms of cognitive preoccupation, extremity of evaluation, urge to act, and a certain feeling. Therefore the two aspects of the four components express highly significant emotional events. Psychologically an emotional state of great intensity is to be understood as a state in which the two aspects of the basic four components, or a certain combined measure of them, have high values. Emotional intensity is considered to be a property of the agent experiencing the emotion and not of the event giving rise to the emotion.

We can recognize that the aspects of peak intensity and duration are related to the partiality of emotions. Emotions with a more partial focus are usually associated with greater peak intensity and shorter duration than the more general emotions. If you take anger and sexual desire, they express more partial concern than hate and love and have a stronger momentary magnitude but are of

a shorter duration. If we take the feeling component in sexual desire, it expresses itself in short outbursts of intense feelings, whereas in love the peak intensity of the feeling is lower, but lasts for a longer period of time.¹

2. INTENSITY VARIABLES

Emotions are caused by significant changes but the intensity of emotions depends on the way in which we evaluate the significance of the change or events. The intensity variables may be divided into two major groups. One of them refers to the perceived impact of the event eliciting the emotional state, and the other to the background circumstances of the agents involved in the emotional state. The variables pertaining to the impact of the event are 1. strength, 2. reality, and 3. relevance of the event while those constituting the background circumstances are 1. accountability, 2. readiness, and 3. deservingness.²

Event Emotional Intensity Variables	1. Impact of the event	1. Strength	
		2. Reality	1. Ontological
			2. Epistemological
	3. Relevance of the event	1. Achievement of our goals	
		2. Our self-esteem	
	2. Background circumstances of the agents	1.Accountability	1. Degree of controllability
2. Invested effort			
3. Intent			
2. Readiness		1. Unexpectedness	
		2. Uncertainty	
3. Deservingness			

3. IMPACT OF THE EVENT³

1) Strength

Strength refers to the extent of the impact. For example, the greater the extent of the misfortune, the greater is the intensity.

Usually there is a positive correlation between the strength of the event, as we perceive it, and emotional intensity. The positive correlation does not mean that the intensity is proportional to the increase in the strength of the event. The emotional intensity rises to a point with increase in the given variable and from there it does not change with an increase in the given variable. It is like emotion reaching an orgasm and from that point it cannot rise further in spite of increasing stimuli.

2) Reality

Depending upon our belief about the realness of the situation, the intensity increases. That is, the more we believe the situation to be real, the more intense the emotion is. The ontological sense refers to whether the event actually exists or is merely imaginary. The epistemological sense refers to the relationships of the event to other events. The epistemological sense relies on the vividness of the object. For example, a picture or a film about an accident will evoke greater intensity of emotion than mere report. Works of art may elicit intense emotions in us. In considering works of art, we usually attribute some kind of existence to them. For example, we may grieve the death of the protagonist of a novel even though we know that such a character did not exist in reality. In that situation we have attributed some existence to the character and that is why we feel sad at the death of the character in the novel or movie.

3) Relevance

Relevance determines the significance of an emotional encounter. It refers to either 1. to the achievement of our goals (goal relevance), or 2. to our self-esteem. Goal relevance indicates to what extent a given change promotes or hinders our performance or the attainment of specific significant goals. Usually changes, which promote our goal achievement, are associated with positive emotions and vice versa. Our self-esteem plays an important role in emotions. For example we do not envy the strength of the mountains or of elephants since they are irrelevant to our personal self-esteem. Relevance also applies to closeness and similarity in background. Events close to us in time, space, or effect are usually emotionally relevant too. As an example of similarity in background, we can think of envying persons who are of our status.

4. BACKGROUND CIRCUMSTANCES⁴

Background circumstance variable comprises accountability, readiness, and deservingness. Accountability involves who was responsible for the emotional change, readiness involves the agent's preparedness for the change, and deservingness involves the normative issue of whether the agent has deserved the specific emotional change.

1) Accountability

The issues relevant in accountability are 1. degree of controllability, 2. invested effort and 3. intent. There is a positive correlation between emotional intensity and controllability. We may overestimate our degree of control over positive outcomes and underestimate our control over negative outcomes. On the contrary we underestimate the degree of control of others over positive outcomes and overestimate their control over negative outcomes. If a student got very good marks in a particular subject, he/she would say that he/she worked hard and earned the marks; when he/she failed miserably, he/she would say that the teacher was unfair. On the contrary if the student were to make a judgement about the marks of another student, he/she would say when seeing a good mark that the teacher was too lenient to the student and if that student had failed miserably, he/she would say that the student was a lazy person and so did not do well in the exam. Effort refers to the extent of involvement in the generation of emotions. It includes physical and mental effort, as well as investment of all types of resources. Intent is a constituting factor in accountability. If a person intended to do something, then his/her involvement and responsibility will be greater than when the event happened without his/her prior intention. Accordingly, the emotional intensity is greater.

2) Readiness

Readiness indicates the cognitive change in one's mind. Major factors in this are 1. unexpectedness (or anticipation) and 2. uncertainty. Unexpectedness is known by the surprise we have by the situation and is central in emotions. Emotions are created by sudden change, which is unexpectedness and is positively correlated with intensity to a certain point. When you expected just to pass in

the exam, you got the first rank, then it is unexpected and the intensity of emotion increases. Uncertainty is positively correlated with emotional intensity. The more we are uncertain that the eliciting event will occur, the more we are surprised at its actual occurrence and the more the emotional intensity accompanying it. When you were caught up in a flood, you were not sure if you would survive and if you are saved by chance, your joy would be greater.

3) Deservingness

The nature and intensity of emotions are determined also by deservingness (equity, fairness) of our situation. We do not want to be treated unjustly, or receive what is contrary to our wish. The more the situation deviates from our baseline, the more we consider the negative situation to be unfair, or the positive situation to be lucky. Let us take an example of you going for a conference where you were not treated fairly accordingly to your education. This markedly deviates from the baseline of deservingness. Corresponding to the deviation, you have anger; supposing you were treated very royally beyond your expectation markedly deviating your baseline, then you have greater joy.

7

THE EMERGENCE OF EMOTIONS

Humans are capable of self-awareness: I know that I know. In the same way I am also aware of others or other objects. The first one is called self-awareness and the second one is called other-awareness. After infancy we not only feel an emotion, we also know that we are feeling an emotion. That is why we are able to report, anticipate, hide, and alter the emotional state. When we are aware of the emotions of others we can comfort them or upset them and may also realize the emotional repercussions we may have for ourselves like feelings of guilt, apprehension, and gratitude.

Humans have a wide variety of emotional experiences and expressions. We are interested in knowing how these emotions emerge and when they start emerging in human life. If you observe newborn infants you will find a rather narrow range of emotional behaviour. When infants are in need of food and attention they cry, and show distress when pained and lonely. If you closely observe them you will find that they are attentive and focused on objects and people around them. They not only look at objects but also listen to sounds and turn their heads towards the direction of sounds and respond to tickle sensations. They also seem to show positive emotions like happiness and contentment. You can expect contentment, smile and relaxed body posture when they are fed, picked up, or changed. They are also known to show a wide range of postural and even facial expressions but they only exhibit a rather limited set of discrete emotions. Surprisingly, by the end of three years, they display a wide range of emotions so much so they show almost the full range of adult emotions.¹

1. EMOTIONAL STATES

We mean by the term 'emotion' a class of elicitors, behaviours, states, and experiences. Emotional states are in fact inferred constructs. They are defined as particular constellations of changes

in somatic and/or neurophysiological activity. It is also possible that one may be sad as a consequence of a particular elicitor and yet not be aware of the sad state in which one is. Thus emotional states can be present without the organism's being able to perceive these states. Typically emotional states may involve changes in neurophysiological and hormonal responses and there are also changes in facial, bodily and vocal behaviour.

We can demonstrate that specific states elicit specific emotions. To illustrate this, take the theory of innate releasing mechanisms (IRMs), which says that animals will show a fear response, given a particular stimulus event. At the same time, we know that certain specific emotions can be produced only through cognitive processes. In this case, certain elicitors invoke cognitive processes, which in turn elicit specific emotional states. Let us take the emotion of pride. For the elicitation of pride there should precede a cognitive process of evaluation.²

2. A MODEL OF EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Development of emotions ³	
Period	Emotions
At birth	Contentment, interest, distress
3 months	Joy, surprise, sadness, disgust
4-6 months	Anger
7-8 months or even earlier	Fear
Second half of second year	(Self conscious emotions) Consciousness, as in self-referential behaviour, embarrassment, envy, empathy
1- 2 years	(Intentionality)They think that their own action can initiate or assuage the emotional expression of others
2-3 years	They think that being happy or not depends on whether you get what you want or not

2½ -3 years	(Self conscious evaluative emotions) Acquisition and retention of standards and rules Embarrassment, pride, shame, guilt
4-5 years	They understand the fit between desire and assumed outcome They think that by unfair means one can be happy (e.g. stealing) They think that emotions can be hidden
7-8 years	They think that unfair means do not make one happy
8-9 years	They think that emotions are single valenced (one situation provokes one emotion)
9-10 years	They think that emotion can be double valenced (the same situation can provoke opposite emotions)

3. PRIMARY EMOTIONS

To trace the emotional development, we take the first 3 years of life. The majority of adult emotions do emerge and develop during this period. We should also keep in mind that there are emotions that emerge past 3 years of age and that the emotions that have emerged become elaborated more fully. At birth the child only shows a bipolar emotional life. On the one hand, we notice a general distress marked by crying and irritability; on the other, we notice pleasure marked by satiation, attention, and responsiveness to the environment. From the beginning of life, we notice attention to the environment and interest in it.

At the age of 3 months, infants show joyful expressions: they start to smile and appear to show excitement/happiness especially when they see familiar and unfamiliar faces. They also show sadness especially when their mothers stop interacting with them. Disgust can be perceived in its primitive form by spitting out and getting rid of unpleasant-tasting objects placed in the mouth. Thus children of 3 months age express interest, joy, sadness and disgust in appropriate contexts.

Between 4 and 6 months, anger is seen to emerge, especially when children are frustrated as for example when their hands and arms are pinned down and they are prevented from moving. Some psychologists also report that anger can be perceived in 2-month-old infants. At about 7 to 8 months children show fearfulness. To experience fearfulness there should be a cognitive development. Children should have the capacity to compare the event that causes them fearfulness with some other event, either internal or external. For example, in fear of stranger, an infant has to compare the face of the stranger to its internal representation or memory of faces. Fear will occur when the face is found to be discrepant with, or unfamiliar, relative to all other faces that the child remembers. Some psychologists also believe that in precocious children fearfulness may appear even earlier. It has been reported that by the first 8 or 9 months the primary emotions or basic emotions do emerge.

In the first 6 months children show surprise. When there is a violation of expected events children show surprise. For example, an unusually large human person walks towards the child, the child shows surprise rather than fear or joy. Surprise can also be seen when children experience discovery. When children learn that doing something will produce certain effect, they are surprised. Thus surprise is displayed either when there is a violation or a confirmation of expectancy. Definitely cognitive processes, which are limited, play an important role in the elicitation of these early emotions.⁴

4. SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTIONS

'Self-conscious emotions' emerge sometime in the second half of the second year of life. Here there is a new cognitive capacity: the emergence of consciousness or objective self-awareness (self-referential behaviour) brings about a new class of emotions known as 'self-conscious emotions.' They are embarrassment, empathy, and envy. Embarrassment can take place only after consciousness or self-recognition occurs. Likewise there is the emergence of empathy and envy related to the emergence of self-recognition. There are two things to be noted regarding self-conscious emotions. First, these new emotions cannot only be observed in facial expression but also in bodily and vocal behaviour. Thus for example, embarrassment is observed by nervous touching, smiling, gaze aversion, and return behaviours. Secondly, although these emotions

reflect self-consciousness, they do not require self-evaluation. At this level children have achieved the development of paying attention to the self.⁵

5. SELF-CONSCIOUS EVALUATIVE EMOTIONS

Around 2 to 3 years of age, children experience 'self-conscious evaluative emotions.' This development indicates the child's ability to evaluate its behaviour against a standard; the standard can be external, as in the case of parental or teacher sanction or praise, or it can be internal, as in the case of the child's developing its own standards. These self-conscious evaluative emotions include pride, shame, and guilt, among others. Typically these emotions require that a child have a sense of self and be capable of comparing the self's behaviour against standards. The emotional life of a child is highly differentiated by the age of 3 years. The child has got an elaborate and complex emotional system. Of course, these emotions will be elaborated with experience but the basic structures necessary for the expansion have been laid. Definitely new experiences, additional meaning, and more elaborate cognitive capacities will enhance and elaborate the emotional life of a child.⁶

6. INTENTIONALITY

Infants are known to resonate appropriately (in the first year of life) to the emotional expression of other people. But they do not realize yet that their own actions can initiate or assuage the emotional expression of others. That is why in the first year infants do not attempt to comfort or deliberately upset another person. In the second year of life, infants are known to make rudimentary efforts to comfort the crying mother or a sibling who shows obvious signs of distress, by wiping the tears, or giving a pat or offering certain available objects. In the same way they also deliberately make efforts to upset or tease other people, by striking or run away with the toy of another person. From these we understand that 1- and 2-year-olds think of another person as experiencing an emotional state that they themselves can causally influence.⁷

7. DESIRES AND BELIEFS

Children of 2 and 3 years age understand that other people will be sad if they do not get what they want, but happy if they do.

Therefore children seem to realize that there is nothing inherently joyful or sad in a given outcome; its effect on particular agents may vary sharply. Thus one individual may be pleased with a particular gift if that is what that person wanted, and another person may be sad to receive the same gift if that was not that person's choice. By the time the child becomes 4 or 5 years old, this simple conception is elaborated still further. Now the child realizes that it is not the fit between desire and actual outcome that elicits emotion, but rather the fit between desire and assumed outcome.⁸

8. SOCIAL STANDARDS

It is interesting to note how children conform to social standards. Children of 4 and 5 years age will think that a person by stealing gets what he/she wanted. But when they grow into 6 or 7 or 8 years they realize that getting what one wants by unfair means does not make one happy, and having obeyed a moral standard and not getting a desired object does not make one necessarily sad. One wonders why children of 4 or 5 years age do not have qualms when getting what they wanted by unfair means because they view their emotional lives in narrowly hedonistic terms. They do not anticipate gaining any emotional satisfaction from conforming to the moral standards they recognize.⁹

9. MIXED EMOTION

If a person is elected president of a country, that person might feel proud at the thought of the high social position but also fear about the criticism of his opponents. Thus the same situation can trigger more than one emotion and surprisingly even provoke emotions of opposite valence. Children of 8 or 9 years age understand emotions as single-valenced. They are not able to think of the existence of two emotions simultaneously. They either say one or the other. Take for example children who are asked what emotions one will experience if suddenly called upon to go to the stage in front of an audience. They might either say excitement or fear but they do not say that the situation could produce both excitement and fear. The reason why young children fail to scrutinize an emotionally charged situation in an exhaustive fashion is that an exhaustive appraisal calls for a minimum information-processing capacity. It is only by the age of 9 or 10 that children acknowledge that the same situation can provoke two opposite feelings.¹⁰

10. HIDING EMOTION

Very young children do not understand that real and apparent emotion need not coincide, but between 4 and 6 years they do understand that real emotions can be hidden. From the age of 6, children can harbour feelings of resentment, anger, and grief, safe in the knowledge that those feelings may be quite unknown to their parents or siblings. They may have doubts as to how successfully they can hide their emotions, even though they realize that they can hide their emotions.¹¹

11. CHANGING EMOTION

Control of emotions is achieved through two means: one strategy is to hide the outward expression of emotion, and the other is by changing the emotional state itself. It is also commonly believed that an alteration in the outward expression is sufficient to change the emotional state itself. However this technique is very weak and the success is not high. Children aged 6, 11, and 15 years were asked about the possibility of both hiding and changing their emotion. They replied that for hiding an emotion one needs to change one's outward behaviour. With regard to changing emotion, they focused on the cause of the emotion: changing either the immediate external situation, or the thought processes sustaining the emotion. Younger children concentrate on the need to change the external situation, whereas older children mentioned using cognitively oriented strategies in addition.¹²

12. THEORIES OF EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

We can identify three bodies of literature relevant to the emotional development over the lifespan. They are psychoanalytic theory, attachment theory, and discrete-emotions theory.

1) Psychoanalytic Theory

The psychoanalytic school includes the writings of Freud and those of the ego-analytic object relations, interpersonal, and relational schools. They are by nature intrinsically concerned with affect and its products. Nevertheless, the psychoanalytic school has failed to produce a systematic theory of affect, much less one that is developmentally informed, excepting Erikson's psychosocial theory of development. The other two bodies of literature, namely

attachment theory and discrete-emotions theory are quite relevant because they offer more systematic treatments of emotional development.¹³

2) Attachment Theory

Attachment theory was formulated by John Bowlby to explain the pervasiveness of human social bonds and reactions to their disruptions, and is informed by an unusual theoretical blend of ethology, systems theory, and psychoanalysis. Attachment is seen as a biologically based, goal-corrected behavioural system oriented toward achieving homeostasis between attachment needs and exploratory drives. It explains how the attachment relationship between infant and caregiver develops over time. Most children form attachments to significant others that are characterized by trust and felt security, which leaves them free to develop an autonomous and flexible sense of self. There are two less optimal outcome groups of children who display insecure attachment style due to insensitive caregiving. One is the avoidant attachment style, according to which a child tends to avoid the caregiver upon reunion following times of distress. The child manifests a kind of false independence by appearing not to need the caregiver. The other group is the ambivalent style according to which a child displays an inconsolability manifested in alternately clinging and rejecting behaviour toward the caregiver. We notice an enduring nature of the bond formed in early infancy and in continuity of attachment organization over time. This pattern is generalized to other relationships. Children classified as avoidant, secure, and ambivalent retain their classifications into the sixth year of life. Adults too can be classified into avoidant, secure, or ambivalent in their intimate relationships. In the case of adults, early experiences with significant others have important developmental consequences that are carried forward in time. Although attachment theory gives importance to emotional conceptualisation it does not supply us with formulations concerning the role of different emotions in differential development.¹⁴

3) Discrete-Emotions Theory

Discrete-emotions theory embraces the works of many writers, according to whom the number of basic or primary emotions is

limited, and that the different emotions have different properties with implications for feeling, motivation, and behaviour. In this regard, Tomkins' writings are relevant since they are related to lifespan issues. Tomkins's theory is called 'affective theory.' In his theory, emotions constitute the primary motivational system. According to him, each of the primary emotions (joy, interest, surprise, fear, anger, distress, contempt, disgust, and shame) gives its own unique kind of motivating information. Tomkins did not indicate how the various affective organizations he described respond to the kinds of life challenges that inhere in the average expectable life.¹⁵

Attachment theory addresses the nature of the singularly compelling instinctual drive to become attached to adult members of the species. Affect theory indicates that individual experiences add emotional content and thus describes the qualitative aspects that inhere in relationships and in personalities. Our understanding of the emotional development consists in the synthesis of attachment and affect theories.¹⁶

8

IMAGINATION IN EMOTIONS

Imagining an alternative to a present situation is crucial for the generation of emotions. This chapter discusses in detail the nature of imagination, its various types, and its role in generating emotions. The discussion focuses on one type of imagination, which is crucial for the generation of emotions, namely, counterfactual imagination.

1. ROLE OF IMAGINATION IN EMOTIONS

Imagining an alternative to a present situation is crucial for the generation of emotions. The ability to imagine situations that are different from those presented to the senses is an essential feature of human consciousness in general and of emotions in particular. For example, in anger we imagine what should have been done but was not done; in fear we imagine a future alternative worse than what we face now. In art, for example, our imaginations are more at work and that is why we are able to enjoy looking at a piece of art. Sometimes we find people objectively worse off feeling happier than those who are in a better position. For example, let us take two students who did an exam in maths. One got 99 marks and the other just got a pass mark. The one who got just the pass mark would feel happy and throw a party for his/her having passed the exam whereas the one who got 99 marks might feel sad and even attempt suicide. The reason being, that in both cases imagination did play a role. The one who hoped to get 100 marks did not get just one mark, which is an alternate situation of imagination. The other however did not expect to pass but in fact passed the test and so that person is happy. The TV advertisements and programmes can very well demonstrate the role of imagination that captures the mind of the viewers.¹

2. DEVELOPMENT OF MENTAL CAPACITIES

Let us have a sketch of the development of mental capacities and locate imagination in it. The most primitive form of mental

capacity is sensation. We become aware of changes in our own body through sensation. Sensation can only indicate the presence of change in us but does not have any cognitive description of the changes. We know for certain the survival value of sensation since awareness of changes is crucial for survival. Sensation cannot be an intentional capacity as it is not directed at some object and has no cognitive content. We can say that intentional capacities developed only when the organism became aware not only of the changes in our body but also of the circumstances responsible for the changes. The first intentional capacity is the perceptual ability by which we separate the stimuli impinging on our sensory receptors and from the perceptual environment as a mental object, which we create. This perceptual capacity helps us to be connected to our immediate environment. But there are factors beyond our immediate environment. For these, we need different capacities such as memory, imagination and thought, which developed later after the perceptual capacity. No doubt, only intentionality establishes a subject-object relation. Complex intentional capacities enable us to carry out more complex types of activity, especially purposeful activity pertaining to future goals. It is precisely because of intentionality, humans can go beyond the confines of the present. Just as the primitive mental capacity of sensation was for the survival of organism, imagination enables us to avoid dangers in future.²

3. IMAGINATION

Imagination, which of course is an intentional capacity, is a capacity that enables us to refer to what is not actually present to the senses. Thus imagination is the capacity to refer to past, present, future, or possible circumstances. In this characterization, memory and thought are types of imagination, since both of them refer to what is not actually present to the senses. Therefore, imagination is an intentional capacity referring to nonexisting objects. We can conclude that imagination refers to an object that is not present to the senses and which has never existed or which, on the basis of our current knowledge, has very little chance of existing.

Imagination can be divided into two kinds: 1. the subject does not know about the falsity of the imagined content (cases of hallucinations, illusions, and simple mistakes), and 2. the subject knows about the falsity of the imagined content (counterfactual

imagination). The content of counterfactual imagination is false and is known to be so.³

Imagination (refers to an object that is not present to the senses and which has never existed or which on the basis of our current knowledge, has very little chance of existing)	1. The subject does not know about the falsity of the imagined content (hallucinations, illusions, and simple mistakes)	
	2. The subject knows about the falsity of the imagined content (counterfactual imagination) The counterfactual imagination can be divided into 4 factors	1. Whether the imagined situation occurred in the past, exists in the present, or will be in the future
		2. Whether the imagined situation is better or worse than the actual one
		3. Whether generating it involves adding something to or subtracting something from reality
	4. Whether generating it involves changing our own actions or those of others	

4. COUNTERFACTUAL IMAGINATION⁴

Counterfactual imagination can be divided according to four factors: 1. whether the imagined situation occurred in the past, exists in the present, or will be in the future; 2. whether the imagined situation is better or worse than the actual one; 3. whether generating it involves adding something to or subtracting something from reality; and 4. whether generating it involves changing our own actions or those of others.

1) Past, present and future situation

In regret, for example, we imagine ourselves wishing to have done something else than what we actually did. This is an example of undoing the past. Undoing the present will involve in fantasizing about someone else while making love to one's partner. Referring to the future we can think of an imagination in which one sees oneself in future in the arms of one's boss.

2) Better or worse alternatives

Here we have either upward comparison or downward comparison. In upward imagination, we imagine ourselves in better situation than we are now in. Downward comparison refers, for example, a lady with breast cancer imagining that the situation would have been really far worse had she suffered leukaemia, which is more serious than breast cancer. The downward comparison helps handicapped persons to cope with their situation.

3) Undoing a given situation

Undoing a given situation can be done either by adding something to reality or subtracting something from reality. An example for adding something to reality will be to imagine that if only one had taken the child to the hospital immediately, the child would have survived. Additive counterfactuals are seen more frequently following failure than success outcomes. For subtracting something from reality we can think of a person saying that if only he/she had not shouted at the son, the son would not have been lost.

4) Change in one's action and those of others

It is also possible that counterfactual imagination can focus on our own actions or those of others. If people have a high self-esteem they are likely to generate counterfactuals blaming others following failure; if it is a question of counterfactuals after success, they refer the glory to themselves. In a similar way, people with low self-esteem will undo their own actions following failure and those with high self-esteem undo other people's action following failure.

5. FUNCTIONALITY OF COUNTERFACTUAL IMAGINATION

Although counterfactual imagination involves some distortion of reality, there are two functions to it: 1. a cognitive function which helps us to understand our environment better, and 2. an affective function which enables us to call up desired emotions and moods. The cognitive function of counterfactual imagination helps us to understand, predict, and control our environment. The affective function of counterfactual imagination is greatly at play in sexual fantasies. For moral, personal and social reasons we cannot have sex with the person we want. But in counterfactual imagination, that is possible. Practically all sexual activities, especially masturbation, involve counterfactual imagination. The affective function of imagination involves positive illusions that are beneficial for us. There are three ways of positively being biased: 1. Our assessment of ourselves: Most humans hold very positive views of themselves. We see ourselves as better than others and as above average in the majority of our qualities. 2. Our assessment of our ability to control what goes on around us: most of us believe that the world is inherently controllable and that our ability to control events around us is exceptional. 3. Our assessment of our future: we are hopeful and confident that things will improve and we are unrealistically optimistic about the future. We tend to see ourselves as having improved even when no actual progress is evident. Thus we see that normal humans are positively biased for their own survival and well-being.⁵

6. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LUCK AND EMOTIONS

Emotions involve perception of significant change. Likewise, lucky experiences involve the perception of significant changes deviating from the expected, normal course of events. Perceiving something to be lucky or unlucky depends on the availability of an alternative: lucky experiences are based on a close avoidance of or narrow escape from, something worse and unlucky experiences are based on a close miss of something better. The experience of lucky events is linked to comparison with an imagined alternative rather than with characteristics of the actual events. Therefore lucky events are those in which the alternative is very close and hence easily imagined. Luck is positively correlated with unexpectedness

and uncertainty. A lucky event is exceptional or out of the ordinary; hence, it is unexpected and uncertain. There is the presence of a high positive correlation between ratings of luck and ratings of how 'easily' the situation could have led to a different outcome. Perceiving ourselves as lucky or unlucky is heavily dependent upon comparison of the actual event with an alternative one. We feel very lucky to have escaped from an accident with only minor injuries, because a far worse outcome was possible, or even probable. In the same way, we missed winning a lottery ticket by one number. We consider this as unlucky.⁶

9

FUNCTIONS OF EMOTIONS

The traditional view considers emotions irrational and identifies them with illness. The identification of emotions with illness often depends on external considerations not related to the psychological nature of emotions.

1. EMOTIONS –OPTIMAL RESPONSE

Emotions are considered the optimal response when we face sudden significant changes in our situation but have limited and imperfect resources to cope with it. In these circumstances optimal conditions for the normal functioning of the intellectual system are absent and so the emotional responses come handy to cope with the situation. For example, imagine a situation where you do not have the relevant data and you need to act quickly as demanded by the circumstances. At that time it is emotions that come to our rescue. Deliberate calculations are not needed for our emotional system to act rationally in the functional sense. Reason in emotions is a matter of sensibility. In so far as emotions are appropriate responses to a given situation, they are said to be rational. But this rationality is local and does not take into account global implications.¹

2. EMOTIONS – ADAPTIVE MECHANISM

For humans, emotions are an adaptive mechanism, which is flexible, and responds immediately to changing stimuli. They are, no doubt, useful urgent responses to emergencies. They are the most practical and useful states for the well-being of humans. If you take every emotion, it has a positive value for the welfare of humankind. The functional value of emotions can be understood in terms of three basic constraints imposed upon human activities: 1. Human beings often encounter uncertain circumstances in which they must make immediate decisions; 2. Human beings have limited resources and multiple goals; 3. human beings need other humans

to achieve their goals. To meet the demands imposed by the above three constraints, emotions may be described as having three basic evolutionary functions: 1. an initial indication of the proper manner in which to respond; 2. quick mobilization of resources; and 3. a means of social communication.²

3. BASIC EVOLUTIONARY FUNCTIONS

The indicative function gives us an initial indication of how to cope with the uncertain circumstances we are facing. The mobilizing function regulates the locus of investment, that is, away from situations where resources would be wasted, and toward those urgent circumstances where investment will yield a significant payoff. The communicative function reveals our evaluative stand and thereby elicits aid from others and insists upon social status. When we compare with the components of emotions, the cognitive component is essential to the indicative function, the motivational component to the mobilizing function, and the evaluative component is significant for the communicative function. In case of emergency, all the three functions are important.³

The Functions of Emotional Components	
Cognitive Component	Indicative Function
Motivational Component	Mobilizing Function
Evaluative Component	Communicative Function

4. PHYSIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE OF FUNCTIONALITY OF EMOTIONS

When we are threatened, we have the emotion of fight-or-flight response associated with physiological changes like an adrenal rush, pupil dilation and faster heart rate, which enable either to run away or fight. There is some research done on emotions in connection with the immune system. When we are in intense emotional states, there is an increase in the number of natural killer cells. These killer cells have been known to kill cells infected with viruses and potentially can also kill tumour cells. The increase of killer cells is associated with both positive and negative emotions but they last no longer than twenty minutes. It is also reported that persons participating in an atmosphere of welcome, acceptance

and cordiality in group therapies seem to experience positive impact on the immune system. Conversely it is also true that prolonged stress weakens the immune system. It is also noted that anger is a factor that causes heart disease.⁴

5. HARMFULNESS OF EMOTIONS

Emotions can be harmful in two circumstances, namely 1. when they are applied in circumstances that are not suited to the given emotion, and 2. when they are excessive. When we compare animals with humans we find that animals operate within a much more limited set of circumstances. In those limited circumstances, emotional instincts of animals are highly functional since they serve an ongoing sense of survival. Therefore, in most instances, emotions are not harmful to animals. But in humans the situation is different. Humans can change their social situation so rapidly before emotional adaptation can take place to accommodate the changed social environment. Besides, along with the spontaneous emotional system, humans have a deliberate intellectual system to guide. Sometimes emotions may override the intellectual system on account of their intensity and such circumstances may be harmful to humans. Excess of emotion is harmful. We need emotions to deal with certain situations. Anything more than the necessary level will become excess and that may be harmful. Fear may enable us to deal with a threatening situation. But paralysing fear may immobilize us.⁵

10

PSYCHOEVOOLUTIONARY THEORY OF EMOTION

Regarding psychoevolutionary theory of emotions, we have two major approaches. The first one is the six-postulate approach and the second one is the three-model approach. Let us consider each of these psychoevolutionary theories separately. In addition to these, let us also consider other evolutionary implications.

1. SIX-POSTULATE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY¹

1) Ethological View

In the first postulate, emotions are understood as communication and survival mechanisms. It is indeed a direct reflection of the Darwinian, ethological view. It was Darwin who pointed out that emotions have two functions in all animals. First of all, they increase the chances of individual survival, which is essential for the perpetuation of the species, through appropriate reactions to emergency events in the environment. Secondly, they act as signals of intentions of future action through display behaviours of various kinds. In this evolutionary theory it is assumed that the natural environment creates survival problems for all organisms, which must be successfully dealt with, if the organisms are to survive. This includes responding differentially and appropriately to prey and predators, foods and mates, caregivers and care solicitors. Here emotions are conceptualised as basic adaptive patterns that can be identified at all phylogenetic levels that deal with these basic issues.

2) Genetic View

The second postulate says that emotions have a genetic basis. Darwin used four types of evidence to prove the genetic basis for emotions. First of all, some of our emotional expressions appear in similar form in many lower animals. Examples are the apparent

increase in body size during rage or agonistic interactions, due to erection of body hair or feathers, changes in postures, or expansion of air pouches. Secondly, Darwin noted that some of the emotional expressions appear in infants in the same form as in adults like smiling and frowning. Thirdly, when we compare the emotional expressions of those born blind with those normally sighted there are identical expressions like pouting and laughter. Fourthly, some emotional expressions appear in similar form in widely separated human groups. We should remember that genetic theory does not indicate that individuals inherit behaviour per se, but only the structural and physiological mechanisms that mediate behaviour.

3) Hypothetical Constructs

According to the third postulate, emotions are hypothetical constructs or inferences based on various classes of evidence. The evidence for the inference of the existence of emotions is 1. knowledge of stimulus conditions; 2. knowledge of an organism's behaviour in a variety of settings; 3. knowledge of what species-typical behaviour is; 4. knowledge of how an organism's peers react to it; and 5. knowledge of the effect of an individual's behaviour on others. There are two reasons why we find it difficult to define emotions. First, more than one emotion may occur at the same time. Secondly, any given overt display of emotion may reflect complex states like attack and flight, approach and avoidance.

4) Complex Chain of Events

The fourth postulate indicates that emotions are complex chains of events with stabilizing loops that tend to produce some kind of behavioural homeostasis. For example, when in distress children cry, it will increase the probability that the mother or caretaker will arrive on the scene. The innate purpose of this complex feedback system is to reduce the threat or change the emergency situation in order to achieve a temporary behavioural homeostatic balance.

5) Three-dimensional Structure

According to the fifth postulate, the relations among emotions can be represented by a three-dimensional structural model shaped like a cone. Thus the vertical dimension represents the intensity of emotions, the circle represents degree of similarity of emotions,

and polarity represents the opposite emotions on the circle. This idea leads us to the concept that some emotions are primary while others are derived or blends.

6) Derivative Conceptual Domains

The sixth postulate states that emotions are related to a number of derivative conceptual domains. For example, terms such as 'depressed,' 'manic,' and 'paranoid' can be conceived as extreme expressions of such basic emotions as sadness, joy, and disgust.

2. THREE-MODEL PSYCHOEVOOLUTIONARY THEORY²

There is yet another way to describe the psychoevolutionary theory of emotion, which consists of three models, namely 1. sequential model, 2. structural model and 3. derivatives model. Let us consider each one of them separately.

1) Sequential model

According to the sequential model, certain events trigger the chain of events called an emotion. Very limited classes of events tend to elicit emotions. They are events that disrupt the equilibrium of the organism at a given moment. In a way these events create 'emergency' conditions or create existential issues for the individual. Another implication of this model is that most of the elements of the chain are not available to consciousness. Often we do not know why we become emotional and we are confused about exactly how to label our inner feelings. Because of the limited awareness of the components of the emotion chain, there is no unequivocal way to decide on the existence of a particular emotion. Based on limited data, we only make guesses or inferences regarding emotional states. Of course introspection is one way of knowing our inner state. A third implication of this model is the therapeutic relevance. According to this model, the cognition determines the subsequent steps of the emotion chain—that is, the feelings, arousal, preparation for action, display rules used, and (to some extent) outcome. Therefore, if we are able to change our interpretation of given events, the emotional reactions may be quite different or greatly reduced.

2) Structural Model

According to the structural model there is a small number of basic emotions (between 6 and 10; many hypothesize 8) whose mixtures or blends produce the many different emotions. We realize

that there is a considerable misunderstanding about what is meant by 'basic emotion.' Every theoretician is trying to describe a dimension. What one calls 'distress' another may call 'sadness.' Sometimes people think that the secondary emotions or blends are somehow less important or meaningful than the primary ones. In fact, all emotions whether primary or secondary, have similar properties: they have adaptive functions for the individual in the sense that they are based on specific cognitions, reveal something of our attitudes and motivations. Mixed emotions necessarily produce some level of conflict.

3) Derivatives Model

According to the derivatives model, certain conceptual domains are derivative of other, more primitive events or concepts. Therefore, a number of conceptual domains are systematically related to one another. Thus for example, the words used in the language of emotions are similar to those of the language of personality. For example to feel nervous and to be a nervous person are one and the same. But the former belongs to the language of emotions and the latter to the language of personality.

3. OTHER EVOLUTIONARY IMPLICATIONS³

Besides the implications of the models presented, there are also evolutionary considerations. For example, social animals, particularly primates, must find their place in a hierarchy or rank order and deal with threats to the position obtained. These primates must handle territorial conflicts. They should be able to identify their own species to interact with and come to terms with the limited individual longevity. These four areas seem to be fundamental. These areas can be termed as 'hierarchy,' 'territoriality,' 'identity,' and 'temporality.' Let us consider each one of them.

1) Hierarchy

Hierarchy indicates the vertical dimension of social life. Hierarchy is seen almost universally, both in lower animals and in humans. Major expressions of high hierarchical positions are first access to food, to shelter, to comforts, and to sex. These are meant for personal and genetic survival. Anyway every member in a group must come to terms with this reality. An individual's attempt to

cope with hierarchical issues implies competition, status conflict, and power struggles. If you are near the top of a hierarchy you tend to feel dominant, self-confident, bossy, and assertive. On the contrary, if you are near the bottom, you feel submissive and anxious and even depressed.

2) Territoriality

Territories are areas or spaces of potential nourishment necessary for survival, or areas that are safe from attack or predation. When dealing with attempts to cope with territorial issues, we feel possessiveness, jealousy, and envy. When we are in possession of some aspect of the environment even including other people, we feel in control, otherwise we feel dyscontrol.

3) Identity

Identity refers to the basic question of who we are, or, alternatively, what group or groups we belong to. We know for certain that if we are isolated we neither propagate nor survive. Whereas in lower organisms, genetic coding mechanisms enable an individual to recognize other individuals of the same species, in humans it is a complex process since we define our own identity through different categories like sex, race, age, religion, occupation and geography. Definitely certain emotions are closely tied to the sense of identity. Thus we note that acceptance and liking versus rejection and hate are the emotional poles connected with the issue of identity.

4) Temporality

Temporality refers to the limited duration of an individual's life. All of us are concerned about life duration. We learn skills to enable us to survive as long as possible and to become a successful reproducing adult. Death is seen as a loss and humans seek or search for a lot of solutions to the problem of loss. Distress signals, for example, are a cry for help. Sympathetic or nurturing responses from a friend or therapist or counsellor are also solutions to the problem of loss. Definitely emotions are attached to the issue of temporality.

4. MAJOR COPING ISSUES

Major Coping Issues Associated with the Existential Crises			
Hierarchy	Territoriality	Identity	Temporality
1. Becoming dominant	1. Having a safe personal space	1. Making friends	1. Dealing with illness
2. Becoming submissive	2. Accumulating possessions	2. Courtship, love	2. Dealing with death
3. Feelings of anger and fear	3. Feelings of envy and jealousy	3. Marriage, family, Community, nation	3. Getting or providing social supports
	4. Feelings of control and loss of control	4. Feelings of acceptance and rejection	4. Feelings of gain or loss, joy, or sadness

11

REASON IN EMOTIONS

1. REASON VS. EMOTIONS

Usually reason and emotion are contrasted as if they are contradicting each other. Therefore when we speak of rationality of emotions, it is seen negatively. Emotions are considered irrational and so disruptive of optimal functioning. Actually emotions do not prevent optimal functioning in most cases except when applied to wrong circumstances and are in excess of what is needed. Emotions serve important functions in our everyday life. We realize that even emotional pretence is also functional. In fact emotions are meant to be optimal functioning especially in emergency.¹

2. INTELLECTUALIST TRADITION

The intellectualist tradition is faced with three positions concerning emotions. 1. emotions are present only in human beings, 2. emotions are present in all living things, and 3. emotional capacities are present in different degrees of development in different living creatures. Of course the first position cannot be held because our own experience with animals dictates that animals too have emotions. The second position too cannot be held because of the great complexity of emotions which requires various mental capacities that are not found in lower organisms. The third position seems to be the most plausible one.²

3. RULE-FOLLOWING VS. RULE-DESCRIBED BEHAVIOURS

In understanding reason it is good to follow the distinction between rule-following behaviour and rule-described behaviour. The former refers to behaviour that follows rules and the latter refers to behaviour that is in accordance with the rules. The first behaviour is being guided by a known rule and the second one is simply being in accordance with a rule. The first one is intentional rule-following and the second one is nonintentional forms of mere lawful connection. Only in the first case we appreciate the relevant

data and regularity involved before rationally deciding to act accordingly. But the phenomenon of understanding so typical of intelligent behaviour may be entirely absent when one merely behaves in accordance with rules. To be intelligent is not merely to satisfy criteria but to apply them; to regulate one's actions and not merely to be well-regulated. Take the birds that build their nests in a typical stereotyped fashion. Though their nest building behaviour can be described by complex, abstract mathematical formulas, the birds do not follow rules or make intellectual calculations. The same holds good for the emotional system too.³

4. RULE-DESCRIBED PLUS PERSONAL MAKEUP

Just like the regularities in the birds, the regularities typical of emotions should be described as assumptions structured into our personality, not as intellectual calculations carried out inside our heads. When we are in the grip of emotions, we are not necessarily aware of premises and do not therefore necessarily infer conclusions from them. Thus our emotional behaviour is clearly not rule-following behaviour. When we like a person, we do not calculate our emotional response. In most cases of our emotional experience, the relevant data and the general principles of calculation are simply unknown to us. Even though we do not actually make intellectual calculations, the emotional response, being in accordance with such calculations, is perceived as if it were the result of such calculations like the nest building behaviour of birds. When we fall in love with the right person, to the proper extent, at the right time, we act in accordance with what reason dictates, but not because of it. Here we do not employ reason through deliberate, intellectual process. We are not in need of such processes; we simply act in accordance with our character. We can say that emotions can be immediate according to their nature and still be influenced by our personal characteristics. Emotional experiences are raw and direct and are influenced by our personal makeup, but they are not mediated by intellectual deliberations. The influence of personal characteristics is expressed by the responsiveness or sensitivity of the system.

In the way emotional patterns have evolved, they have resulted in the adaptive value of emotions. Evaluative emotional patterns have come into existence and have been modified throughout

evolution. In every emotional experience we need not undergo the whole process of evolutionary and personal development. This process has tuned our emotional system in such a way that our surroundings in a fraction of a second become emotionally significant. Thus the creation of emotion consists mainly of activating basic evaluative patterns rather than a process of intellectual persuasion. As rational beings we know that under certain conditions it is better to follow emotional tendencies than to use more elaborate intellectual procedures.⁴

5. EMOTIONS THROUGH THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY⁵

Consideration of reason in emotions has something to do with the history of philosophy. Philosophical discussions have down through the centuries focused on reason and emotions. Therefore it is worthwhile to glance through the pages of the history of philosophy to understand how reason is considered in emotions.

Interest in emotions has been there ever since the pre-Socratic time. In Greek philosophy Socrates and his student Plato have contributed to our understanding of emotions. The metaphor of master and slave corresponding to reason and emotion has been maintained for a very long period. Reason is considered to be the true nature of humans and the dangerous impulses of emotion are supposed to be under the control of reason.

1) The Greeks

Tracing back to the philosophy of the Greeks, we take Plato's views. His tripartite soul does not contain emotions as such. The tripartite aspects are reason, spirit, and appetite but according to him emotions are involved in reason. In contrast to Plato, Aristotle had a view of emotion as such and defined emotion 'as that which leads one's condition to become so transformed that his judgement is affected, and which is accompanied by pleasure or pain.'

2) The Romans

In the times of the Romans, one finds the conjunction of ethics and emotion in the philosophy of Stoics. For Aristotle emotions were essential to make good life, but the Stoics considered emotions as conceptual errors, conducive to misery. Emotions were considered judgements – judgements about the world and one's

place in it. The Stoics saw the world they lived in as out of control and beyond any reasonable expectations. Therefore they saw emotions as misguided judgements about life and our place in the world. For them emotions make one miserable and frustrated. Therefore the alternative was seen as 'psychic indifference,' or *apatheia* (apathy).

3) The Middle Ages

In the Middle Ages, emotion was typically attached to ethics, which was central to Christian psychology. There were studies mostly elaborate and quasi-medical regarding the effects of the various 'humours' (gall, spleen, choler, and blood itself) on emotional temperament and like the Stoics' studies of cognitive and 'conative' aspects of the emotions. The Middle Ages found a linkage between emotions and desires, particularly self-interested, and self-absorbed desires. During that period the Christians preoccupied themselves with sin and this led to elaborate analyses of emotions, passions, and desires designated as sins (notably greed, lust, anger, envy, and pride). Because of the close connection between emotions and ethics, love, hope and faith were not classified as emotions but rather were elevated to a higher status and were equated with reason. The same old master-slave metaphor was maintained to the extent that some emotions were considered as sins and one could never think of emotions being considered among the highest virtues.

4) René Descartes (1596-1650)

René Descartes, 'father of modern philosophy' was a bridge between the scholastic world of the Middle Ages and our own time. He insisted that the mind is a separate 'substance' from the body. For him emotions require the interaction of mind and body. Body and mind meet in a small gland at the base of the brain (now known as the pineal gland). There takes place the agitation of animal spirits, which bring about the emotions and their physical effects in various parts of the body. Therefore an emotion is not merely a perception of the body but rather it is a perception of the soul. Emotions are considered as disturbing passions. Emotions move from the merely bodily to an essential ingredient in wisdom.

5) Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza (1632-1677)

Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza is considered to be a latter-day Stoic, like Chrysippus and Seneca in ancient Rome. As the Stoics saw emotions as misguided judgements about life and our place in the world, Spinoza too saw emotions as a form of 'thought' that, for the most part, misunderstand the world, and consequently make us miserable and frustrated. Whereas the Stoics proposed 'psychic indifference,' Spinoza urged the attainment of a certain sort of 'bliss,' which can be achieved once we get straight our thinking about the world. Spinoza anticipated the subtle emotion-brain research that is being carried out today by some philosophers as well as by neuropsychologists.

6) David Hume (1711-1776)

David Hume was one of the most outspoken defenders of Enlightenment. He challenged the inferior place of passion in philosophy and questioned the role of reason. He also advanced a theory of the passions that although limited and encumbered by his general theory of mind, displayed dazzling insight and a precocious attempt to grapple with problems that would only be formulated generations later. He defined an emotion as a certain kind of sensation, or what he called an 'impression,' which (as in Descartes) is physically stimulated by the movement of the 'animal spirits' in the blood. Such impressions are either pleasant or unpleasant. The impressions that constitute our emotions are always to be located within a causal network of other impressions and, importantly, ideas. Ideas cause our emotional impressions, and ideas are caused in turn by them. Emotion is not an embarrassment or part of the refuse of the human psyche, but rather the very essence of human social existence and morality. Emotions are not opposed to reason but rather they should go along with reason.

7) Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

Immanuel Kant was also a champion of the Enlightenment, but he too questioned the capacities and limits of reason. It was Kant, a quarter-century before Hegel, insisted that 'nothing great is ever done without passion.' When his successor Hegel (1770-1831) took over the reins of Germany philosophy in the early 19th century, the overstated distinction between reason and passion was

again called into question, and Hegel's own odyssey of reason has rightly been called a 'logic of passion' as well.

8) Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)

Friedrich Nietzsche was a philosopher for whom passion was the watchword and reason a source of suspicion. He praised the passions and, in an ironic twist, described the passions as themselves having more reason than reason. But he also acknowledged that some passions are not wise and they drag us down. But Europe saw enough passion and irrationality in the Great War and then the rise of National Socialism in Germany. Thus reason was once again given prominence to the neglect of emotion.

9) 20th Century

In the 20th century, in Europe, emotions enjoyed more attention. Following the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler (1916/1970), Martin Heidegger (1927/1962) and more recently Paul Ricouer (1950/1966) developed ambitious philosophies in which emotions were given central place in human existence and accorded considerable respect. Jean-Paul Sartre wrote many pages of phenomenological analyses of emotion. In our present time, of course, emotions are emerging in their sensory, social, or physiological aspects, among philosophers, psychologists, neurologists, anthropologists as a reaction to hypercognizing of emotion.

12

EMOTIONS IN PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT

In this chapter we are concerned about the issue of emotions in the role of personality development. There is a connection between the functions of emotions and the development of human personality. We would like to understand in precisely what way emotions do shape our personality development.

1. ORGANIZATION OF TRAITS AND DIMENSIONS

It has been identified that the major function of emotions and the emotions system is the organization of traits and dimensions of personality. It is not yet clear how this is accomplished. Emotions are motivational and in that sense they organize and motivate cognition and action. Thus emotions would affect our characteristic way of thinking and action or in other words our personality. Personality is the sum total of all that we are, our internal and external behaviour. Emotions influence such realities. It is also argued that some emotions at some level of intensity are continually present in our consciousness. Each emotion influences perception, cognition, and action in a particular way. Therefore we can say that specific emotions help shape specific traits, and those particular patterns of emotions influence particular broad dimensions of personality. There are some correlations among measures of emotion experiences and personality traits.¹

2. MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES IN EMOTION-PERSONALITY RELATIONS

The chief functional characteristic of emotions is their capacity to organize and motivate behaviour. But we should not take this to mean that emotions motivate random responses. Each emotion can only motivate a particular type or range of cognitions and actions. Thus if a given emotion is experienced frequently, it is

likely that a particular type of thought and action will occur frequently. Therefore as we develop characteristic patterns of emotion-cognition-action sequences, personality traits are formed. From what we said, it is clear that there is stability in the frequency of experiencing a particular emotion. Besides, some emotions co-occur with regularity. Perhaps such co-occurrence is a function of both innate and learned relationships among emotions. For example, when we take depression, people may experience sadness-anger pattern. There is what is called an affective-cognitive structure, which is a bond or association between an emotion or pattern of emotions and a thought or set of thoughts (schema or script). Such an affective-cognitive structure can motivate a related pattern of behaviour that is manifested as a characteristic or trait. So we are now aware of the way in which emotions do really shape personality traits or characteristics.²

3. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF EMOTION-PERSONALITY RELATIONS

Several studies have indicated that there is a relation between indices of emotion experience and dimensions of personality. For example correlations have been consistently found between positive emotionality and extroversion. Fear, sadness, guilt, and hostility were strongly related to neuroticism. Joviality, self-assurance, and attentiveness were moderately related to extroversion and conscientiousness. Positive and negative emotionality correlate significantly with extroversion and neuroticism respectively. The emotion of interest correlates with the traits of achievement and endurance. The emotion of enjoyment correlates with the trait of affiliation. Anger, disgust, and contempt (the 'hostility triad') relate to the trait of aggression.³

4. EMOTIONS AND MALADAPTIVE BEHAVIOUR

Emotions are meant to be adaptive. But emotions are not always associated with adaptive behaviour. Emotions automatically do not guarantee an effective response to threat or challenge. Emotions can become maladaptive if the individual's resources for emotion regulation are inadequate, in terms of either neural or cognitive-behavioural controls. When there are problems in emotion-cognition relations and in emotion-cognition-action patterns, maladaptive behaviour usually occurs.⁴

13

EMOTIONS IN COMMUNICATIONS

Humans keep communicating with one another. Communication is punctuated with emotions whether we are aware of them or not. In this chapter let us consider in what way emotions are involved in our communication by analysing 'pretence.' These two phenomena of emotion and pretence are prominent in personal and social communication and that is why we take them for our analysis.

1. EMOTIONAL PRETENCE

Emotions are manifest in sincere communication but there could also be circumstances in which deceptive emotional messages are conveyed. The pretence of emotional experience can be found in romantic relationship. There could be games of 'hard to get' and 'easy to get.' From the Transactional Analysis point of view, there are games played from persecutor's role to put down the other somehow conning the other to play the complementary role. In the game of 'hard to get,' the partner is encouraged to sustain efforts to interest the player despite apparent evidence to disinterest. In the game of 'easy to get' the partner is encouraged to engage in sexual courtship while the player may not be interested in sex. Thus we see how emotional pretence could be had in sexual courtship or relationship.

We may notice the face of emotional pretence in many emotions, which have a functional value for the player. In emotional pretence we veil and mask the real emotion we experience and pretend to experience an emotion we do not have. It is noticed that in some emotions it is easy to pretend, and in some other emotions it is hard to do that job. Take for example envy and hope. In these circumstances, one can very easily hide the emotion and pretend to have an entirely another emotion. But in case of fear and anger, it is not so easy to hide such emotions. Likewise long-term sentiments of love or grief too are difficult to hide.¹

2. USEFULNESS OF EMOTIONAL PRETENCE

Emotions have a functional value for our survival and well-being. Emotions are useful under three circumstances, namely 1. To gain some personal benefits. People pretend to have affection for the higher-ups in order to be in their good books or to gain some personal benefits. One may also fake anger or sadness in order to get attention. There are hardcore criminals who pretend remorse in order to escape punishment. 2. To avoid hurting other people. We may choose not to reveal annoyance at someone in order not to hurt the person. 3. To protect our privacy. We may feel strong sexual desire for someone and it may not be prudent to express that desire to that person because the person may not share the same emotion towards us or may reject us if we reveal our sexual desire to that person.²

3. MOTIVES OF EMOTIONAL PRETENCE

In further analysing the three types of emotional pretence we find that the first type meant to gain personal benefit is typically deliberate lies. In the second type of emotional pretence, the motive is not to hurt others. Thus the motive in the first instance is egoistic in the sense of personal gain whereas in the second instance the motive is altruistic of not hurting others. The third type seems to have more functional value in terms of individuals. What would be at stake in this situation is our privacy. We know our emotions express our most profound values, and attitudes. Therefore by revealing our inmost values and attitudes we become quite vulnerable. Others can take advantage of our revelation to hurt us; privacy is essential for our existence and relinquishing it can be dangerous. Sometimes limitless exposure of our emotions can be dangerous to our mental safety since our private self becomes part of the public domain.³

4. DISADVANTAGES OF EMOTIONAL PRETENCE

Total emotional exposure can be problematic and dangerous for the very emotion of sexual desire. Romantic relationship expresses our profound evaluation of us by others. When others do not accept our romantic relationship, it might hurt our self-esteem. Therefore we think it is better that we indicate our romantic desire

in a veiled manner of pretence so that when our relationship is not accepted by chance we are not hurt. Psychologists say that total exposure in romantic relationship may erase mystery and imagination from the romantic relationship. Since we know that imagination is essential for emotions, it is doubtful whether romantic love could survive a loss of imagination.

There are advantages of emotional pretence, but there are disadvantages too. Take for example faking sexual emotion. It is exhibiting sexual emotion when in reality it is not there. The partner, who perceives that the other is willing, will become sexually ready. This creates a complicated and unwanted situation for the one who faked.⁴

14

EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

The concept of 'emotional intelligence' (EQ) is known in psychological literature quite recently. The essence of emotional intelligence is the integration of the emotional and intellectual system. The reason why the concept developed quite late is that the idea of integrating emotion and intellectual thinking seemed contradictory. They are supposed to be diametrically opposed to each other. Once that hurdle was overcome, it became easy to talk about emotional intelligence. Let us trace the struggle that went before the arrival of the concept of emotional intelligence.¹

1. RELATION BETWEEN EMOTION AND INTELLECTUAL SYSTEMS

There are two views concerning the relation between emotion and intellectual systems. One tradition sees the differences as an indication of the shortcomings of the emotional system and so made a conclusion that the intellectual system is the true essence of the mental realm. In this view, the mind is an intellectual processor of knowledge which sorts out information in a relatively unbiased manner and emerges with carefully drawn conclusions and well-considered decisions. Seen from this perspective, the mind is considered as a sober agent seeking the most intellectual answers. This tradition belongs to the fields of the philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology. Prominent figures who subscribe to this idea are Plato, Descartes, and Kant among many others. The other view, which is the opposite of what we have seen, considers the emotional system to be of greater cognitive value. It considers emotions to be extremely useful and that one should prefer their guidance to that of intellectual reasoning. According to this view, the ultimate cognitive tool is instinct, which shares many characteristics with emotions. It criticises that the intellectual reasoning is based on its reliance on the stable and unchangeable, whereas reality consists of instability and change as its central characteristics. Prominent

figures that subscribe to this idea are David Hume, and Henri Bergson.²

2. EVALUATIVE SYSTEMS

There are evaluative systems underlying emotions and intellectual thinking. These systems can be discerned through their mechanism and content. There are two basic mechanisms: 1. the schematic mechanism, and 2. the deliberative mechanism. With regard to the content, we have 1. narrow (or partial) validity and 2. broad validity. When we compare emotion with intellectual thinking, we find that emotional system typically uses a schematic or spontaneous mechanism and has narrow (or partial) validity. But the intellectual system uses typically deliberative and has a broader validity.³

Substantial Differences of Emotional and Intellectual Systems ⁴		
	Emotional System	Intellectual System
Mechanism & Content	Emotional attitudes focus upon rather narrow informational content and the content's validity is limited to these cases only	Intellectual attitudes refer to a much broader informational content and accordingly the content is valid concerning many more circumstances
Scope	Deals with local stimuli which require immediate attention	It requires more time and is able to refer to much broader and general circumstances
Engagement	Emotions are engaged with the particular and the volatile	The intellect is concerned with the general and the stable
Aim	The aim of emotion is to see a specific event as specific only	The aim of the intellect is to see a specific event as a specific case of general regularities
Difficulty	Emotion has difficulty in prevailing under stable and universal conditions	The intellect has difficulty in understanding change and movement

3. RECONCILIATION

Definitely the two views are valid in the sense that the differences between the emotional and intellectual systems are genuine. All the same, the possibility of integration of these two is possible depending upon how we view different levels of cognition. It consists in considering that the ultimate cognitive tool is composed of both the emotion and the intellect. There can be three different levels of cognition (or knowledge). 1. Emotional Cognition: Cognition stemming from singular (or unique) things, and which is based on the senses and imagination. It is considered to be confused and false. 2. Intellectual Cognition: Cognition based on common and universal notions is considered as necessarily true. 3. Intuitive Cognition: The highest form of cognition is not intellectual knowledge, but a kind of combination of the above two types. It is intuitive knowledge, which combines elements from the other two types. It proceeds from singular things but expresses universal knowledge concerning the essence of things. Intuitive cognition is related to emotional attitude.⁵

Comparison of Levels of Cognition ⁶		
Levels of Cognition	Mechanism	Content
1. Emotional Cognition	Spontaneous or Schematic Mechanism	Partial
2. Intellectual Cognition	Deliberative Mechanism	General
3. Intuitive Cognition	Spontaneous or Schematic Mechanism	General (has a broad validity as it refers to many circumstances)

4. INTIUTIVE COGNITION

Intuitive cognition or knowledge can be explained by referring to expert knowledge. Both emotional knowledge and expert knowledge are intuitive in the sense that they are not based upon a careful intellectual analysis of the given data, but rather on activating

cognitive structures such as schemata. Since there is urgency associated with emotional situations, the cognitive activities associated with emotions are typically those, which do not require a lot of time and processing like intellectual deliberations, but rather immediate responses based on existing cognitive structures. Now acquiring cognitive schemata is like acquiring skills. Think of the stages of learning any skill. For example, one learns to play violin. In that process there are different stages, which are learnt by conscious deliberations. Once the schema is acquired, the mediating stages disappear along with the reasoning process. The skills thus learned can be performed automatically since the intellectual rules have become part of the agent's cognitive structure. We can say that here the cognitive effort is restricted to a trigger function only and the rest happens automatically. Expert knowledge is the highest form of knowledge and it is by nature intuitive. Emotions too typically involve such type of intuitive or immediate knowledge because of the urgency involved, not because we are experts in the matter of emotions. Because of the partial nature of emotions, they may lead to distortions. Thus both emotional knowledge and expert knowledge may have distortion.⁷

5. EQ IS EXPERT KNOWLEDGE

We know for sure that we can acquire cognitive schemata, which makes us experts. Likewise we can also acquire emotional intelligence, which is a kind of expert knowledge, even to a greater degree than intellectual intelligence. Intellectual intelligence (IQ) hardly changes after our teenage years but emotional intelligence can continue to develop. It is possible that as we mature, we acquire a greater degree of emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence is sensitivity to certain types of higher-level stimuli. It is an ability that involves a unique type of sensitivity rather than intellectual deliberations. Emotional intelligence becomes useful for us since it integrates in an optimal manner the emotional and intellectual systems. The emotional sensitivity we speak of has some aspects as innate while other aspects are acquired through engaging in various activities (both emotional and intellectual) until general rules and past experience are embodied in our mental system, thus sensitising this system to more complex and general circumstances and regularities. There are times when we need to use emotional system;

there are situations when we need to use intellectual deliberations; and there are situations in which we need to use the emotional intelligence. Now we are in a better position to understand emotional intelligence, which is a capacity to process emotional information accurately and efficiently, and accordingly regulate the emotions in an optimal manner.⁸

6. DOMAINS OF EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

There are two domains of emotional intelligence: 1. recognizing emotions in ourselves and others; 2. regulating emotions in ourselves and others. It is not very clear whether these two strategies are easier to apply to ourselves or to others. Recognizing emotions in ourselves may be easier and that too when they are positive emotions. For, with regard to negative emotions, the mechanisms of denial and repression are operative and hinder our ability to recognize their existence in us. From an emotional point of view, emotional intelligence is known by the skills rather than the knowledge we have of our emotions. Identifying our emotions and those of other people is not merely a cognitive ability, but also an evaluative ability, which depends largely upon our emotional sensitivity. Emotional intelligence involves emotional self-awareness and empathy as well as intellectual ability, which can calculate the various implications of the different alternatives.⁹

7. EQ HAS MODERATE EMOTIONAL INTENSITY

Sometimes our ability to postpone or delay emotional gratification seems to be an indicator of success in life. But this does not mean that we should disregard our emotional tendencies, which may prevent us from enjoying the many advantages of the emotional system. For example, being professional does not mean being emotionless. Professionalism is not to be associated with excessive emotional intensity, which prevents normal functioning. But we really do need emotion in professionalism. One may wonder if emotional intelligence is positively correlated to emotional intensity. On the one hand, emotional intelligence includes the capacity to identify emotions easily in others and ourselves which is usually related to high emotional sensitivity. On the other hand, emotional intelligence also needs the capacity to regulate and utilize emotions, which involves a certain type of indifference and

detachment. Highly emotional people will not be able to be flexible and have comfortable relationship. Likewise they will not be able to stop something they have started and found to be harmful. Thus we can say that emotional intelligence will not be very high both among indifferent people, whose distance from the emotional circumstances will make it hard for them to identify such circumstances and very sensitive people, whose tremendous emotional involvement will make it hard for them to keep the distance required for emotional regulation. Therefore, we can conclude that people with high emotional intelligence will have moderate emotional intensity; those at the extremes will have low emotional intelligence.¹⁰

15

PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC VIEW OF EMOTIONS

The various schools of psychotherapy or psychological counselling have been concerned with working with people's emotions. Nevertheless, there have been no adequate theories of emotional functioning or comprehensive means of assessing emotion in therapy. Of late, interest is created in the role of emotion in therapy.

1. PSYCHODYNAMIC APPROACH

Psychoanalysis dominated the field of psychotherapy until quite recently. It took a keen interest in the role of emotion in human affairs. But neither Freud nor his followers really developed a systematic, comprehensive theory of emotion. Emotion was understood in psychoanalysis as affect playing a variety of different roles. In the beginning it was thought that the strangulation of affect was the main cause of hysteria. Therefore abreaction was proposed as its cure. When Freud went to develop his biologically based theory, he considered affect as some form of psychic energy; and affects were regarded as drive derivatives with no independent status of their own. Thus Freud lost sight of the crucial importance of affects as a fundamental aspect of human functioning.

When the ego psychologists came to the scene, they shifted their focus from affects as drive derivatives to a discussion of the relations between the ego and affects. They were primarily concerned with problems caused by traumatic affects, especially anxiety and overwhelming of the ego, and the importance of the taming of affects. Proponents of object relations theories emphasized the role of feelings in object relations. According to them, affects are not exclusively connected to drives, but are a function of the relationship between the self and its internalised

objects, which are representations of others. Affects were seen as the earliest experiences both with oneself and with others, and as providing links between self-representations and object representations. In this view, drives are derivatives of affects.

The current perspectives of psychodynamic practice give importance to the curative effects of affective experience of conflicts in the transference with the therapist. Both transference interpretations and corrective emotional experience with the therapist are seen as mutative. According to this view, if one experiences affective responses in the context of a therapeutic relationship, that is the prerequisite for correcting distortions of the object world. Lately, modern object relations, self-psychological and interpersonal oriented dynamic therapies see affect as connecting the organism with its environment through both action tendencies and communication. For them, affective experience and expression are seen as being centrally involved in need satisfaction; and the owning of disclaimed action tendencies is seen as therapeutic.

In summary, in the classical psychoanalytic view, emotions were seen generally as drive-related and as needing to be discharged or tamed, whereas in object relations, self-psychological and interpersonal approaches emotions are seen as the building blocks of the self, and as linking the person to others. Modern developments in psychodynamic therapy have led to a greater emphasis on the acknowledgement of disavowed affect and the owning of disclaimed action tendencies as important to therapeutic change.¹

2. BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH

According to behavioural therapists, emotions have been understood fundamentally as learned emotional behaviours and they have focused on modifying the maladaptive emotional behaviour. Fear and anxiety received the greatest amount of attention from them. There are two major theories of emotion by behaviour approach. One of them holds that the individual is viewed as a tabula rasa that learns emotional responses in relation to environmental contingencies (Skinner, 1953). The other holds that emotion stems at least in part, from innate propensities or

predispositions (Rachman, 19187). In both theories, anxiety reduction is seen as the key to therapy. This attempt has led to treatment strategies involving deconditioning, gradual exposure, or flooding. Recently attempts have been made to explain the modification of fear as involving 'emotional processing,' which means the modification of emotional memory, by the incorporation of corrective information. Repeated exposure to fear situation, be it gradual or total, imaginal or in vivo, has been a key ingredient in the treatment of anxiety. In sum, in behavioural therapies, the need for modification of maladaptive emotional responses is stressed.²

3. COGNITIVE APPROACH

In cognitive therapies, affect is seen as a postcognitive phenomenon. It holds that the meaning of an event determines the emotional response to it. Constructs such as 'automatic thoughts,' 'irrational beliefs,' and 'self-statements' have been posited as mediating between events and emotional responses to events. Some have challenged the assumption of the causal priority of cognition; nevertheless, most theorists still emphasize the elimination of emotional responses to faulty cognitions by rationally challenging beliefs, by presenting schema-inconsistent evidence, and by providing self-instructional training. In recent years, however, they have adopted a constructivist position (which incorporates emotion as a fundamental aspect of meaning construction) with a rationalist approach (which elevates reason above emotion).³

4. EXPERIMENTAL AND HUMANISTIC APPROACH⁴

Experimental and humanistic therapies regard emotion as an essential component of human meaning and as an important motivator of behaviour. Here, there is no question of considering emotions, neither as expressions of instinctual impulses nor as learned responses. But, it is purely seen as an orienting system that provides the organism with adaptive information.

1) Client-centred Therapy

In client-centred therapy, a central construct is 'experiencing,' which is defined as 'everything occurring within the organism that is currently available to awareness.' 'To experience' means to receive the impact of sensory and physiological events occurring in the

moment. For Rogers, 'feeling' is a complex cognitive-affective unit composed of emotionally toned experience and its cognised meaning. He was of the opinion that therapeutic change involves experiencing fully in awareness feelings that in the past were denied awareness or distorted.

2) Gestalt Therapy Approach

The experience and expression of emotion have always been regarded as of critical importance to change. Nevertheless, there has not been a systematic theory about its role in the therapeutic process. For Gestalt therapists, emotion is regarded as the organism's direct, evaluative, immediate experience of the organism – environment field. Emotion is not considered to be mediated by thoughts and conceptual judgements, but is considered as a vital regulator of action. Emotion furnishes the basis of awareness of what is important to the organism, and it energizes action. But emotions are often interrupted before they enter awareness or organize action. For Gestalt therapists, avoidance of painful feelings and the fear of unwanted emotion is the core of many problems.

Thus, in the experiential approaches, we find that feelings are valued as aspects of experience, not something to be expelled or discharged. Therefore the goal of therapy is not to get rid of feelings. The goal is to increase awareness of emotional experience so that it is available as orienting information in dealing with the environment, and to help clients become aware of and responsive to the action tendencies toward which feelings prompt them. In this situation, treatment focuses on empathetic responding to client experiencing (Rogers, 1957) or the creation of experiments to increase awareness of both emotional experience and processes that interrupt such experience (Perls, 1973).

There is a lack of a comprehensive theory of emotion and so each tradition has tended to adopt a narrow, singular view of emotion. Again, emotion has not been given the central role in understanding dysfunction and therapeutic change. Different therapeutic approaches considered emotion either as irrational, as destructive, as an epiphenomenon, or as an aspect of adaptive biological functioning. We can grant them to be so. If at all we are in need of a comprehensive understanding of emotion in therapy, a

more differentiated, multifaceted view of emotion and its function in the process of change is required. I do not think that any single therapeutic approach has understood all of emotional functioning in therapy. Different investigators have focused on different affective phenomena without being aware of it.

5. CURRENT VIEWS OF EMOTION⁵

It is good to describe emotion as an ‘action tendency.’ Emotions are not only action tendencies but they are relational action tendencies that act to establish, maintain, or disrupt a relationship with the environment in the form of a readiness to act. Emotions are most noticeable as changes in action readiness. In ‘primary’ or ‘fundamental’ emotions we can discern action readiness and facial expression. In more complex emotions, such as pride and jealousy we do not notice action readiness and facial expression. More complex emotions are defined more clearly by the situation, story, or script. They are devoid of characteristic facial features and expression of action tendencies.

It is the encounter between an event and the individual concern to which the event is relevant that results in emotions. This view implies motivation in emotion. Concerns, needs, or goals are not like drives, pushing for release; rather, they are highly stimulus-sensitive and involve a behavioural potential in the form of an increased readiness to act. Thus we understand that motivation is the elicitation of behaviour systems by appropriate stimuli. In this view of motivation, the things we need or desire are provided both by nature and by experience. Since emotion and motivation are thus highly interlinked, it is good not to separate them but to think of a combined emotion-motivation system.

Another view of emotion is from network theories of emotion. Network theories of emotion explain how emotions are generated. In this view, emotional experiences are the result of a synthesis of different levels of processing. This synthesis produces emotion and is available to us as a constant readout of information relevant to adaptation. So our feelings are an ongoing source of feedback to us about our automatic reactions to situations. Thus emotions generate important information about the meaning of events, and they motivate behaviour in a potentially adaptive

fashion. When we recognize and attend to what we are feeling, we get information about our physiological readiness to act.

In this view, automatic associative processes are dominant at first in generating emotional experience and they govern initial primary reactions, which are based on only simple appraisal. At first, we have emotion by automatic associative process and have primary reactions. This happens because there is a simple appraisal at first. These automatic responses are rapidly followed by more complicated emotional responses. As the mind brings various sensory ideational and memorial inputs together, we have more developed emotional experiences. This high-level integrative structure is called by some as ‘emotional scheme.’ These internal, emotionally-based mental models are the primary targets of therapeutic change.

Thus we find that unconscious processes are centrally involved in generating emotion. Though emotions organize us for action, they do not lead directly to action. Action results from the preattentive integration of a number of levels of information processing, coupled with conscious planning and goal setting.

6. IMPORTANCE OF EMOTIONS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY⁶

Now let us see in what ways emotions play an important role in psychotherapy.

1) Emotion makes schemes accessible

The experience of emotion is an indicator that a schematic emotion network has been activated and is running. In this view of network analysis of emotion, emotion is considered as consisting of a variety of components. Eliciting any one component can evoke other parts of the network and thus the whole network may become conscious. When a sufficient number of components are primed, then the whole network is activated. The activation of the emotion network is important in therapy where the goal is to evoke underlying cognitive-affective structures. Evocation of emotion is not a simple linear or conceptual process. It is more primarily an experiential process involving the shifting of attention allocation to different elements of experience until the scheme is evoked and emotional experience is generated by it.

2) Emotion is an orienting and meaning-producing system

Emotion signifies our concern, provides information about people's reaction to situations, and is fundamentally an adaptive orienting system. Thus we are able to orient ourselves and solve problems. If our emotional responses to situations are problematic or dysfunctional, we have lost our orienting system, and our primary reactive system has gone awry. Therapy needs to help us access the information provided by the emotional system to orient ourselves, or to become aware when the system is dysfunctional.

People respond dysfunctionally when their emotional response information is no longer adaptive to their current situation. Our life experience leads to the development of complex affective schematic structures, which essentially store our experienced reactions to situations and the salient features of the eliciting situation. Now, when these emotion schemes are activated in a new situation, they may generate the responses to the previous situation. Thus we may react with anger if we had been harshly disciplined and we had felt angry. The new situation may not be potentially harsh and yet the old response of anger automatically may be evoked.

3) Emotion is a regulatory system

Regulation is seen as an essential component of the emotion process. Emotion, behaviour, and experience are the products of excitation of an action tendency on the one hand and inhibition of that same tendency on the other. Therefore what is felt depends upon the balance between the two. It is a kind of dual-control system involving letting go and restraint. There could be two potential problems in this system. One of them is the possible presence of unwanted emotions, and the other is the possible absence of desired emotions. Thus problems may emerge from 1. suppression and 2. indulgence or overreaction. We have emotions and we manage them. But we also need to find a balance between expression and control. Therapy needs to address the issues of self-expression and self-control.

4) Awareness of elicitors provides personal clarity and control

It is likely that emotional reaction or an organized response can occur without any awareness of the elicitors. In this case, we are puzzled by our emotional state. This is how it happens. There could have been an automatic cueing of an idiosyncratic emotional scheme, which is more self-relevant than situation-relevant. In this situation, the response may not seem to fit the situation. Thus we may automatically appraise neutral situations or statements as rejection or as threats to our competence or knowledge. This leads us to feel insecure, inexplicably shaky, or devalued and unappreciated. We may automatically respond with fear or sadness but may not know why.

For example, when you go to your friend's house, observing certain non-verbal behaviour as rejection may have activated your emotional scheme and so the resulting feeling will be sadness. You automatically respond with sadness at rejection. But in fact, in conscious processing, you have not clearly symbolized the cues that elicited this response and so your conscious conceptual view does not contain this information. Nevertheless, you are left with a feeling of sadness. By contrast, if you can symbolize your own appraisals and emotional reactions in consciousness, you feel more in control of your experience and can begin to deal with your own experience. Without this awareness, you are confused and stuck in your reactions. Therefore, therapy can help by closely tracking the quality of clients' feeling reactions to problematic situations, enabling them to become aware of the meaning the stimuli had for them, their experienced reality at the moment the response was triggered, and their actual response.

5) Emotion identifies where to focus

Besides tracking the quality of clients' feelings, the therapist needs to use clients' current emotions to grasp what is personally important to the clients (motivation) and what clients believe about themselves at the core (cognition). Thus, emotion becomes the central means for accessing cognition and motivation. In therapy, when clients talk to therapists, the therapists can understand the type of client they are going to be involved with. This enables them to know when and where to focus to get at what is of central concern to them and at their core beliefs about themselves.

6) Emotion controls action

Emotion controls action; this is termed as ‘control procedure’ of emotion. For change to be effected, it is important that therapists help clients achieve a living connection between thought and emotion. It is observed that behaviour-governing cognition seems to change most when cognition is accompanied by emotion. When we feel what we say and think, the confusion disappears and we become clear. At this point, we feel we are connected to our internal resources, and we are confident that what we say is valid and are more likely to act.

7. AFFECTIVE ASSESSMENT⁷

The therapist needs to know the ongoing client process in order to access, stimulate, modify, or bypass different expressions of emotional processes. The recurrent type of processing in which the client is engaged needs to be determined. Basing on the assessment of the client’s current state, the therapist needs to intervene in order to direct the client’s internal processing in ways that will change the client’s emotional state.

For the purpose of intervention, distinctions initially need to be made at least among the following four broad categories of emotional expression: 1. adaptive primary emotions, 2. secondary emotions, 3. instrumental emotions, and 4. maladaptive primary emotions. When we know them and their role, we will be in a position to discern which are the ones we need to access in therapy. Let us consider each of these in turn.

1) Biologically adaptive primary affective responses

Biologically adaptive primary affective responses provide information to the organism about responses to situations. Emotions provide adaptive action tendencies to help organize appropriate behaviour. Thus emotions such as anger at violation, sadness at loss, and fear in response to danger provide adaptive action tendencies. Anger mobilizes one for fight, fear for flight, and sadness for recovery of that which is lost and for grieving. Such emotions are often not initially in awareness, and need to be assessed and intensified in therapy and used as aids to problem solving, healing or growth.

2) Secondary reactive emotional responses

We can distinguish between primary reactive emotional responses and secondary reactive emotional responses. The primary reactive emotional responses are the real emotions to given situations. The secondary reactive emotional responses are not the organism’s direct responses to the environment. These are elicited as reactions to primary responses being thwarted. These are defensive or reactive in nature. Thus for example, one may cry in frustration when actually the person is angry. Here anger is the primary reactive emotional response, and crying is the secondary reactive emotional response. Similarly when afraid, one may express anger, which is a secondary emotional response to underlying emotional process. Again emotions such as fear in response to anticipated danger or hopelessness in response to negative expectations are secondary emotional responses to underlying cognitive processes. In therapy one need not focus on or intensify secondary reactive emotional responses. They are to be bypassed or explored in order to access underlying processes. Usually secondary emotions are part of the presenting problem and they are readily available to awareness. There are also psychologists who make a distinction between primary and advanced empathy. In primary empathy the counsellor identifies the feelings that are apparent (secondary reactive emotional responses) and in advanced empathy he/she identifies the buried feelings (primary reactive emotional responses).

3) Instrumental emotional responses

We can make use of emotions to influence others. Instrumental emotional responses are emotional behaviour patterns that we use to influence other persons. These are expressed in order to achieve some intended effect. For example, one may cry to get sympathy from others. Another may express anger in order to control or dominate. These emotions are not information about responses to situations, but rather attempts to influence others. Therefore, in therapy, the therapist needs to bypass, confront, or interpret them rather than explore.

4) Learned maladaptive primary responses

There can be primary responses (primary emotions), which are learned and maladaptive. Though we intend to deal in therapy

with primary responses, we are not concerned with these learned maladaptive primary responses. Examples for learned maladaptive primary responses include fear to harmless stimuli and anger in response to caring. Since emotions play an adaptive role in our lives, maladaptive responses are learned as a function of trauma or strongly negative environmental contingencies in childhood. These emotions need to be accessed in therapy; they are in need of being modified rather than to be used for orientation.

When a therapist accesses the type of emotions expressed by clients in therapy, he/she knows what to do and when and with what emotion. We need to access primary and maladaptive emotions in therapy rather than secondary and instrumental emotions. We do access primary adaptive emotion for its orientation information, whereas we access maladaptive emotion to make it more amendable to modification and restructuring. Secondary and instrumental emotional expressions are bypassed and often dampened in order to get at underlying experience.

8. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EMOTIONALLY FOCUSED INTERVENTION⁸

There are some general principles of intervention for working with emotion: 1. directing attention to inner experience; 2. refocusing attention on inner experience; 3. focusing on the present; 4. analysing expression; 5. intensifying experience; 6. symbolizing experience; and 7. establishing intents. These seven principles are based on a distillation of the essential therapist operations involved in the practice of emotionally focused interventions by expert practitioners (Gendlin, Greenberg & Safran, Perls, Rice & Rogers). These are principles of therapeutic process that guide the moment-by-moment interventions of the therapist, in an approach to therapy that is highly attuned to shifts in the ongoing experiential process in the client. The seven principles can be understood in the following ways:

1. On the part of the therapist in tune with the above-mentioned seven principles, he/she directs attentional allocation in order to symbolize tacitly generated emotional experience. It is the key intervention process. By directing the client to attend to his/her internal experience, emotion is accessed. This is done in

many ways by the therapist. It can be directly asked by the therapist as 'what are you experiencing?' or by directing a response at the client's internal experience like saying 'I sense some sadness as you say this...'. 2. If the client moves attentional allocation away from his/her internal experience, the therapist refocuses the client's attention inward to attend to bodily-felt experience. This will mean in practice, that when the client deflects from a description of an internal experiential track, the therapist redirects him/her to this inner track. 3. The focus in accessing affect is predominantly on what is occurring in the present in the client's experience. 4. The therapist now analyses carefully the manner of verbal and nonverbal expression as it is occurring and directs attention to or provides feedback about this expression in order to promote the client's awareness of current experience. 5. Then comes the process of intensifying the emerging experience by increasing the client's level of arousal, accessing memories, and encouraging active expression in order to make the experience more vivid and clear. 6. Now the therapist facilitates the client to symbolize in awareness the current experience. 7. Finally the therapist and the client together state intentions based on needs or wants. The last two principles serve to promote the creation of new meaning and to provide a sense of direction for action.

The style of therapeutic intervention proposed above is inherently nonlinear. The therapist can respond to the client's expressions of the moment like a sigh, a gesture, a poignant phrase, a tone of voice, or a vivid memory fragment so that he/she can help prime and evoke the underlying network. At this level the therapist attempts to help the client bring into awareness and develop certain implicit affectively laden information from the expressive motor and schematic levels, as well as the conceptual level. This is done until sufficient stimulus material has been provided to evoke the network. In sum, the therapist, first of all, works to evoke affect. Once feelings are experienced vividly, in the moment, the process shifts to a more symbolic form of processing in order to generate meaning.

For the above principle to be put into practice effectively, the therapists need to create particular types of relationship contexts that will support the intense inner concentration needed for focusing

on emotion. There is a need for the therapist to establish good therapeutic alliance with the clients. It should be an alliance in which the emotional bonds between them will promote the exploration of the clients' internal experience. It is understandable that without a relationship bond in which clients feel accepted, safe, and supported, they will not enter into exploration of their feelings. Besides this sense of acceptance in the 'safe-enough' environment, the clients should sense that they are working together with their therapist to overcome the obstacles, that they are hopeful or optimistic, that what they are doing in therapy will be beneficial. For this, clients need to feel that they are in agreement with their therapists on the goals of therapy, and that the affective tasks they are engaged in are relevant to the goals.

9. TYPES OF THERAPEUTIC INTERVENTION PROCESSES⁹

Three major types of emotionally focused intervention processes can be extracted from the theory and practice of psychotherapy: 1. acknowledging emotion; 2. evoking and intensifying emotion; and 3. restructuring emotion schemes.

1) Acknowledging Emotion

Acknowledging emotions is one of the primary tasks of the clients. Usually the therapist helps clients to acknowledge what they are experiencing. One of the methods is to direct the clients to attend to what is being felt. For emotions to serve their biologically adaptive function, it is necessary that the experience be attended to with accuracy and immediacy.

Clients can attend to different levels of emotion. Therapists can facilitate them to pay attention to different aspects of their experience, for example, to sensations, expressive actions, primary emotions, complex felt senses of meaning/feeling, and needs and wants. When clients attend to bodily sensations, they begin to experience actual tension, aches, temperatures, and the like; when they attend to expressive motor actions, they become aware of gestures, movements, vocal quality, and facial expression; when they attend to discrete primary emotions, they are led to conscious awareness of feelings of sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and joy. When they attend to complex feelings and felt meanings, they come to differentiate a perplexing inner felt sense into complex meanings,

such as feeling 'insulted,' as well as to differentiate complex sensory and expressive motor experience into feeling 'drained.' What needs to be attended to is the idiosyncratic meaning of complex relational emotions and their meanings. This process can be aided by identifying the stimuli that trigger the emotions, as well as by attending to the bodily sense. At last, in symbolizing needs/wants or organismic concerns, clients are able to attend to the action tendency associated with emotion. The clearest aspect of emotions is this disposition to action, and it always needs to be identified, as it provides the directional tendency in emotional experience.

The second major method of facilitating clients' attention to inner experience and acknowledging of emotion is the attunement to clients' feelings and empathic responding to these feelings. Clients' feelings are initially highly subjective and unsure felt sense. They are solidified by empathetic confirmation. When the vague and unsure feeling is empathetically understood by another, this acts to confirm that the feeling is real, and the client becomes more confident in his/her own experience. Thus, the unsure felt sense progresses from a state of relative globality and lack of differentiation to one of increased differentiation, articulation, and integration. For example, one could describe the experience in the therapeutic development like this: 'I feel bad,' to 'I feel angry,' to 'I feel angry with you for what you are doing,' to 'I prefer you stop what you are doing to me.' Sometimes what a client feels in the beginning as a feel of many mixed feelings will end up saying that he/she feels anger, fear, or sadness; when what one felt is made clearer, it is easy to deal with them.

2) Evoking and intensifying emotions

Evoking emotions in therapy leads to a number of change processes:

(1) Core Cognition: It is only when emotions are experienced, one is able to access the core cognition or otherwise called 'hot cognition.' Core cognitions are belief about what we are. In the therapy context we think of unhealthy beliefs, which are negative. When in the throes of pain in interpersonal life, one might say 'I am unlovable.' In ordinary circumstances one does not access such core cognitions.

(2) Leading to Action: If we experience emotions, we are led to action. By nature, emotions motivate behaviour. The presence and intensification of emotions can be used to change behaviour. The motivational component of emotion leads us to action. For example, unless you are angry, you will not be assertive; unless you have fear, you will not run away from danger.

(3) Completion: Expressed emotions lead to further processing and to completion. Let us take situations such as loss or trauma, or the persistent return of intrusive signs. In these situations, there has been incomplete processing of emotional reactions, and the action tendencies have been interrupted. When emotions have not been fully expressed, they interfere with the ability to allocate processing capacity optimally to other tasks. Thus clients feel a sense of being stuck and are unable to proceed further. Within the safety of a therapeutic situation, clients need to access traumatic or painful memories and to re-live, re-experience, and fully express their interrupted emotions. Instead of resisting, surrendering to emotion lets it run its course. Thus, this enables emotion to follow a 'release-relief-recovery' sequence.

3) Emotional restructuring

To achieve the goal of emotional restructuring, relevant activating information must first be made available to the emotion scheme in a fashion that will evoke the internal structure. In this context, it is important to pay attention to body sensation, expressive movement, images, and other immediately evocative aspects of emotional experience, rather than purely conceptual aspects (memory and symbolizing). It is necessary to prime sufficient nodes of the emotion network to get it activated and running. In restructuring, this is the first thing to be done.

Secondly, there could be novel information coming in. This novel information should be made available to the emotion scheme in order for a new scheme and a new memory to be formed. We are not sure whether change is brought about by modifying old scheme or making a new scheme more accessible. Anyway, once a new scheme is formed, there are going to be new automated reactions. Affective synthesis of new meanings guided by the new scheme will bring about newness.

It is to be noted that restructuring of emotion schemes can occur when new information is made available from a number of different sources. For example, external and/or internal dialectical contradictions are to be resolved; new organismic information about needs and concerns must be made available; new, more developed adult processing capacity is to be brought to bear on childhood experience; greater attentional capacity is to be made available in the current in-therapy situation, enabling more information to be synthesized; and dysfunctional beliefs in the scheme are to be changed.

Therapeutic situation is a 'laboratory' for studying emotion process. Research needs to be done on what emotional processes lead to what kind of change. This would illuminate how change occurs in treatment. Research could be on intensifying or promoting expression of emotion; and when it is therapeutic to dampen, modify, or control emotion would be highly relevant to enhance treatment and improve our understanding of therapeutic change. Research could be on the development of reliable means of assessing affective processes (primary, secondary, instrumental, and maladaptive emotions), based on differential patterns of action readiness and eliciting situations.

SECTION - II

EMOTIONS IN PARTICULAR

The second section of the book deals with individual emotions per se. After considering a general framework for understanding emotions, it is appropriate that we turn our attention to particular emotions by applying the general framework to each of them. The description usually takes the mode of comparing, along the discourse with other emotions, which are similar in some aspects and different in other aspects. This is intended for the sake of clarity, taking into account the complexity of emotional realities. There is usually a general description of the characteristics of a given emotion under discussion, followed by a comparison with other emotions, especially the ones that resemble the emotion under discussion. We also dwell upon the intensity variables that influence emotions.

Emotions are complicated, seemingly heterogeneous, states or processes that have been described in many ways. Thus there are many classifications. For our consideration, we take the classification made by Aaron Ben-Ze'ev. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev's classification uses two distinguishing features of emotional evaluations according to which firstly we have to decide the **positive** or **negative** nature of emotions, and, secondly, the object of emotions. Thus, basically every emotion can be classified as positive or negative depending on the evaluation we make of them. This feature expresses the evaluation of our own state. The consideration of the objects indicates the different types of emotional objects.

There are multiple types of objects characteristic of emotional evaluations. The typical emotional object is a certain actual or fictional agent who may be another person (or another living creature in general), or the person experiencing the emotion. It could be different situations of agents like events involving agents (happiness at your son's graduation), states of persons (worry about

your child's health), attributes of persons (your envy about the gracefulness of your rival), and relationships (your jealousy about your partner's interest in another person).

If agents are the typical emotional objects, then emotions can be categorised into three groups according to

1. **fortunes of agents**
2. **actions of agents**, and
3. **the agent as a whole**.

Again each group can be further divided into emotions directed at other agents and at oneself. These groups are known to express three basic patterns involved in evaluating agents:

1. **desirability** of the agent's situation;
2. **praiseworthiness** of the agent's specific actions;
3. **appealingness** of the agent.

The three groups such as fortunes, actions and the agent as a whole can be directed at **oneself** or at **others**. These features express the social nature of emotions. They express our concerns of how we view others and how others view us.

To recapitulate what we have so far said about the classification of emotion: 1. The division is based on our **evaluation** of emotions. 2. This evaluation is about the **fortunes** of agents whose concern is desirability of the agent, **actions** of the agents whose concern is praiseworthiness of the agent, and the **agent as a whole** whose concern is the appealingness of the agent. 3. These fortunes, actions and the agent as a whole can be directed towards **oneself** or towards **others**. 4. With regard to the fortunes of the agent alone there could be possibility of considering them as **actual** or **possible** and **good** or **bad**. 5. Now finally whatever emotion you arrive at can be considered as **positive** or **negative**. To make clear the points that I have hitherto dealt with, let me present the table of classification of emotions here, though it is dealt with properly and in detail in the chapter on the classification of emotions.

The classification of emotions									
Emotional evaluations of									
	Fortunes of agents (desirability of)				Actions of agents (praiseworthiness of)				The agent as a whole (appealingness of)
							The agent as a whole (appealingness of)		
	Oneself		Others		One-self	Others	One-self	Other agents	
	Actual	Possible	Good	Bad					
Positive:	Happiness	Hope	Happy-for	Pleasure -in-others' -misfortune	Pride	Gratitude	Pridefulness	Love	Sexual desire
Negative:	Sadness	Fear	Envy	Pity	Regret	Anger	Shame	Hate	Disgust

Note: Love, hate, pridefulness and shame are not only influenced by actions of agents (praiseworthiness of) but also by the agent as a whole (appealingness of). They are conjointly produced by the praiseworthiness and appealingness of the agent.

This section has three parts. The first part deals with the fortunes of agents; the second part deals with the actions of the agents; and the third part deals with the actions of agents and the agent as a whole. Emotions considered in each of the parts may either be directed to oneself or to others.

PART - I

FORTUNES OF AGENTS

In this first part dealing with the fortunes of agents, we have emotions directed to oneself and emotions directed to others.

A. Oneself

Emotions directed to oneself include, happiness and sadness; and hope and fear which refer to the future. Under fear, we also deal with despair, resignation, horror, courage, cowardice and shyness.

16

HAPPINESS

So far we have been dealing with what emotions are and their characteristics. In a way we have been seeing emotions in general. But now we are starting to understand individual emotions. For this I would like to fall back on the classification of emotions. According to the broad classification of evaluation of emotions, we have first the fortunes of agents in the sense of the desirability of the given situation, secondly the actions of agents in terms of their approval or disapproval of the actions, and thirdly the evaluation of the agent as a whole. We shall proceed in describing individual emotions in the order given above. So let us take the first division, which comes under the emotional evaluations of the fortunes of agents. These again can be divided into emotions directed at oneself or at other agents. These again can further be divided into: the emotions directed towards oneself as either actual or possible and the emotions directed towards others as either the good fortune or bad fortune of others. Thus let us take happiness which is the actual positive emotion directed towards oneself, according to the emotional evaluations of the fortunes of agents. To put it differently happiness is simply an emotional evaluation of the fortunes of agents, which is directed towards oneself and it is actually happening and is positive.

Humans tend towards happiness. In whichever situation we are, we always seek happiness. It is our individual right and it is one of the central themes in works of art, films and writings. Yet it is also a mystery. To define what exactly constitutes happiness is difficult.

Psychologists make a distinction between two major types of happiness. They are 1. a long-term sentiment of happiness, which concerns the well-being and flourishing nature of an individual and 2. a short-term emotion of happiness, which denotes the state of joy and satisfaction. They are happiness as an acute emotion and happiness as a sentiment.¹

1. HAPPINESS AS A SENTIMENT

If we take happiness as a sentiment, it is the most general positive emotion. It contains a general evaluation of our life as a whole or at least a significant aspect of our life like work and family. Seen from this perspective, happiness involves our deepest strivings and concerns. Happiness need not be taken merely as a pleasant feeling but it entails evaluation of our situation and things around us as basically right and good. Happiness resembles love in so far as it entails a positive profound evaluation of significant aspects, but love mainly refers to another person. We also realize that love is one of the most important features determining our happiness.²

2. HAPPINESS AS AN ACUTE EMOTION

Happiness is an acute emotion and a short-term state of pleasure or satisfaction occurring as a result of a specific (real or imaginary) positive change. Generally we can find that even people who are depressed laugh momentarily at something and are pleased with a specific event. This may be a minimal functioning of mere contentment or relaxation found in animals or infants or senile people. Healthy adults desire a profound sentiment of happiness, which involves the optimal functioning of humans. If one is merely content with one's current state without any ambitions and fulfilling activities, then that will result is misery in the long run. It is like viewing television and gorging ourselves on consumer goods, which in fact satisfy us in the short run, but may not make us substantially happier.³

3. BACKGROUND BASELINE

As an acute emotion, happiness is the occasional foreground reaction to specific positive events. Happiness as a sentiment is the background framework. Certainly the background framework determines to a certain extent the foreground element of occasional happiness. Like other emotional evaluations, the evaluations underlying the occasional emotion of happiness are made always in relation to a certain background baseline. The experience of individuals can be varying depending upon where they are with regard to the baseline. If the experience is above the baseline, then it is happiness; if it is below the baseline, then it is unhappiness; and those experiences, which match the baseline, are understood

as neutral. One and the same experience may be associated with different levels of emotions due to the relative position with the baseline. In addition to this, people's baselines too slide up and down. It is known that people whose baselines are lower, for instance, whose standards and expectations are lower, are known to be happy. Thus we notice that people who were brought up in poverty and deprivation, when they attain a certain level of comfort and standard in life, experience happiness compared to people who may be enjoying a moderate level of standard right from the very beginning. It is like being happy if you have been saved from a terminal illness through medical procedure compared to those who did not experience anything like terminal illness. It is to be noted that personal and social comparisons are in a way crucial in determining happiness.⁴

4. PERSONAL MAKEUP

Though the background framework as a baseline influences the level of happiness or unhappiness or neutral experience, what is also important is that this framework expresses our personal makeup, which also determines the very nature of our emotional sensitivity. Our personal makeup gives a colouring to all our experiences; for example, making us interpret specific events as positive or negative. Have you not noticed people who whatever happens in their lives excepting great misfortune, tend to be always happy, whereas others whatever happens excepting great fortune, tend to be always unhappy regardless of their current situation? Thus the level of happiness reported by people seems to remain rather stable in their lives.⁵

5. GENETIC STABLE BASELINE

It is interesting to note that there is a genetic stable baseline or a 'set point' that is characteristic of individuals. Negative experiences do diminish the level of happiness in individuals but only for a while. They are only transitory fluctuations of a more stable baseline genetically predisposed. Thus we understand that there is a set point for happiness, a genetically determined mood level that may move up and down due to various experiences but only for a while. People tend to come back to their genetically determined baseline. Some estimate that the stable component of our subjective well-being approaches even 80 percent.

Based on the view we have seen above, we can reasonably predict that those who are the happiest will be the happiest ten years from now in spite of the fluctuations they may experience in their lives. It is common experience for us to meet people who seem happy most of the time and also people who are unhappy most of the time. This baseline does not dramatically change except for a while, as a fluctuation due to educational achievement, income, or social status. I have known people who rose in social status rather rapidly but remained rather depressed and wanted all the more a rise in social status. Even if they achieved what they desired they were not as happy as they expected. Some even go to the extent of saying that it is futile to be happier just like wanting to be taller than what you are and the attempt is counterproductive.

Besides the genetic factor that influences long-term happiness, another important factor is the frequency with which one experiences the occasional emotion of happiness and other positive emotions. This determines one's happiness as a sentiment. We can safely say that happiness as a sentiment consists of the acute emotions of happiness; so a succession of specific positive experiences will increase our long-term happiness. If one has the chances of frequent specific positive experiences, then that person in all likelihood has a long-term happiness. Now we come to a clear distinction between occasional factors responsible for the generation of happiness as an emotion and constitutive factors responsible for the generation of the sentiment of happiness. Both occasional factors and constitutive factors are to be taken seriously in providing emotional support to oneself or to others. Now with the distinction of the occasional emotion of happiness and the long-term sentiment of happiness being clear, let us turn our attention to the discussion of long-term sentiment of happiness.⁶

6. DETERMINANTS OF HAPPINESS

1) Objective Factors

It is not just one factor that influences happiness. There are quite a few of them. One wonders whether the subjective individual personal factors or objective factors are at play. It should be both; both the subjective and objective factors influence our happiness. There appears to be a positive correlation between income and

long-term happiness. This we can see in any culture, in any country. Usually richer people report higher average levels of happiness than poorer people. Rich people seem to enjoy well-being and life satisfaction, which are happiness in concrete terms. It is the common belief among people that money will bring in happiness. Money or material things are needed for everyone to develop both one's personality and to grow in a society. Poverty beyond a certain limit is degrading. Poor people usually are worried about the next meal and are preoccupied with various demands of living for want of money. Therefore money is required for one's happiness. But after a certain level of possession, money may not matter. Therefore we need to understand that for the ordinarily satisfied life we need money to a certain level and beyond that point money has no great influence on our happiness. Why, after a certain level the accumulation of money may even decrease the happiness of the individual.⁷

2) Subjective Factors

There are also subjective factors that contribute to one's happiness. It has been noticed that people who are handicapped, blind, retarded and malformed are not less happy than other people in general. People in poorer environments are not necessarily less happy than those in a richer environment. So objective factors alone do not produce long-term happiness. A man who got the highest lottery in a country was not happy and got into a lot of gambling and other criminal activities that he was jailed, at which his wife remarked that her husband was happier without winning the lottery. For the disabled people, achieving a small little progress in any field will give them great happiness, which is not noticed by able-bodied people. Like other emotions, happiness is typically comparative. Our relative position is usually more significant than the absolute one. Of course there are instances where comparative concern is not important. Take the example of parents who lost their child. The death of their child does not function as a comparative baseline against which all other events are perceived. The death of the child does reduce, if not completely eliminate, the possibility of being happy.⁸

3) Genetic Factors

A study done on good-looking people indicates that they are not happier than other people in spite of the advantage they have with their good look. This may be due to the genetic factor to happiness. To a greater extent our happiness is determined by our genetic factors and, secondly, there is the comparative concern. The good-looking people may be comparing themselves with the even better-looking people. This may be seen with actors and actresses. They are in fact objectively good-looking but they may constantly compare themselves with other better-looking people and thus reduce the chance of being happy.

So far what we have seen applies both to the sentiment of happiness and the occasional acute emotion. Positive objective experiences like a salary rise or an unexpected gift will generate the acute emotion of happiness but it is not known to change our personal affective baseline, and so there may not be any change in the long-term sentiment of happiness. That is why people say that money cannot buy happiness. Money can increase our acute emotion of happiness temporarily but cannot significantly change our constitutive disposition of happiness. For example, one may be richer now than fifteen years before but that may not make the person happier. We need to keep in mind that I am not talking about absolute poverty in which money is needed and that will make one happy. I am thinking of a situation where one has enough money to live a reasonably comfortable life and in that situation I am considering whether having more money will make one happier or not.⁹

4) Subjective-Objective Dilemma

There is one difficulty in our distinction of objective and subjective determinants of happiness. It is not always obvious to everyone whether a certain factor is objective or subjective. There are factors which cannot be identified either as objective or subjective. Let us take, for example, money. Money is an objective factor but our attitude towards money is a subjective factor. With money we can buy many gadgets that may give us comfort and luxury. There are also people who do not give much importance to money and thus their attitude towards money significantly

changes their manner of use of money in their lives. There are also social factors like marriage, family, friends, and children, which determine our long-term happiness in a more significant way than economic factors like job, income, and standard of living. But it is difficult to classify the social factors either as objective or subjective. A factor is considered objective if it does not depend upon the thinking of the agent. But these social factors depend upon the activities of the agent.¹⁰

5) Happiness - A Dynamic Process

Oft recurring good experiences need not generate happiness. What was originally enjoyable becomes less enjoyable with repetition. In our counselling course, I enjoyed taking the participants for a picnic during the programme. In the beginning that was an enjoyable experience which I was looking forward to. But when repeatedly I had to go for the picnic and to the same places, the happiness I enjoyed originally became less. Our needs change and thus our evaluation of the things we achieve or have, and so they generate less happiness when repeated. We just cannot attain happiness and sit with that. Happiness is an ongoing dynamic process.¹¹

6) Happiness from Pursuit

When we strive after something, we are happy to attain it. Once the end is achieved, it does not continue to occupy our mind. Our mind with its imagination is set on a distant goal more difficult than the previous one we achieved. Therefore, happiness does not rest with the specific results of our activities but it rests on the way we act. Thus happiness is generated from the pursuit rather than from the attainment of any end. Happiness depends more on the degree in which our minds are properly employed than the circumstances in which we act, the materials which are available, and the tools we employ.¹²

7) Happiness depends on attitude

Attaining a specific goal may give us an occasional emotion of happiness rather than the long-term sentiment of happiness. What is meaningful in life is the nature of our activity and the value we attach to it rather than the attainment of external ends.

Having more things is not going to make us happy since we will never reach a point where we can say that we have enough. Therefore happiness depends on our attitude towards the things we achieved rather than the quantity of things we achieved. Since our needs and desires are constantly changing and we are not satisfied with what we achieved, advertisements make full use of this phenomenon.

One wonders what is crucial in determining happiness. Happiness consists of both objective and subjective factors and its dynamic nature. It is known that in extreme situations, the objective factors are more needed. In normal circumstances, the subjective factors are essential. In every instance we notice the dynamic nature of both the objective and subjective aspects.¹³

7. MAINTAINING LONG-TERM HAPPINESS

Most people report that they are happy and recount their satisfaction with domains like marriage, work, and leisure. This is true even among the majority of disadvantaged persons. In any case, the comparative aspect is crucial in emotions. We are happy when our current situation is perceived better than our personal affective baseline; we are sad when our current situation is perceived to be worse than our personal affective baseline. The determination of our personal affective baseline will depend on many subjective factors.

Most emotions are well-circumscribed reactions to specific events, but happiness is a way we evaluate life as a whole, or significant aspects of our life like family and work that have a broad impact on life as a whole. Because of its global evaluation, its scope too is correspondingly broad. Therefore, it is rather difficult to delineate its boundaries. Some people equate happiness with joy. But joy is part of happiness. Happiness can include episodes of joy as well as other positive emotions like contentment, but happiness cannot be equated with any of these. Happiness indeed touches upon our deepest strivings, ideals and competencies. Therefore, it is not surprising to note that happiness will also include moments of struggle, turmoil, and pain. That is why meaningful endeavours and even pain and suffering can legitimately contribute to our happiness. Episodes of happiness may last for minutes or days, and

may be punctuated by moments of sadness and despair as well as joy and gladness. Even though happiness is an episodic state, its connotations are nonetheless global. Generally happiness means that things are all right with the world around us, even though sometimes there are temporary hardships on the way.¹⁴

8. EXPERIENCE OF JOY

It is known that joy is not the same as happiness and it is only part of happiness. At the same time the experience of joy is different from sensory pleasure. But sensory pleasure may lead to the experience of joy as in the case of the culmination of sexual pleasure, which may increase intimacy and lead to enjoyable social interaction. By its expression, joy serves a distinct function in society: It operates as a universally recognizable signal of readiness for friendly interaction. By contagion, empathy and facial feedback, joy expression can contribute to the well-being of the social interactions. Now let us proceed to see the characteristics, causes and functions of joy.

1) Not Sensory Pleasure

Joy is not the same as sensory pleasure. Pleasure we attain through senses and joy is quite different from pleasure. If we enjoy our favourite dish, it is merely a pleasure. Even the sexual experience, though it may be very high in its intensity, cannot be equated with joy. Sexual encounters are often related to interest-excitement and may be accompanied by or followed by feelings of enjoyment. In this case, it is merely a sexual pleasure. We come to the conclusion that sexual pleasure can be attained even when one is sad. That is why people who are grieving the loss of someone can experience sexual pleasure amidst the grief.

2) Causes of Joy

Infants are known to smile at the age of 3 weeks when a high-pitched human voice is addressed to them. Even though a smile at the age of 3 weeks does not suggest its social nature clearly, it is nonetheless in the context of social interaction that the smile takes place. Thus social interaction or social relations may be one of the sources of joyful experience. We also observe that infants of the age of 4 or 5 weeks to the age of about 4 to 5 months respond with

joyfulness to a smiling and gently nodding face of a human face towards it about 2 feet away. Play is another source of joy in infants and adults. The next one will be the overcoming of obstacles or triumphing over a handicap, whether real or imaginary. Joyful experiences are expressed through smiling and laughter. Nevertheless the very first smile of the newborn seems to have been entirely mediated by internal brain stem activity, for it occurs during drowsy states and sleep. Therefore, there cannot be the possibility of interaction with another human being.

3) Functions of Joy

First of all, there is a social function. The interaction between the infant and the caregiver, out of which emerges joy, is a prototype of the experience the infant will have in later life in society. Feeling secure in the love and presence of the caregivers especially the mother, the child explores its environment and enjoys in doing it. Secondly, there is a biological function. Joy is a matter of rewarding experience. When we are joyful for the most part of our wakeful hours, all the bodily systems work smoothly and in harmony. Both body and mind work in collaboration and in tune with each other. Thirdly, there is the socialization function of joy. We may experience joy as a by-product of accomplishing something or achieving a goal. Though we cannot pursue joy, we can plan and arrange things that are likely to induce joy as a by-product. This happens especially by the acquisition of skills by which we gain mastery over certain situation and that might become a source of joy.¹⁵

17

EXHILARATION AND HUMOUR

Consideration and study of humour led to the idea of exhilaration. The study of positive affective responses to humour actually led to the idea of exhilaration. The original aim of introducing the concept 'exhilaration' as an emotion was to integrate the various responses occurring at the levels of behaviour, physiology, and emotional experience. Before the use of the word 'exhilaration,' the concept 'humour response' was used and it did not adequately represent the affective nature of the response to humour. Humour response implied the perception of a stimulus as funny, sometimes also including such overt behaviour of smiling and laughter. However, what were missing were the physiological changes and the emotional experience.

Humour is considered a positive state of mind produced by someone saying or doing something incongruous, unexpected or absurd, or this occurs for some other reason, and people laugh. To find things funny is a special kind of joy and so important for happiness. Several studies have identified a clear relation between humour and happiness. Happy people seem to have a good sense of humour.¹

1. EMOTION OF EXHILARATION

The term 'exhilaration' was originally associated with cheerfulness. The term as derived from the Latin word 'hilaris' that is translated as 'cheerful' was originally meant to denote the process of making cheerful or the temporary rise in cheerful state. It is not surprising to note that some other definitions of exhilaration give more importance to 'excitement' component than to 'cheerfulness' component. Perhaps in common language the meaning of exhilaration is sometimes restricted to the high end of the excitement continuum. But as it is used here, the excitement component is not emphasized.

Wundt (1874/1903) explained feelings in terms of a three-dimensional model containing the axes pleasantness-unpleasantness, excitation-quietness, and strain-relaxation. Accordingly, exhilaration might be described as a pleasurable, relaxed excitation. Within taxonomies of emotion categories, exhilaration may be seen as a facet of the positive emotion of happiness (or joy).

It is good to separate exhilaration from cheerfulness conceptually. A cheerful mood is characterized by a longer duration, less fluctuation in intensity, and greater independence from eliciting stimulus. Incidents of exhilaration are of short duration, have a marked timing, steep onset, a pronounced apex and a less steep offset. Nevertheless there is a positive correlation between cheerfulness and exhilaration. A cheerful state may induce exhilaration and an accumulation of exhilaration responses may lead to longer-lasting changes in the level of cheerfulness. Thus exhilaration may be described as an emotion construct denoting a temporary increase in a cheerful state that is observable in behaviour, physiology and emotional experience, and that occurs in response to humour, but also to other stimuli.²

2. DESCRIPTION OF EXHILARATION³

1) Behaviour

Smiling: The smile of exhilaration is produced by the contraction of two pairs of facial muscles. One of them produces the facial appearance perceived as smiling. It pulls the lip corner obliquely up and back, and deepens the furrow running from the nostril to the lip corner. The other lifts the cheeks upward and draws the skin toward the eyes from the temple and cheeks.

Laughing: The contraction of the two pairs of facial muscles also forms the core of the laughter exhilaration besides other muscles.

Gestures and Postures: With the increasing intensity of laughter, movements of the trunk and the limbs may occur, as well as changes in posture. The head is thrown back and this facilitates the expulsion of air through the throat. There is the vibration of the trunk and shoulders, which reflect the effects of the forced respiratory movements of the diaphragm and abdominal muscles.

2) Physiology

Respiration: Typically a respiration cycle consists of inspiration, inspiration pause, expiration, and expiration pause. When one laughs, the respiration rate remains within the boundaries of the resting state. Nevertheless, there is more expiration than inspiration. Usually the respiratory muscles are passive during exhaling; there is a forced expiration during laughter.

Vocalization: There are sounds emitted during laughter. The sounds thus emitted are extremely diverse, including all vowels and many consonants, but also voiceless laughter. The sound most generally emitted is identified as 'he-he' turning to 'ha-ha.'

Cardiovascular and Electrodermal Activity: Characteristic cardiovascular changes and fluctuations in electrodermal activity are also observed. These take place perhaps due to the altered respiration pattern. There will be acceleration of the heart rate.

3) Experience

In humour, we are confronted with a stimulus that contains incongruous, contradicting or opposing elements. There are physiological changes. Emotional experience is positively inter-correlated which means that increased intensity in one component of exhilaration goes along with increased intensity in the other two components.

4) Antecedents

A variety of stimuli can elicit exhilaration. It usually happens in complex situation towards which several social and physical factors may influence the success of the induction. Even organismic factors facilitate or inhibit the release of exhilaration. These factors may relate to temporary states or to habitual traits.

3. ELICITORS OF EXHILARATION

Humour: Humour (in the form of jokes, cartoons, funny stories or films, comedy, parody, practical jokes, music, pantomime, etc.) is a reliable elicitor of exhilaration. But humour is not an emotion. **Nitrous Oxide:** Nitrous oxide (N_2O , the 'laughing gas') is a colourless, non-flammable gas that has a sweet, almost mentholated taste. The effects last for the duration of the time the

gas is inhaled. The concentration of N_2O can be varied experimentally by mixing it with O_2 . **Other Stimuli and situations:** Exhilaration may also occur in response to other stimuli and situations. The laughter of others can be exhilarating itself; exhilarated laughter is catching or infectious. Exhilaration may occur during various forms of motor play (e.g., dancing, running, jumping, or chasing), although these states are not experienced as humorous. Exhilaration may accompany the breaking of taboos, or doing something that is forbidden or secretive. Humour consists in the discovery and the resolution of incongruity.⁴

4. FUNCTIONS OF HUMOUR

Children of 2- or 3-years age want to share their humour, and try to amuse each other or their parents. For 7-year-old children, humour is contagious. They laugh more when humour is shared. Laughing acts as a signal for intimacy. Laughter is rewarding in the sense that the individual will be liked, and accepted as a member of the group. Humour makes young people more attractive to one another. Humour acts as a powerful source of social bonding. When someone provides humour to the group, the social cohesion of the whole group will increase. Joking relationship usually signifies close relationship. It was found that joking relationships were quite common in pre-literate societies. The jokes consist of insults, teasing, banter, horseplay and obscenities, which are not taken as offence. Humour in working groups usually eases tensions, hardship and boredom of work, increases job satisfaction, improves social relationships and results in more cooperation and productivity. Needless to say that humour helps us cope with social stresses.⁵

18

SADNESS

1. SORROW AND SADNESS

Sadness is another negative emotion toward the misfortune of agents, just like happiness is a positive emotion toward the fortune of the agents (oneself). In pity and compassion we are concerned with the misfortune of others but in sadness we are concerned with the misfortune of ourselves. Since sadness is concerned about our own misfortune, it includes a more profound negative evaluation. Sadness seems similar to sorrow. When we are concerned with a specific negative event about ourselves, it is ordinary sorrow. But when the event is judged to be personally more significant and sorrow is more intense, then we speak of this emotional attitude as sadness. Therefore sadness is deeper and longer lasting than mere sorrow. From what we learned about emotions and sentiments, we can say that sadness is a sentiment rather than an emotion. Of course, extreme cases of sadness can turn into mood disorder of depression.¹

2. PASSIVITY IN SADNESS

Since sadness involves profound negative evaluation of our situation, it is typically not associated with putting up resistance but with passivity and resignation when confronted with a negative event. Though people may withdraw in sadness, it is also a moment of fostering a constructive self-examination. Sadness only confirms our appraisal of things as valuable. Thus we become aware of what we value, hold precious and conserve in our life.

Sadness is a response to an event that has already taken place or is perceived as inevitable, and so may be regarded as an event that has already taken place. When we do not have control over the situation that had taken place, we feel sad; if there was control, we might feel angry. Compared to guilt and shame, the self in sadness is not responsible for the problem. Compared to anger, which

believes that the loss can be replaced, in sadness it is the acceptance of the loss.²

3. SADNESS – A RESPONSE TO LOST OR UNATTAINED GOAL

Like any other emotion, sadness does the function of enabling and motivating us to respond adaptively. Emotions have adaptive function at the centre. Sadness is an emotion experienced in the face of an event perceived as unpleasant. Typically sadness is a response to a goal that is lost or not attained.³

4. DIFFERENTIAL UNDERSTANDING

Emotion compared with	Characteristics of the emotion compared with	Characteristics of Sadness
Fear	Anticipates an event to take place	Response to an event that has already taken place
Anger	Someone is responsible Thinks that one can replace the lost goal	Self is not responsible Accepts the loss
Guilt	Judgement that self is responsible	Self is not responsible
Resignation	It is a response when the bad outcome was inevitable	Sadness comes when one thinks that the situation might have been reversible

Research shows that the negative emotions anger, guilt, and sadness are often felt together and therefore a judgement about agency does not always explain the choice of sadness versus anger or guilt. There are instances when individuals take to anger instead of sadness in the event of frustration, even when it is clear that there is no one responsible for the problem. Some psychologists are not convinced that agency is that crucial in appraising sadness. They say that it is the degree of surprise at the outcome that better predicts sadness as opposed to anger.⁴

5. SELF-FOCUS IN SADNESS

In sadness one is self-focused so much so one's attention is lowered. One finds it difficult to focus on other things since so

much of attention is paid to oneself. One turns inward, as this emotion is not caused by another agent. In anger the attention goes out to another person, but in sadness the attention turns to oneself. It is 'me' emotion rather than 'I' emotion. In sadness the focus is on the consequences for the self in the event of not achieving its goals compared to anger where the focus is on the external cause of frustration.⁵

6. FUNCTIONS OF SADNESS

Sadness usually can strengthen social bonds like joy. It is a common experience in society that when someone dies and one is sad, family members and friends come together to console the person. It is also said that grief besides strengthening communal bonds, increases the probability of survival. In grief there may be many emotions but the dominant one is sadness.

Sadness usually slows down the cognitive and motor systems. In a study done with 9-month-old infants, it was found that when the mother showed sadness in her interaction with the infant, the infant significantly decreased exploratory play. Play is supposed to be the principal and continuous activity of healthy infants and children. But it can be dramatically reduced due to sadness.

The slowing down of mental and motor activities may have an adaptive function. It makes one to have a careful look at the source of trouble, and deeper reflection on a disappointing performance or a failure that caused the sadness. It enables one to scrutinize the self and the circumstances and gain a new perspective, which will ameliorate the performance better in the future. Besides, sadness also communicates to the self and others that there is a serious trouble and succour is needed immediately. Friends and relatives immediately rush in with help. People become empathetic towards the sad person. Other people may be moved to altruistic behaviour seeing a sad person.⁶

19

GRIEF

Grief is a profound form of sadness. Usually it is concerned with death, the most substantial misfortune we experience. In the death of someone very close to us and whom we value very much, we experience the irrevocable loss. Since death has a profound impact on us, grief is focused on the same issue for a long period of time. Thus grief typically develops into a sentiment and in extreme cases into depression. Grief is not limited to death alone, it may concern misfortunes, which do not involve death but nevertheless are considered as grim as death. Losses can happen through separation and divorce, both of which have their own psychological costs. Losses can also be less tangible, for example, the loss of an ideal, the loss of a limb, or the loss of capacities through chronic illness. Such examples highlight that although we consider the interpersonal context in which losses occur, reactions to losses that are not interpersonal must also be considered. The implications they may have are similar to the loss of death.

When classifying we assign grief as an emotion toward the bad fortune of others. But in fact, it has so much to do with our own misfortune as well. A great deal of concern in grief is that of our own misfortune or feeling of loss. When we grieve the death of someone, it is not that the dead person is suffering now or missing something of our present life, but we feel something in us has died, that our life has lost a valuable aspect.¹

1. GRIEF OVER THE CHILD'S DEATH

It is said that the parents' grief over the death of their child is perhaps the most intense emotion a person can experience. In the tsunami of December 2004 we heard of many stories of people being lost and grieved. Among them the most pathetic was parents mourning the death of their children. The general rule that company in distress, that is, a common or shared loss, makes sorrow less,

does not apply to the loss of a child. Whenever the bereaved parents hear of a child's death in some other family, they are reminded of the loss of their own child and thereby grief is increased rather than reduced.

Parents usually grieve the death of their child for life. Some say that the earliest period of minor closure of grief of a child's death is three years. It is hard for them to continue as usual. Sometimes grief may harm their relationship with the surviving children also. Parents may idealize the deceased child and overidentify themselves with the dead child. Over the years the intensity seems to decrease but it usually continues for life. Studies indicate that when parents lose their children through death, the grieving can go unabated some 13 years. It may be harder for older parents to come to terms with loss than it is for younger parents. Whereas the younger parents may eventually come to develop new plans and goals, older parents have fewer options, for example, to have additional children to replace the lost child, or to come to value some other role or goal in the place of the lost child. This may be due to the aging process and the vulnerable health they have.

We know that happiness is parallel to sadness. But grief, which expresses the most profound loss, has no parallel positive emotion that expresses the greatest possible gain. It is so because the loss in grief is irrevocable, and our greatest gains are revocable. This means that there can always be something that abolishes or reduces the gain.²

2. RECOMMENDED PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOUR

In most cultures and religions there are traditional or customary rituals or practices associated with grief. The practice differs from culture to culture. In some cultures, for seven consecutive days following the death of a person, all the relatives and friends sit together with the grieving family members, having a small talk. This reduces the intensity of grief. There are also ceremonies for which all the friends and relatives come together again after sometime to mark the end of the major mourning. The cultural practices and religious ceremonies are meant to reduce the intensity of grief. Then for some deaths, there is mourning for a

year. This is meant to maintain an appropriate level of grief, which tends to be reduced over the passage of time. During that one year, there will be no social functions or marriages in the family and the members may have to observe certain fasts or say prayers.³

3. BACKGROUND CIRCUMSTANCES

The intensity of grief may also be influenced by background circumstances expressed in the variables of accountability, readiness, and deservingness. Let us take the example of the variable accountability. If the death of our beloved can be attributed to impersonal circumstances, then our grief will be less. It is difficult for parents to cope with the death of a child who committed suicide. Therefore the attempt by the parents is to blame other people or on external circumstances beyond their control. Parents of children who committed suicide or who died in an accident experience more guilt than did parents of children who died of chronic illness. Here death linked to suicide or accidents may be perceived as preventable, and thus are more likely to elicit guilt.

If we had been expecting the death of someone and were ready for that person's death, that might influence our grief. If the person has been seriously ill for a long time, our grief is usually less intense than in the case of a sudden death. Almost the whole world grieved the deaths of thousands of people by tsunami. One reason could be that it was all of a sudden and unexpected.⁴

4. EMOTIONAL DYNAMICS IN GRIEF

It is agreed that separation or loss is the principal determinant of grief. Bowlby points out that in infancy and early childhood the first emotional response to separation is fear; whereas in the case of adults, loss elicits distress first; and in most cases distress remains predominant. It is likely to be a combination of fundamental emotions in grief: such as distress, fear, anger, guilt, and shame. The experience of grief could be in the following pattern:

Distress-Fear: The infants' reaction to separation or loss is fear. In older children and adults, distress seems to be the first reaction. Grief as such is experienced only when the distress becomes prominent. Nevertheless at any time one will experience distress-fear interaction when one thinks that safety or security is jeopardized.

Distress-Anger: Distress is known as the innate activator of anger. Since distress is part of loss reaction, one is likely to have anger as well. Even the one experiencing loss of someone will be angry with the one who deserted or died. The plans one had to be executed by the dead person are not going to be realized, and that might give rise to anger.

Distress-Fear-Anger: In this type of interaction, the anger experienced may be either functional or dysfunctional. Positively it is meant to overcome the obstacles to reunion and in discouraging a loved one from going away again. Negatively, when one is left behind repeatedly, it will lead to destructive aggression and violence.

Distress-Guilt-Shame: In this combination, one is likely to feel guilt as part of grief since one might think that one did not do as much one should have done. Likewise, there will be feeling of shame when the individual thinks that others are condemning him/her for not having been good to the dead person as much as one should have been.⁵

20

LONELINESS

Loneliness is a form of sadness. This type of sadness stems from the absence of desired social relationships. It is known as an emotional hunger for intimacy in personal and social relationships. It involves a discrepancy between one's desired and achieved level of social interaction. The characteristic desire of the lonely people is not so much to yearn for others to be part of their lives, but they desperately wish to be part of the lives of others. This desire is more to be an emotional object than a subject. They feel as though they are nonentities, and special to no one. That is why even the quality relationship of the family members does not improve the situation of lonely people. Family members are not considered to be chosen by choice but are born into this relationship. On the contrary, our friends choose our company and thus we may feel special and valued by their choice. What the lonely people are concerned about is the attitude of others towards them than others' actual company. The lonely people only want to be sure that they can have the company of others if they do want it. I remember to have lived in two different circumstances. In one I was rather alone and I could not have the company of others. In that situation I was feeling lonely. Then I happened to live in another circumstance where there were many people around me. In fact I did not have many interactions with them, but the assurance that I can have the company of others if I wanted was there and therefore I did not feel lonely.¹

1. MESSAGE OF CONTRADICTION

It is true that the lonely persons desire so much the intimate and meaningful relationships with others. But unconsciously they send messages of disinterest and non-involvement. This may stem from their fear of failure in forming relationships, which in most cases is supported by past experiences, and generates a negative attitude towards such relationships and towards other people. It

looks that unconsciously lonely people seem to expect others to hold negative views towards them. Their unconscious desire not to get involved seriously in the lives of others and their expectation that others hold negative attitude towards them act as a defence mechanism against possible failure in developing rewarding relationships with others. The actual discrepancy between what they desire deep down and what they expect complicates the already miserable situation of lonely people.²

2. LONELINESS AND ALONENESS

There is a difference between loneliness and being alone. When a person is alone, it means that the individual is not with another person. But loneliness is a subjective phenomenon irrespective of the presence or absence of another individual. A person may feel lonely even in a crowd. Physical proximity is not a guarantee against loneliness. Therefore lonely persons may not be alone, and persons alone need not be lonely. All the same, it is often assumed that loneliness and aloneness are correlated.

It looks as though loneliness is a type of emotion directed at desired social relationships. Yet, it is not a typical emotion since it lacks a specific object. It is not directed at a specific object. Loneliness is often associated with shyness, shame, guilt, anxiety, and frustration. Each of these emotional states indicates the problem we have with our self-esteem.³

3. POSITIVE SIDE OF LONELINESS

Our evaluation of loneliness is negative since it expresses involuntary separation from social relationships, which are so central to our life. We also realize that being alone in a voluntary and constructive manner as in solitude has many positive values as it facilitates self-knowledge and a better perspective on life. Just as we devote a lot of time to converse with others, we need to devote sometime to converse with ourselves, which will be rewarding. Like any other negative emotion, loneliness is considered valuable as long as it is temporary. When it becomes a sentiment, it is related to feelings of emptiness. We find it hard to bear emptiness. We should keep in mind that fulfilment and happiness require both a supportive social environment and also the ability to separate ourselves from that environment.⁴

21

H O P E

This chapter deals with the emotion hope, which is concerned with our own future; since looking forward to our future plays an important role in shaping our present life, it is significant to understand hope with its full implications.

1. DISTANCED OBJECT

We have already seen what happiness and sadness are, and how they are related to our present fortune. On the contrary, hope and fear are concerned with our future fortune. What is present and imminent is more crucial than what lies in the future. Therefore, happiness and sadness are more intense than hope and fear. There is a distance between the subject and the emotional object of hope and fear. Therefore, they are not intense by nature due to the temporal distance. Any distance for that matter will make the intensity of emotion less. If hope and fear are to have impact on our present life, then they should be of greater magnitude and should be perceived by the agent as imminent.¹

2. LESSER INTENSITY

We said that there is a temporal distance between the agent and the emotional object of hope and fear. This distance weakens the impact of the emotions on our lives. All the same it should be noted that these emotions have a longer duration compared to happiness and sadness. For most of us, our interest lies in the future. Some people live in the past, and some live in the present. But most people seem to live in the future, in the sense that people always have projects to be carried out. These projects keep our lives sustained at the present and draw them to the future. We can say that most of us are future-oriented. Even the person who ruminates his/her past valour and achievements will have plans for the future. Actually when hope ceases to be, that is the point of despair, and despair usually leads to suicide. The longer the time

we spend with our future projects, the more central they are in our lives. Therefore, when we say that hope and fear are of less intensity because they concern our future, it should be balanced with the statement that when they are of longer duration in occupying our attention, then they are really intense. The longer duration of preoccupation makes them imminent and intense. We know the present moment is fleeting and we are going to live the future and the future legitimately has an impact on us. Usually hope and fear are connected to the future. There are also instances when these are connected to the events that might have taken place in the past. For example, you might hope that you had done well in a job interview or you fear that you did not do your exam well.²

3. IS HOPE AN EMOTION OR SENTIMENT

There are different theoretical approaches to hope. Some (predominantly, the philosophical and the religious) consider hope to be one of the most fundamental emotions. There are others (mainly, psychological) that do not even consider it as an emotion. From what we have learnt, it appears that these two approaches represent two different phenomena of emotions. The psychological approach looks for defining emotion as an intense experience. Since in hope, intensity may not be perceived due to the temporal distance, this theory may not like to consider hope as an emotion. The philosophical and religious approach is content to consider any sentiment as an emotion. Hope is more understood as a sentiment due to its duration by this approach. Therefore it becomes clear that these two approaches speak of two phenomena of the emotion of hope. Hope can be considered as an emotion when it is intense and it can be considered as a sentiment when it lasts for longer period with less intensity. Both these dimensions are seen in the emotion of hope.

It is to be noted that many people consider hope as a sentiment since it lacks intensity due to its temporal distance. Because of the lack of intensity it may not have behavioural or physical symptoms. Under this consideration, hope is a disposition. People's experience of hope is as an experience lasting for a relatively long period of time. We know that emotion does not last long but only sentiments can last longer. People seem to report that episodes of hope last from one to six months. This definitely is the description of

sentiment rather than emotion. In most instances what is said of hope as a sentiment is correct, but it is also possible that when the emotional object of hope is close, hope may be intense and can have all the characteristics of emotion including intense feeling. The closeness of the emotional object, even though it is in the future, and the significance one attaches to the event, can make hope really an emotion with its feeling intensity. It is curious to note that fear even though it concerns the future like hope is not doubted as an emotion. All of us accept fear as an emotion, despite its concern about the future. This differential consideration goes to suggest that we attach greater emotional impact to negative events than to positive events.³

4. CRUCIAL ROLE OF HOPE

Hope as a sentiment is more valued and has more practical utility than hope as an emotion. All living humans should have hope as a sentiment; otherwise perhaps they may not be living. Hopelessness about the future is a sure sign that one will not survive. People with terminal illness are known to have extended their life because of the hope of some events that would take place in the future. Once the events had taken place, their lives have ended. People who committed suicide too have reached the point of no hope. This is revealed in what they have written in their letters saying farewell to people. The type of hope we are speaking of, which is a sentiment is not goal-oriented, since it lacks a specific object or target. In a sense, it is a type of evaluative openness to a better and more valuable future, though what that might be is not clear to the agent. Viktor Frankl in his book 'Man's Search for Meaning' has amply demonstrated the crucial role of hope for survival. In the concentration camp there were all around electrified barbed wires. One who wants to commit suicide can just go and touch the fence and in a matter of minutes the person is off. Viktor Frankl noticed that those persons who lost hope went straight to the fence and committed suicide. Therefore he was interested in giving hope to the inmates saying in one way or other that one's wife or children or parents are waiting for the person's arrival, which was a hope that sustained many in their lives. Even Viktor Frankl kept himself alive thinking of his wife who was already dead in another concentration camp, the fact of which was not

known to him until he was freed. Hope as a sentiment is not only needed for the mere survival but also necessary to overcome the hardships of life. The drudgery of life drags us down and we are downcast with the burden of life. It is at that time that hope sustains people and gives them the courage to overcome their difficulties and hardships which otherwise are unbearable.⁴

5. INTENTIONAL ELEMENTS

Hope and fear have two basic intentional elements. One is the desire to be in or to avoid a certain situation. The other is a belief that the desired or undesired situation is probable. These two elements are invariably found in hope and fear. A closer look at these elements reveal that the first element refers to the evaluative and motivational components of emotion and the second indicates the cognitive component. If you take hope, these two elements relate to the desire for a certain situation, and a belief that the desired situation is probable, in spite of the indication to the contrary. These two elements are not sufficient for hope. For the generation of the emotion of hope, the desired object must be of great importance to the agent. Factors, which normally determine such importance, are: relevance, degree of reality, the strength of the given event, plus various personality features.

Let us analyse the probability of the cognitive belief in hope. The probability should be between 0 and 1. Hope is likely to be present even if the probability is low. When we say that 'we are hoping against hope' it is that the probability is low. When the probability is high, we are not only hopeful that the desired object will be attained, but we also expect it. When the probability is quite high and we see no difficulty in attaining the desired object or reaching the desired situation, then hope will not be intense, if at all it is there. So in all typical cases of hope, it is difficult to attain the desired situation, but it is all the same possible to attain it. To be more precise we can say that hope is mostly initiated when we meet with events that cause a decrease in the probability of a previously certain event, or an increase in the probability of a previously unlikely event. Here what is involved is appraisal of the future event. An increase in the appraised importance of the future event will intensify hope. Hope is terminated when there is a reduction in the perceived probability or importance of the event,

and also when we obtain what we hoped for, or believe that obtaining what we hoped for is certain. To put it differently, when we know for certain that the desired situation will not be achieved or will be achieved, there will not be any hope.

It is the element of probability that distinguishes hope from fantasy. In fantasy, the cognitive element of believing that the desired situation is probable is not significant, whereas in hope it is significant. Hope involves realistic imagination in the sense that when the probability of attainment is unrealistically low, there is no hope.

Empirically when we analyse episodes of hope, we realize that achievement-related goals like success in some academic, artistic, or athletic endeavour, and obtaining a good job are the most common cases. Secondly, come hopes relating to interpersonal relationships like romantic hopes and hopes of good relationships with others. The third group involves altruistic hopes for the well-being of another person. Other objects of hope are not that common.⁵

6. OPTIMISM

Hope and optimism are closely related. Both in hope and optimism we anticipate possible positive events. Even though hope is related to optimism, we cannot say optimism is an emotion because it is an attitude, which may turn into a mood or an emotion. We may make a distinction between expectation, optimism, and hope. For example, one may expect an event without considering whether that event is positive or negative. But when one is optimistic about that event, then the person considers that event as positive. This does not mean that the person has got emotional attitude towards that event. For example, you may be optimistic about world peace but you may not experience an emotional state with all its typical characteristics like instability, great intensity, partiality and brief duration. It is not only the mere expectation towards a positive event that constitutes hope, but also the personal significance, which turns our experience into an emotional one. Hope has something to do with our personal values. In optimism we have our general positive attitude towards the expected event. It is merely a general and uninvolved attitude. It does not have our

profound values. Therefore, optimism refers more to our reassessment of the situation rather than our values.

There is yet another difference between the emotion of hope and the attitude of optimism regarding the probability of the expected event. Usually emotions are present in unstable circumstances. In the case of hope, hope can be present only when the event's probability is neither too unlikely nor virtually assured, whereas optimism may increase linearly with the probability of attainment.

In hope, the personal significance of an event seems very crucial even ignoring the event's probability. We can imagine a situation in which the probability is nil and yet the event is sufficiently important. In this situation hope may be generated. But for optimism, just the importance of an event, however great it is, is not enough. That is why those who are terminally ill may not have enough reason to be optimistic and yet they may not lose hope. This example illustrates how, even in the absence of probability, there is the possibility of hope provided the event is sufficiently important. There is something called 'hope of reprieve.' It refers to the official order stopping the killing of a prisoner as a punishment. Studies have revealed that persons who are about to be executed will entertain hope of being ordered officially not to be killed. It is said that most prisoners going to be executed entertain such a hope till the last moment. Perhaps, only such a hope makes them endure till the end in sanity.

It is considered that hopefulness, which expresses optimism or a hopeful disposition, is a kind of affective trait. We know by experience that hope and optimism greatly enhance our life, help us overcome or endure hardships, cope with negative events, lead us to higher motivation, more effective performance and to greater success. For physical recovery, hope and optimism play a major role. While optimism promotes courage, pessimism promotes depression. Hope and optimism tend to be self-fulfilling. Optimistic people set high goals and strive to achieve them thinking that it is possible to attain the goals. Even when they fail, they attribute their failure to something that can be changed and work hard to change them. They can anticipate success the next time they try.

Pessimists take the blame for failure attributing it to some lasting characteristics of theirs that cannot be changed and they are depressed since they think the situation cannot be changed. While the optimists give external and specific reasons for their failure, the pessimists make internal, stable and global evaluations. Even one's ability to take failure is indicative of how far one is able to muster all the energy and resources that are available. The optimists usually tend to succeed on account of their resilience and perseverance.

Empirical evidence indicates that high-hope people have greater number of goals, have more difficult goals, have more success, experience greater happiness and less stress, have superior coping skills, and recover better from physical injury. People with low-hope experience the opposite of what the high-hope people are experiencing. Hopes are realistic dreams of those who are awake.⁶

22

FEAR

In the spectrum of fear, we find some fears are quite common and some others are extremely rare. Most people seem to fear snakes. Many fears are focused on objects that threaten life like potential predators, unfamiliar places, and the dark. Yet some of the fears have no survival value, like the fear of cockroaches. The experience of fear varies with many personal and social factors. Age is a factor; fear reaches its peak incidence in early adulthood and declines in succeeding years. The fear of animals and the dark is experienced in this pattern. The second pattern of fear reaches its peak in middle adulthood. Fear of illness, injury and crowds follow this second pattern. There are acute fears and chronic fears. Fear of a specific animal can be an acute fear which has a high peak of intensity, is provoked by tangible stimuli or situations and is easy to detect, whereas chronic fear like being alone is typically of longer duration, its peak intensity at most moments is low and is not necessarily connected to specific stimuli or situations and hard to detect. Chronic fear is a type of sentiment.

Usually fear is experienced more when we are alone. In a group or when accompanied, we experience less fear. Even in imagination, when one thinks of a feared situation or object in the company of another, its intensity is less. We should also keep in mind that in a group we might be susceptible to fear by contagion, if the group is already stricken with a high intensity of fear.¹

1. INTENTIONAL COMPONENT

The intentional components of fear are: 1. a cognitive component which attaches some probability to the undesired situation, 2. an evaluative component which includes a very negative evaluation of the undesired situation, and 3. a motivational component which expresses a strong desire and readiness to act.²

2. INTERPLAY OF FEAR AND HOPE

One can find an interplay between fear and hope. In fear there is the presence of some probability that the desired event will not materialize. This is precisely hope. Here fear implies hope. In the same way, hope implies fear because of the presence of the belief that the desired event will not materialize. Like hope, fear is also self-fulfilling. In fear you will make true what you dread. For example, if you fear that you will be rejected by an audience, you will unconsciously behave in such a way that will precipitate your being rejected.

Since fear was originally meant as a response to existential threat, its adaptive value can be clearly seen. Fear emerges quite early in our life, probably around eight months, some fear responses may even be hard-wired.³

3. OBJECT OF FEAR

The self is the focus of concern in fear and it is quite obvious; but concerning the object of fear, we are not quite sure what this object can be. For example, when I am afraid of a person or situation, is it the person or the situation the object of my fear? It is not that clear when we compare with other emotions and their objects. In these fears it is not clear if it is me or the other person or situation that is the object of fear.

We may discern various types of emotional objects of fear: 1. a certain situation – I am afraid of being alone, 2. another person – I am afraid of terrorist, and 3. oneself – I am afraid of losing my reputation as the best actress. In evolution what emerged first was fear of certain situation; fear of oneself appeared last. In feared situation we focus on the threat. Take for example, the fear of darkness. Here our cognitive faculties cannot function properly. All the same, we sense danger and are not aware of the source of the danger. Being afraid of darkness is not the same as being afraid of a terrorist. Yet we do not consider the dark as the object of fear. Concerning objects, this type of fear is closer to a type of mood than to a typical emotion. As in moods, the object of such fear is diffuse and unspecific and so it appears to lack an object. We fear the dark because it renders us vulnerable and makes us unable to adequately locate the possible threats.

Fear of a situation is a simple cognitive system; fear of a specific person or animal involves a more developed cognitive system to identify the specific course of the threat and an even more developed cognitive system is required to focus upon the effects of the threat to the self. In the modern society, fear is often concerned with social, rather than existential issues. What is at stake is not survival but one's status and well-being. Many of the officials may not be as afraid of their existence as their reputation. A person with a very good reputation may fear that some accusation or slander might endanger his reputation. Hence the focus is on one's own activities and relationships in a future social environment.

In the light of what we have seen so far, it makes sense to classify fear either in the group of emotions toward others (or toward external objects in general) or in the group of emotions toward oneself. Many psychologists tend to classify it in the second category because in our day-to-day life, fear is not existential but social, and in most of these cases, one's self is the emotional object. Fear belongs to the group of emotions like hope, which is directed to oneself. In hope we have no difficulty to identify its objects as in the case of fear. Our hopes are directed at future situations in which we or those related to us are in a better situation.⁴

4. RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER EMOTIONS

Comparison of Hope with Other Emotions	
Hope	X wishes Y and thinks that Y is probable
Fear	X wishes not-Y but thinks that Y is probable
Despair	X wishes Y but thinks that Y is contraccertain
Resignation	X wishes not-Y but thinks that Y is certain
Confidence	X wishes Y and thinks that Y is certain; and wishes not-Y and thinks that Y is contraccertain

Some psychologists believe that hope and fear are typical emotions; despair and resignation are considered affective, not emotional, attitudes. Despair and resignation are closer to moods than to emotions. Confidence may not be considered an affective attitude at all.⁵

5. UNCERTAINTY IN FEAR

Uncertainty positively correlates with emotional intensity. Certainty is not typical of emotions. That is why we do not consider confidence as an emotional attitude. If we are sure that our desire will materialize or a feared situation will not take place there is nothing to be excited about. Such situations do not involve change, which is needed for generating affective states. One may wonder, what about despair and resignation, which involve certainty. But here they are concerned with negative events and so their impact is different. Though despair and resignation are not emotional attitudes, they are affective states. In contrast to confidence, in despair and resignation there is tension between what we desire and the expected event, and this generates affective attitudes. But these attitudes are not emotions since they are not focused on specific object – the desired situation is not probable any more. For confidence and hope there is a certain harmony between the agent's wish and the expected event. Likewise, for despair and fear, there is a discrepancy between the agent's wish and the expected event.⁶

6. DESPAIR

Despair and hope are similar in their evaluative component. But in their cognitive component they are different. Despair involves the belief that the desired situation is contraccertain. Even in motivational component, they both are different. Though, in both hope and despair, there is a strong desire for a certain situation, in despair the desire does not lead to readiness to act. Because in despair there is a belief that no action will generate the desired outcome and therefore actions are considered futile. As despair is closer to a negative mood, it may turn into a non-affective attitude of indifference.

It is interesting to compare despair with desperation. In both, X wishes Y, but thinks that Y is contraccertain. In their motivational component they differ. When one is in despair, one will do nothing; but on the contrary when one is desperate, one will do anything even though one thinks it to be contraccertain. But the action undertaken by a desperate person is not usually connected to a specific situation since such a situation is considered contraccertain. These actions may relate to other aspects of one's life.⁷

7. RESIGNATION

Resignation and fear are similar in their evaluative component. But in their cognitive component they are different. In resignation there is the belief that the undesired event is certain. The difference is also noticeable in their motivational components. In both there is a strong desire to avert a certain situation; in resignation the desire does not lead to action since no action is considered to be capable of eliminating the undesired situation. Like despair, resignation is closer to a negative mood and may turn into a nonaffective attitude of indifference.⁸

8. HORROR

Horror is a kind of intense fear. There is no flight in horror nor is there any viable manner of coping with the situation. Horror is similar to resignation in wishing that something will not happen but one thinks that its occurrence is almost inevitable. We know that resignation may lead to a nonaffective attitude; horror is always an intense affective state. Horror cannot be mild; it is always intense.⁹

9. COURAGE

Courage is considered to be the opposite of fear. They are also similar because of desire and belief. In both, X wishes not-Y but thinks that Y is probable. In both we find a negative evaluation of Y. In their cognitive component too, both the attitudes seem similar since both of them include the belief that Y is probable. But the probability given to Y in courage is considerably greater. This is one of the differences; and the most important difference is in the motivational component. In fear, flight is the typical behaviour but in courage the agent usually confronts the threat since the agent believes that he/she can successfully overcome it. In fear a woman may run away from the assaulter, but in courage she will stand up against the assaulter and fight.

Normally courage is identified with fearlessness, namely, the absence of fear. This statement is misleading. Courage is not lack of fear but facing fear. There was a worker in our compound who on seeing a snake went towards it with a small stick and somehow managed to press its head and hold it between his thumb and the

index finger while all the others ran away from the scene. I noticed that the man who was holding the snake was trembling all over. He was indeed courageous but there was fear. There are also people who are fearless exhibiting none of the usual physical symptoms that normally accompany fear, like palpitations or sweating. These people are fearless but not courageous; they have no fear to cope with or overcome. Therefore what will distinguish courage from fearlessness is the presence of a genuine effort to cope with or overcome fear. But repeated and intensive training or meeting with fearful situation may lead a person from courage to fearlessness. That is what seems to have taken place in the training of astronauts who were fearful during the training but later became fearless. I have observed something similar in people who lie. Those who lie for the first few times tremble, and stammer and thus betray their fear in lying but those who are accustomed to lying do not exhibit such physical symptoms.

We can conclude that courage is not an emotion but rather a behavioural attitude. Therefore the feeling component in courage is not always intense. One may associate courage with fear, but it is not the opposite of fear.¹⁰

10. COWARDICE

Cowardice is the opposite of courage. It refers to a behavioural attitude and not to an independent emotion. All the same cowardice can also refer to a more enduring characteristic of a person and so may be described as a sentiment or an affective trait. In the same way, courage can also be described as a specific behaviour, a sentiment, or an affective trait.

Both courage and cowardice are contagious – the courageous or cowardly behaviour of one person may easily affect the behaviour of other people.

Let us distinguish fear from anxiety and anguish. Fear as an emotion should have a specific object but anxiety as an affective disorder has a more general concern than fear. Anguish comes in between fear and anxiety. While anxiety has no clear object, anguish has the self as its object. Compared to fear, anguish is concerned with more fundamental problems relating to our very existence or survival, the nature of the self and its future. On account of its

general nature, anguish may not be regarded as a typical emotion, but it is closer to typical emotion than anxiety.¹¹

11. SHYNESS

There are various descriptions of shyness by different psychologists. Shyness is sheepishness, bashfulness, a feeling of uneasiness or psychological discomfort in social situations, and oscillation between fear and interest or between avoidance and approach. Shyness is related to fear and is a nonevaluative emotion centred on the individual's discomfort response to others. Shyness is an emotional response elicited by experiences of novelty or conspicuousness. Shyness and fear are closely related and represent fearfulness toward others. Shyness appears much earlier in our life-span development than shame and guilt.

Psychologists identify individuals as social and asocial by genetic disposition. Some psychologists point out that there are inhibited children. The inhibited or shy children are withdrawn, are uncomfortable in social situations, and appear fearful. It is believed that shyness may be a dispositional factor not related to self-evaluation. It is simply the discomfort of being in the company of other social objects. It is simply the opposite of sociability.

We are not able to identify a single behaviour that consistently and uniquely describes shyness. Of course, there are gaze aversion and head turning or lowering, which are associated with shyness, but these behaviours are also associated with shame. The core of shyness is the feeling of vulnerability in social situations. Vulnerability is related to the self, self-image, or ego. In social situations, shyness seems to involve a mixture of, or a conflict between, positive and negative feelings. There is an approach-avoidance behaviour in the shy individuals. On the one hand they are attracted to people, and at the same time concerned about whether they will communicate and relate to others in an effective and satisfying way. So shyness is often accompanied by interest in people, and fear of social encounters at the same time.¹²

12. ANXIETY

Anxiety is a term that denotes apprehension, tension or uneasiness that stems from the anticipation of danger. The danger

can be internal or external. Both fear and anxiety include the same manifestations like motor tension, autonomic hyperactivity, apprehensive expectation, hypervigilance and scanning. But anxiety differs from fear in lacking a recognizable external source of threat. There is more to anxiety than merely the absence of recognizable external stimuli. Fear is usually related to action of escape and avoidance. If the action is blocked or thwarted because, for example, the situation is uncontrollable, fear is turned into anxiety. If there are no internal or external restraints, fear will lead to the action of flight. Anxiety is unresolved fear or a state of undirected arousal following the perception of threat.¹³

13. INTENSITY VARIABLES

Compared to happiness and sadness, the intensity of hope and fear are not strong since the latter are directed at the future and the former at the present. The reason for the low intensity is the temporal distance. There are some intensity variables. They are the event's strength, degree of reality, and the degree of relevance.

The event's strength is one of the intensity variables since the event is located in the future. What is far away appears to be small and does not affect us very much. There are also instances in which temporal distance seems to amplify the event. In these cases, we keep thinking about the future event and that makes the event more central for us. Here time, which separates us from the event, is perceived as very significant.

The degree of reality is another intensity variable. In hope and fear we are not sure if the event will actually take place. Here we are only dealing with possibility. The hoped-for or feared events are only probable.

The degree of relevance is the third intensity variable. That which is not close to us is usually less relevant to our self-image and the attainment of our goals. Especially in cases of emotional threats, we place ourselves at a safe distance.

The above mentioned intensity variables weaken the effect of the event. This is more so in hope than in fear. Therefore fear is stronger than hope. There are also cases of attitudes where we have intentional components of hope but lack an intense feeling

component. Therefore these attitudes appear to be similar to general nonaffective attitudes than to emotional ones. In the same way there are also instances of the attitude of fear having the intentional components but not having the intense feeling component.

Accountability is a significant aspect in hope and fear. In other emotions, accountability is retrospective but not in hope and fear. Accountability in the context of emotions will mean the consideration of whether the event, which triggers the emotional attitude, could have been otherwise. Since in hope and fear the triggering event has not yet been actualised, our accountability will determine whether it will be actualised. Thus if one feels unable to control the probable outcome, one is likely to feel fear, and if one feels able to control it, one is unlikely to feel fear. In the same way, seeing ourselves as able to increase the likelihood of a desired event will increase hope. In all these instances, confidence plays a major role in decreasing fear and increasing hope.¹⁴

14. THE FUNCTIONS OF FEAR

Fear motivates us to escape from dangerous situations. But either escape or avoidance implies the behaviour of flight. It is likely that sometimes fear disengages the motor system, which results in freezing behaviour. Threats are not only physical but also psychological. Threats to our self-concept, our integrity, or our psychological well-being can elicit fear, and these threats are not eliminated by physical escape. Nevertheless, in all cases of threats, involving either physical or psychological threats, fear performs its basic function of motivating escape and alleviating fear-eliciting conditions.

Fear usually empowers us to organize and direct perceptual and cognitive processes. It produces 'tunnel vision' by focusing attention on the source of the threat and restricting cue utilization. Thus focused attention to the threatening agent or situation can be adaptive in guiding self-protective behaviour in us. If such a process is directed to unrealistic or unwarranted fear, then it is maladaptive.¹⁵

B. OTHERS

Emotions directed to the fortunes of others are pleasure-in-others'-fortune (or, in short, happy-for) and pleasure-in-others'-misfortune. We also have envy, jealousy, pity, compassion, and mercy.

23

HAPPY-FOR

(PLEASURE-IN-OTHERS'-FORTUNE)

Now we enter the section of the emotional evaluations of the fortunes of others. In this section, we can speak of fortunes good for others and fortunes bad for others. Thus we have happy-for and envy. Happy-for is positive for others but envy is negative for others. What are bad for others are pleasure-in-others'-misfortune which is considered positive and pity which is considered negative.

1. NATURE OF HAPPY-FOR EMOTION

Happy-for and pleasure-in-others'-misfortune are types of the emotion of happiness and as such they contain a positive evaluation. However, whereas happy-for is directed at someone's good fortune, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune is directed at someone's misfortune. When we take happy-for, our concern is focused on the person enjoying good fortune whereas in pleasure-in-misfortune, the focus of concern is our comparative position. In the case of happy-for our evaluation and the evaluation of the other person are positive. But in pleasure-in-others'-misfortune there is a conflict; what we evaluate positively is evaluated by the other negatively.¹

2. CAN THERE BE HAPPY-FOR EMOTION?

There are some people who doubt the existence of an emotion like happy-for. They believe that nobody can share the happiness of even his best friend without envy. Our generous emotions come forward only when we find our friend's neediness. According to this view, we see happy people as insult to us since they seem superior to us and are not in need of us; on the contrary unhappy people seem to affirm our own worth and superiority. This view though expresses the centrality of the comparative concern in emotions may not be valid in all the circumstances. Take for example your own children. You will not be unhappy about the fortune

and success of your own children because we closely identify ourselves with our children. In the same way, we may not feel as a threat to those who are very close to us. In close relationship, others form part of our self-identity. In such instances there is no comparative concern. We do not feel harmed by the fortune of others and we may also feel that the other close person really deserves such a fortune.²

3. GREATER FORTUNE OF OTHERS

There is a limit to the scope of happy-for emotion. The limit concerns the closeness of the other person to us and the extent of the other person's good fortune. Sometimes the high degree of closeness required in this emotion does not guarantee its presence even among family members. The less close we feel towards the other person, the more important are the extent and nature of the other's good fortune. If the other's good fortune is better, lasts longer, and is relevant to our own fortune, negative emotions of resentment or envy may appear. This may be the case among good friends. Similarly, a very great misfortune of someone is likely to induce pity rather than pleasure-in-others'-misfortune.

Typically when we like a person, his/her fortune elicits happy-for emotion in us. But in the case of pleasure-in-others'-misfortune the more we like the person, the less likely we are happy with their misfortune. It is also true that sometimes we are pleased with minor misfortunes of others whom we like.³

24

ENVY

Emotions toward the fortune of others constitute a common group whose prevalence is related to the importance we attach to the comparison with others in assessing our own value and happiness. This group is divided according to others' good or bad fortune. The major items in the group of negative emotions toward the good fortune of others are envy and jealousy; the major emotions in the parallel group directed at the bad fortune of others are pity and compassion. Positive evaluation of the good fortune of others underlies the emotion of happy-for, and positive evaluation of the bad fortune of others underlies pleasure-in-others'-misfortune.

1. ENVY-JEALOUSY COMPARISON

Some languages do not have two words to express the terms 'envy' and 'jealousy.' The meanings of these two terms overlap. They seem to co-occur though envy may occur without jealousy. But jealousy is often accompanied by envy. Envy involves a negative evaluation of our undeserved inferiority. Jealousy on the other hand involves a negative evaluation of the possibility of losing something especially a favoured relationship. Both are focused on a change in which there is either a wish to obtain or the fear of loss. In envy we wish for something we do not have, whereas in jealousy we are afraid of losing something we already have. This is one difference and another difference will be that jealousy is typically associated with losing a human relationship. Your partner preferring someone else to you is jealousy. The beauty someone else possesses which you may not have is envy. You envy the beauty you do not have and you experience fear of losing your favoured position with your mate. The first one is envy and the second one is jealousy. Here we are speaking of typical expression of envy and jealousy. Of course there are also exceptions to what we have said.

Envy necessarily means comparison. Without comparison there is no envy. A beggar will not envy a millionaire. A beggar

may envy another beggar who may earn more per day. With a millionaire a beggar is not going to compare himself.¹

2. OBJECT OF ENVY

What other people are and have are objects of our envy. Envy is usually directed at human beings. We do not usually envy the strength of the mountains or the vastness of the ocean, but in some atypical cases envy may be directed at animals and inanimate objects as well. First of all, we may envy personal attributes like beauty, patience, or intelligence; secondly, we may envy the possessions of others like car, house and land; thirdly, we may also envy positions like being a boss or head of an institution. The implication here is that we do not have the envied objects within us or with us.²

3. COMPARATIVE CONCERN

In envy what is crucial is the comparative concern. We do not worry about the intrinsic value of a desired object but rather the concern is that we do not have a desired object, which is owned by another. It is not necessary that we need the same object the other has; it will suffice to have an object similar to the one possessed by another and that which we earnestly desire. If I desire a female child and I am envious of my friend who just got a female child, it does not mean I just want the female child of my friend, but I would like to have a female child of my own. Here the implication is that my friend has a female child and I should have one, not my friend's female child. Whatever characteristics, possessions or status we envy, we would like to have them in a somewhat different form. In this respect, envy is general. It is not just that we envy one particular individual but we may envy the class of people possessing the same characteristics, possessions or status. Thus if I am lacking in beauty, I may not just envy one particular beautiful person but every beautiful person. Envy emerges usually in association with a particular event. For example, if my wife is not that attractive, when I meet a colleague of mine who has an attractive wife, I envy him. A comparison takes place at some particular event; here in this case, it is in meeting the attractive wife of my colleague.³

4. TWO VIEWS OF ENVY

There are two views regarding envy. One of them centres on inferiority. This view holds that in envy we are concerned with our inferiority. Here what is assumed is that others deserve what they are or possess, that is, they are entitled to their superiority. We malignantly dislike the superiority of those who are really entitled to all the superiority they possess. The second view centres on desert. This view holds that envy is concerned with the other person's undeserved good fortune. The other person, in this view, is not entitled to what he/she is or possesses. Therefore our moral protest of the emotion envy is justified because others basically are unworthy of their good situation. In envy we judge the other unworthy of his/her good. The second view is related to resentment, which expresses a moral protest. The second type is perceived as a type of resentment. According to this view resentment is concerned with undeserved good fortune of the other, envy is concerned merely with the other having something we want. There are also some psychologists who consider undeservingness as the central concern of envy and classify envy as a specific example of resentment. Thus resentment involves a concern for the undeservingness of the other enjoying the benefit; envy adds to this concern our desire to obtain the benefit.⁴

5. RESENTMENT

Resentment is an emotional protest against what is perceived as morally unjust. Therefore it is considered closer to anger than to envy. In resentment, the superiority as such is not the concern though at times resentment may be directed at the superiority of others. Resentment typically focuses on some injustice rather than on superiority itself. One can also make a distinction between discontent, envy, and resentment. Discontent emerges when we believe that something is wrong, namely, a better alternative is available. Envy emerges when the wrongness is related to our inferiority. Resentment occurs when wrongdoing is perceived; it conveys an implicit accusation. That is why when unjust treatment, but not inferiority, is perceived, anger and resentment are more dominant than envy. When we are envious we project ourselves as concerned with moral justice, thus attempting to justify it. Thus concealing our envy, we describe our attitude as resentment. This

is a kind of mental mechanism of rationalization of our negative attitude to being inferior.⁵

6. COMPETITION

If desert is not our central concern in envy, then it is our inferiority. The issue of inferiority arises just because of the importance we give to our comparative stand. We keep ourselves compared to others to reduce uncertainty about ourselves and maintain or enhance our self-esteem. In this case, envy is the result. Social comparisons may take many forms, and one of the forms of envy is competitiveness. Competition involves a prized status where there was none and doing this we are impelled to desire the prized status. But not everyone can get it. If at all one wants to get it, he/she has to defeat all the others. Here we see a restricted access to something desired and a belief that someone else has got it at our own expense. It is precisely envy.

Envy may take one of the forms of social comparison called competition, but it is not necessary there should be competition in every instance. There can just be mere comparison only. I may wish to be like Tata being wealthy and famous, but it is only a comparison not a competition. I cannot compete with Tata.⁶

7. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

It is not every kind of deprivation that is involved in envy, but only a relative deprivation. If I am rich I am envious of another person a little richer than I am. If I am handsome, I envy someone a little more handsome. The relative deprivation can be either subjective or objective. Sometimes the better off from an objective viewpoint feels subjectively worse-off. Likewise those who are the most deprived in an objective sense are not the ones most likely to experience deprivation.⁷

8. SOCIAL COMPARISON

Social comparison is more essential in envy than in discontent and covetousness. Covetousness and discontent are merely concerned with gaining something or achieving a certain state. But envy is mainly concerned with someone else who has something or is in a certain state. We may covet money, be discontented with our present position, but we may envy people who are rich. It is the comparative absence of something, which concerns us in envy.⁸

9. INFERIORITY CONCERN

In common with other emotions, envy is partial and it addresses people who belong to our emotional environment with emotional significance for us. The inferiority concern in envy is partial in so far as it refers to specific people in specific domains. Narrowed down, specific people and specific domain are indicative of partiality. We do not compare ourselves with everyone and in everything. If a situation is not significant to us, we do not envy those who succeed in those areas. A professor may not be envious of the president of his country but may envy another professor who is better placed in his department. The professor may not envy every aspect of his colleague but may envy only his colleague's superior position. This is what we mean by partiality. Usually we envy only one aspect of another person and may consider ourselves superior to that person in general or in many other aspects. Again what we want to possess should be belonging to our self-defining domains, otherwise envy will not be there, or even if it is there it will not be intense. Mere lack of things will not make us feel inferior if we have many other good things to which our self-esteem is linked or we have found deeper satisfaction elsewhere.

Please note that when we envy the other person's good fortune it somehow has relevance to our self-esteem. When the good fortune of the other is relevant, our self-esteem and evaluation of ourselves by others is threatened and in this situation we experience envy.⁹

10. CHILD-ADULT ENVY COMPARISON

There is a difference between the typical adult envy and the typical envy of children. For young children the value of things arises simply from seeing others with those things. Since children have not developed a sense of what is relevant or irrelevant, their envy is general and non-specific to certain people or domains. Therefore, they may not be happy every time they fall short of another person's performance. As children grow older, they are selective and slowly they make sense of what is relevant and irrelevant. In the same way children's pleasure-in-others' misfortune too is non-specific to certain people or domains, and they seem to enjoy many types of failures.

It is noted that envy not only wishes to eliminate inferiority but also wishes to achieve superiority. This is a preventive measure against being in an inferior situation.¹⁰

11. LOW SELF-ESTEEM

There is no positive correlation between envy and a person's low self-esteem. It is not true that people with low self-esteem only experience envy and those with high self-esteem will not experience envy. Envy can be experienced by any person of any possession and character. There is always the relative nature of the inferiority concern in every human person. Here the inferiority is not in general but with specific inferiority regarding people who are emotionally significant to us. The social comparison involved here, is limited to those similar to us. It refers to small subject-object gaps and not to big gaps.¹¹

12. WEAK-STRONG ENVY

There are many classifications of envy. One of them is between weak and strong envy, which is quite simple to understand. In weak envy, we do not wish so much damage to other person but rather we give priority to our welfare. In strong envy, we are willing to give up some of our welfare for a decrease in another's welfare. There is an extreme story to illustrate this strong envy. One day God appeared to a man who was quite envious of his neighbour and told him that whatever he asks for, will be granted, provided his envied neighbour would be doubly blessed with that same favour. Then the man thought for a while and said, 'Lord, please remove one of my eyes.' He said it in the hope that his envied neighbour will lose both his eyes. This illustrates how a strong envy wishes the damage of the one envied. In both the strong and weak envy our attitude towards the envied person is not necessarily negative, though it is seen so quite often. Our behaviour may be selfish rather than malicious or spiteful. We should also remember that envy is different from spite. Envy wishes for a situation in which the other's superiority is eliminated, spite wishes for the inferiority of the other. We can overcome someone's superiority in two ways. We may either bring the other down to our level or we can raise ourselves up to the level of the other person.¹²

13. COMPARISON OF PITY AND ENVY

Since I have followed the method of treating two emotions at a time for the sake of clarity, often you will find individual emotions spoken of in comparison with at least one other emotion. This goes well especially when two or more emotions look similar in some aspects and dissimilar in other aspects.

Pity and envy though they look quite different, from a psychological point of view, are similar in some important aspects. Pity is a positive attitude, highly valued in our relationships, while envy is basically a negative attitude we try to avoid. Envy, pity, and compassion are sometimes seen in the same individuals. Envy towards those who are better off will go together with pity and compassion for the worse-off. Our sensitivity to the fortunes of other people comes to the foreground when their fortune is different from ours; that is when their situation is better or worse. Thus our well-being will be reduced when another individual either has more or substantially less than we do. If it is more, we feel envy; and if it is substantially less, then we feel pity or compassion. When we feel pity for other persons, we are in a superior position, which provides some compensation for our inferior position, which we feel when we experience envy. Therefore, what appears to be altruistic in pity may in reality be a form of self-interested envy reduction.

There is an association of pity with the perception of inferiority. Envy typically involves our own relative deprivation or inferiority; pity involves the substantial deprivation of others. To feel envious, it is enough to see the other slightly in a better position. But to feel pity the other should be substantially lower. Both pity and envy are associated with a small hope of changing the unfavourable situation. In pity, the hope is all the weaker. The subject-object inequality can be annulled either elevating the lower or lowering the superior. In envy we attempt to annul subject-object inequality by both means but in pity we would employ only by elevating the lower and we would not like to lower ourselves.

We may be preoccupied with our own situation or the situation of the other. Our situation is the focus of our concern in envy, but in pity the situation of the other is the main concern. Thus in pity consideration of our own situation is less significant

and mainly associated with a possible dangerous future situation and so there is fear. Fear is a component of pity. In envy we are concerned with our present inferior position and so there is shame. Shame is an important component of envy. Substantial misfortune of another person generates pity in us and a small difference generates envy in us. This being the case, there is an element of unfairness in envy. Since we feel unfairness in envy, correspondingly we have resentment, which is a kind of moral protest. There are two main reasons why we feel resentment in the face of unfairness in envy. Envy does not involve a kind of acceptance, and hence justification, of the given situation. When we are in an inferior position, our misfortune is magnified. Therefore, the desire for relief is stronger in envy since here we are concerned with our own relief.

What we express in pity and envy is some kind of weakness in us. Definitely in envy the weakness is expressed in our inferior position, and in pity the weakness is our inability to change the undesirable situation. Even envious people too believe that personally they cannot do much to change their inferior position. An immediate change in the situation is usually beyond one's power in these instances. The inability may arise due either to differences in natural capacities or to external circumstances. The weakness inherent in these emotions should not be taken to mean that we are passive in situations of envy and pity. On the contrary it only makes us take steps to avoid it. The weakness we speak of is more dominant in pity, because in pity the misfortune we encounter is more substantial and so it is objectively hard to change the situation. Secondly, changing the situation in envy will benefit us, and hence we tend to be more optimistic concerning its feasibility.

Both in pity and envy, we tend to reduce the unpleasantness of the situation by diverting our attention; in pity, by paying lip service to the other's misfortune or by offering token help which cannot change the basic misfortune; in envy, by engaging in hard work aimed in the long run at changing the basic causes of the inferior situation. The differential approach expresses our belief that in envy, but usually not in pity, the situation can in principle be changed. Therefore, pity is more passive than envy.

Envy has sorrow like pity and compassion, but its intensity is often greater than in the other two, because it is we who are in the

unhappy situation. The sorrow in pity and compassion is a sympathetic sorrow for the misfortune of others; the sorrow in envy is a kind of self-sorrow.

In envy we are dissatisfied with our comparative unfavourable situation, whereas in pity we are satisfied with our comparatively favourable situation. Envy may be accompanied with shame; and pity, with pridefulness. Regret may also be associated with these circumstances.

In pity, compassion and envy, by using mental substitution by which we place ourselves in the other's situation, we generate fear, or hope, of being in that situation. The concern in envy is our inferiority; in pity and compassion, the other's misfortune; so the element of comparison is less dominant in pity and compassion.

In envy and pity we notice conflicting emotional strands. There is attraction to, and repulsion from the other. In envy the attraction is seen as admiration; and in pity, as sympathy. Likewise, repulsion is seen in envy as hostility, and in pity as contempt.¹³

25

JEALOUSY

St. Augustine spoke of jealousy in a succinct way. He said that one who is not jealous is not in love. Envy is a two-party relation, but jealousy is basically a three-party relation. Jealousy concerns the mate's relationships with others. These relationships may threaten our favourable and exclusive relationship with the mate. The fear in jealousy is about completely losing our relationship with the mate, or losing some qualities of that relationship, even though the relationship may continue. We witness this in romantic jealousy. If one is interested in another and that another also has relationship with a third party or the third party is after the second party, then jealousy will be generated in the first party.

It is interesting to note the relationship between envy and jealousy. Whereas envy can be part of jealousy, jealousy is not part of envy. Situations in which one experiences jealousy may also inherently create envy to some extent. If you have your romantic partner and that partner is drawn towards another who is not attractive, competent, and successful, the attention that person receives from your romantic partner will generate envy in you.¹

1. OBJECT OF JEALOUSY

In jealousy the objects are two people. The first is the primary object, that is the mate (the person very close to us); and the other is the secondary object, that is the rival. The rival need not be real; the rival can be imaginary. In the case of envy, the object is the reminder of our disadvantageous situation. The object is not understood as causing the emotion, though sometimes we perceive it as a cause. The object in jealousy functions as a cause, not so much as the reminder of our disadvantageous position, though at times it is also a reminder.

Jealousy is essentially directed at a few people since the primary object of jealousy is our mate, and we just cannot have unlimited mates. In envy the object does not have a previous personal relationship and so the object can be substituted. That is why if I am envious of you because of your house, when I obtain a similar house, my envy will cease, but if my wife has a lover, my jealousy will not cease even if I have a mistress as beautiful as my wife. My attitude towards my wife is personal, and someone else cannot be a suitable substitute for her. In comparison with envy, jealousy is more personal and generates greater vulnerability. Since it touches on far more significant aspects of our self-esteem, it is more likely to cause profound injury to our self-esteem. An intense pain is generated by jealousy. This pain is not because something extraordinary has happened, but because we may lose something crucially important to us.²

2. CONCERN OF JEALOUSY

If my wife rejects me that will not necessarily arouse jealousy in me. Only when after the rejection she takes up a new relationship with someone else, I will experience jealousy. Therefore the focus of concern in jealousy is the threat to our exclusive position, and in particular, to some unique human relationship. In a way we are afraid of losing our present favourable position to someone else and thus end up taking an inferior position. Just losing someone is not the central issue in jealousy but rather losing something to a rival. That is why when people kill their mate out of jealousy, they are not worried about suffering a loss, and they are only concerned with the rival enjoying their cherished object. Hence we come across instances of one murdering one's mate and then committing suicide. People attempt to prevent the loss of their loved object to a rival, even if it means losing one's life. In jealousy, the object is always a human being and we are concerned with losing a unique relationship with that person. The three-party relationship in jealousy involves two human beings competing over a favourable chosen relationship with the third human being.

In envy, improving our situation depends upon us, but in jealousy the partner's attitude is more significant. Thus the motivation to improve oneself is more significant in envy than in jealousy. It looks as though in jealousy we want to get even with

both the mate and the rival, and at the same time maintain the relationship. These two desires may not be compatible.

In envy we are mainly troubled by an existing inferior situation rather than, as in jealousy by the threat of ending up in such a situation. Envy is concerned with a current situation in which our inferior position is already evident; jealousy anticipates a future or possible threat. Accordingly, the envious person wants to change the existing situation, whereas the jealous person fears that a change had already happened or is likely to happen in the existing situation. The cognitive element is therefore usually more verdict in envy than in jealousy, as the threat in jealousy can be imaginary. Jealousy often involves fantasy. Frequently, our jealousy does not die when we realize our error; any pretext whatsoever is sufficient to revive this emotion. Indeed, the most frequent event eliciting jealousy among married people is not actual infidelity, but the partner paying attention, or giving time and support to, a member of the opposite sex. This situation tends to elicit extreme jealousy when the third party is the partner's ex-spouse.³

3. EXCLUSIVITY IN JEALOUSY

Regarding exclusivity in jealousy, it does not mean exclusion of all people. There are quantitative exclusivity and qualitative exclusivity. Quantitative refers to the number of persons with whom our partner can have relationship and qualitative refers to the types of relationship. From a quantitative perspective, exclusivity does not have to refer to the relationship of merely between two persons. For example, a woman in polygamous marriage does not feel jealous when her husband has relationship with his other wives but she will feel jealous if her husband has relationship with women other than his other wives. So sexual jealousy requires exclusivity, though a more flexible variety.

In some cases jealousy is not concerned with actual exclusivity but merely with apparent exclusivity. I may be indifferent to my wife having an affair with someone as long as this affair is kept secret and my apparent exclusive position remains intact. Sometimes adultery is tolerated but not infidelity. Infidelity involves attitude of the two persons, and adultery does not depend upon the attitudes of the two partners. In open marriages, adultery is not regarded as infidelity.

Jealousy too involves competition like envy. It is not a general but a specific competition with a third party. Jealousy arises just because we desired to be favoured and we suspect that it is not the case. The choice of someone else over us by our mate contributes to the painful nature of jealousy. A choice is a clear preference and not accidental. Jealousy concerns the free choice of our mate and not our own.⁴

4. JEALOUSY AND ROMANTIC LOVE

There is a positive correlation between jealousy and romantic love. But jealousy is not a sign of caring and love for the mate. Jealousy may arise even in the absence of love and caring. I may dislike and despise my wife and yet when another man looks covetously at my wife I may become jealous. In this case, jealousy is close to selfishness than to love. Therefore jealousy is not always indicative of love. Where there is romantic love, there is always the possibility of jealousy. It is because in romantic love we are concerned about a favourable relationship we value. The prospect of losing that relationship to someone could provoke jealousy. We can say that the level of involvement in the relationship is often positively correlated with the level of jealousy.⁵

5. NO SOCIAL COMPARISON

In envy one wishes to be like others and so the competitive and comparative concern is more in envy than in jealousy. In jealousy we just want to maintain a relationship regardless of others. Envy is more of a social character; there is a consideration of what we have in comparison with others. This consideration is not essential in jealousy. The competitive concern in jealousy does not involve a social comparison concerning a higher or lower status, but it presupposes personal rivalry that someone else may obtain what I have or value.⁶

6. DESERT CLAIM

Desert claim in jealousy is stronger than in envy since in jealousy we are already involved in the relationship we want to maintain. We also believe that we deserve to be so. There is a feeling of being more entitled to something that we possess than to something we do not have. If our rival is perceived as clearly superior

to us and more deserving of the favourable relationship, the loss we experience is less humiliating. Here the loss seems inevitable; we could do nothing to prevent it.⁷

7. SELF-ESTEEM CONCERN

What we said applies to our mate being superior rather than our rival being superior. For example, if I have a low self-esteem and consider my wife superior, I may feel only gratitude to her for having given me whatever attention she has. My self-esteem is boosted by being with my superior wife and so even if her infidelity hurts me, in the overall calculation my relationship with such a woman increases my self-esteem. In such a situation jealousy may also arise if the infidelity is considered a blow to my self-esteem and exceeds the other benefits I may derive from being with my wife.

Needless to say that envy and jealousy are unpleasant feelings, which we would like to overcome. Jealousy typically is more a negative personal attitude, expressed in more intense desire and feelings and in being more aggressive than envy. Therefore, jealousy is more painful than envy and it is so because of its more personal nature and the fact that it is difficult to bear the loss of something we already have than to gain something we never have had.⁸

26

PLEASURE-IN-OTHERS' - MISFORTUNE

Pleasure-in-others'-misfortune involves two things. Firstly, there is the misfortune of the other, and secondly, one experiences pleasure. These are indisputable. Here there is a comparative and at times competitive concern. The reason why we have pleasure in the misfortune of others is that the misfortune of the other somehow benefits us and in a way enhances our superiority. Both in envy and pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, comparison of our fortune with that of the other is crucial. But contrary to the situation in envy, here we occupy a superior position.¹

1. ESSENTIAL FACTORS

The other's misfortune makes us aware of our better position and this precisely generates pleasure in us. Added to the feeling of superior position, there is also the belief that the other deserves his/her misfortune. We have already seen that two factors are essential: the misfortune of the other and our pleasure. Besides these, there are three more factors. They are 1. The other person is perceived to deserve the misfortune, 2. The misfortune is relatively minor, and 3. We are passive in generating the other's misfortune. If these three added factors are not there, we will not have the typical emotion of pleasure-in-others'-misfortune.²

2. DESERVINGNESS

When you are in a line for buying a ticket, if someone comes and takes a position in front of you, you feel angry. If the organizer comes and pulls the person and puts him/her at the end of the line, you feel happy about it. Because you realize that this person deserves this misfortune. You feel happy all the more because justice

is done. Besides, you morally feel all right since the misfortune was not brought about by you. The more deserved the misfortune is, the more justified is your pleasure. When people from high position fall, it is usually greeted with great pleasure, if the fall is understood as deserved. We can witness this every now and then with political leaders and heads of governments when they happen to lose their positions. The fact that the misfortune of the other is deserved gives us a moral confirmation for our emotion, which we might fear in the beginning as morally unfounded. The very fact that we are pleased with the misfortune of others indicates our belief that the misfortune was deserved. Thus deservingness is one of the key variables that generate our pleasure in the other's misfortune.

It is somewhat difficult to determine at what age one experiences pleasure at the misfortune of others. It has been found with children as early as three or four years to laugh at the misfortune suffered by a villain in movies because the children perceived that the villain deserved the misfortune.³

3. MINOR SETBACKS

There is always the comparative, and often the competitive concern prevailing in pleasure. But comparison is possible only when the two parties are not too apart and they both belong to the same comparative framework. When there is no great gap, the situation can be reversed. For example the one in the superior position may occupy an inferior position and likewise the one in an inferior position may occupy a superior position. This can happen just because there is no great gap between the two parties being compared. Therefore we can say that pleasure is involved when there is a small difference. If the misfortune is severe, pleasure usually turns into pity. You may enjoy a minor setback of your colleague with whom you compare yourself. But if a great misfortune befalls him or his family, you will not be feeling pleasure but pity for him/her. When a dictator fell, most people felt very happy but when they realized how miserable he looked when he was captured, even his enemies felt pity for him. There is no great substantial benefit from the minor misfortune of others except the psychological gain expressed in a positive mood for a while.⁴

4. PASSIVITY OF THE AGENT

In pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, the agent is passive. In the emotion happy-for, the agent is personally involved in bringing about and sustaining the other's good fortune. This is typically absent in pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, because an active personal involvement is contrary to the rules of fair competition. If there is an involvement, it may be misunderstood as deliberately harming the other and so one is not the fair winner in the ongoing competition. One of the reasons for our pleasure in others' misfortune is the feeling that the failure of our competitor is not due to our own behaviour but to fate.

In pleasure-in-others'-misfortune there is the fear of the reversal of the situation which would mean that we may occupy the other's inferior position. Since the difference is minor, things can turn out to be otherwise in a short while. The satisfaction we derive from pleasure-in-others'-misfortune may be momentary, because our own overall situation often is not much better and may be even worse at any time. This possibility is quite real.⁵

27

PITY

Though in many cases of pity we could offer substantial help, we think ourselves as being unable, or not obliged to do so. In pity there is a perceived lack of obligation associated with our unwillingness to become personally involved. Even when we offer help, it is so little that the recipient's life is not going to change a lot. There is a belief behind such behaviour that a single person like me cannot alleviate the misery of millions of people in the world. The needy people are too many to be assisted by an individual. Therefore the best we can do is to help in a limited way or to limit it to our intimates. We notice various types of miseries in the world and we also believe we can hardly do anything substantial to change the miserable situation and so we just pity the suffering people. Thus pity is often sympathy for the helpless by the powerless or those who consider themselves as powerless.¹

1. HELPLESSNESS AND UNWILLINGNESS

Pity is not proper when we can alleviate misery. When we have the power to alleviate suffering we no longer need to show pity. When we are able to help a person and yet we did not do, then it results in guilt. We tend to repress this guilt saying to ourselves that the other person is inferior and hence is undeserving of our help or the other person is able to solve his/her own problem. There could also be instances in which the perceived impotence is real. For example the helplessness or impotence we experience when faced with the terminal illness of another is real. Therefore pity can be shown both when we really are helpless, or when we are able but do not want to get involved.²

2. REASONS FOR PASSIVITY

The fact that we accept the other's situation and are unwilling to become personally involved may arise from our three beliefs. They are (1) the other's position is unalterably inferior; (2) the

other person is somehow responsible for his inferior position; or (3) we lack the required resources. These are rationalization to justify our passivity in pity. It is not necessary that all these three beliefs should be operative in our case. Any one of the beliefs is enough to justify our passivity. Pity will be strongest even with the single belief that we lack the required resources. Pity will be weakest with the belief that the other's position is unalterably inferior. This is so because in the former instance our ability to change the situation is greatest, and with the latter our ability to change the situation is limited. Usually we tend to rationalize our passive attitude by our many supposedly convincing beliefs for not helping others.

Since in pity we believe in the other's inferiority, the recipient may feel insulted or humiliated. Therefore many people do not like to be pitied. Some people want to be pitied because they might not otherwise get the attention they want. Of course it is also disputed if all those who are pitied are considered inferior.³

3. UNDESERVEDNESS

Our emotion of pity will be stronger depending upon the strength of our belief that the other does not deserve such substantial misfortune. The stronger the belief, the more intense is our emotion of pity. It is also noted that we may experience pity and yet believe that the other person deserves the misfortune. For example we may pity a serial killer but believe that he deserves the punishment. Here emotional evaluation clashes with the intellectual evaluation. From an intellectual point of view, we may justify the execution of the serial murderer, but taking the person as an individual we may say that the misfortune (in this case execution) is too severe. In any case, whenever we pity under any aspect, there is an element of the belief that the person does not deserve the misfortune or the severity of the misfortune is too great.⁴

4. COMPARISON OF PITY AND ENVY

Since I have followed the method of treating two emotions at a time for the sake of clarity, often you will find individual emotions spoken of in comparison with at least another emotion. This method goes well especially when two or more emotions look similar in some aspects and dissimilar in other aspects. The material you find below was already seen in the chapter on envy.

Pity and envy look quite different, yet from a psychological point of view they are similar in some important aspects. Pity is a positive attitude, highly valued in our relationships, while envy is basically a negative attitude we try to avoid. Envy, pity, and compassion are sometimes seen in the same individuals. Envy towards those who are better off will go together with pity and compassion for the worse-off. Our sensitivity to the fortunes of other people comes to the foreground when their fortune is different from ours; that is when their situation is better or worse. Thus our well-being will be reduced when another individual either has more or substantially less than we do. If it is more, we feel envy; and if it is substantially less, then we feel pity or compassion. When we feel pity for other persons, we are in a superior position, which provides some compensation for our inferior position, which we feel when we experience envy. Therefore what appears to be altruistic in pity may be in reality a form of self-interested envy reduction.

There is an association of pity with the perception of inferiority. Envy typically involves our own relative deprivation or inferiority; pity involves the substantial deprivation of others. To feel envious, it is enough to see the other slightly in a better position. But to feel pity, the other should be substantially lower. Both pity and envy are associated with a small hope of changing the unfavourable situation. In pity, the hope is all the weaker. The subject-object inequality can be annulled either elevating the lower or lowering the superior. In envy we attempt to annul subject-object inequality by both means, but in pity we would employ only by elevating the lower and we would not like to lower ourselves.

We can think of our situation and the situation of the other. Our situation is the focus of our concern in envy, but in pity the situation of the other is the main concern. Thus in pity, consideration of our own situation is less significant and mainly associated with a possible dangerous future situation and so there is fear. Fear is a component of pity. In envy we are concerned with our present inferior position and so there is shame. Shame is an important component of envy. Substantial misfortune of another person generates pity in us and a small difference generates envy in us. This being the case, there is an element of unfairness in envy. Since we feel unfairness in envy, correspondingly we have

resentment, which is a kind of moral protest. There are two main reasons why we feel resentment in the face of unfairness in envy. One is that envy does not involve a kind of acceptance, and hence justification, of the given situation. The other is that when we are in an inferior position, our misfortune is magnified. Therefore, the desire for relief is stronger in envy since here we are concerned with our own relief.

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Both in pity and envy, we tend to reduce the unpleasantness of the situation by diverting our attention; in pity by paying lip service to the other's misfortune or by offering token help which cannot change the basic misfortune; in envy by engaging in hard work aimed in the long run at changing the basic causes of the inferior situation. The differential approach expresses our belief that in envy, but usually not in pity, the situation can in principle be changed. Therefore, pity is more passive than envy.

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In pity, compassion and envy, by using mental substitution by which we place ourselves in the other's situation, we generate fear or hope, of being in that situation. The concern in envy is our inferiority; and in pity and compassion, the other's misfortune; and so the element of comparison is less dominant in pity and compassion.

In envy and pity we notice conflicting emotional strands. There is attraction to and repulsion from the other. In envy the attraction is seen as admiration; and in pity, as sympathy. Likewise, repulsion is seen in envy as hostility and in pity as contempt.⁵

28

COMPASSION

Compassion is an altruistic concern for another's suffering and the desire to alleviate it. In compassion and pity we consider someone who suffers. But the ways we consider the suffering of another are different in both cases. In pity we believe that the other is inferior and so we take a sympathetic attitude. This sympathetic attitude stems more from our own fear of sharing the other's situation. In compassion, on the contrary, we transcend different types of disparity and assume equality with regard to common humanity. When we are compassionate, we are more willing to help and perceive ourselves more obliged to act. Therefore, compassion involves a greater commitment to help and is less passive.¹

1. ALTRUISTIC

Compassion is altruistic since it involves a regard for the good of other persons. The object of compassion is any person in a negative condition, suffering some harm, difficulty, danger (past, present, or future). It is the person and not merely the negative condition, which is the object of compassion. Nevertheless, the focus of compassion is the condition. We should not think that compassion is a simple feeling-state. It is, in fact, a complex emotional attitude towards another. It characteristically involves imaginative dwelling on the condition of the other. It has an active regard for the good of the other, a view of the other as a fellow human being, and intense emotional responses. In compassion, we imaginatively reconstruct someone's condition. We come to understand someone's condition by imagining what our own reaction would be.²

2. SHARED HUMANITY

In compassion there is a sense of shared humanity, which promotes the experience of equality, even when we are aware of

actual social inequality. Compassion means that we do not equate social inequality with human inequality. We transcend social inequality, and promote equality of all humanity.³

3. STRENGTH AND DURATION

If compassion were merely a passing reaction, it would not be sufficient for the level of concern, the imaginative reconstruction, and the disposition to beneficent action required for compassion. Therefore the threshold of emotional strength required for compassion has to be relatively high and enduring. Etymologically the word 'compassion' suggests 'feeling with' the other person, sharing his/her feelings. In a way the subject and the object have the same feeling-type: distress, sorrow, desire for relief. At the same time, the feeling the subject and the object experience is not the same. The difference consists in this: in a case of my neighbour's loss, my neighbour suffers his own loss and I suffer the loss that has affected my neighbour, not my own. Therefore my suffering 'as it were' will be less than the experience of my neighbour.⁴

4. READINESS TO HELP

In pity we accept the present situation and are unwilling to become personally involved. There is no readiness to help. But in compassion there is clearly a readiness to help the other. That is why in close relations, we usually feel compassion rather than pity because of our readiness to act. Compassion requires the disposition to perform beneficent actions, since the subject has had a certain sort of imaginative reconstruction of someone's condition and has a concern for his/her good. The steps that are taken by the subject to ameliorate the condition are guided by and prompted by imaginative reconstruction and concern. If beneficent actions are impossible to perform as in the case of distant far away flood victims, or inappropriate as in the case of jeopardizing the sufferer's autonomy, compassion may not need an active performance of beneficent acts. In such situations, compassion involves hope and desire for the relief of the condition by those in a position to provide it. We should also remember situations in which we can do nothing to alleviate the affliction, as for instance we meet someone with a terminal cancer. In such a situation, compassion involves sorrowing for the person, hoping that the condition might be mitigated or

compensated, being happy or grateful if this occurs, and similar responses. In a helpless situation, when we express our compassionate concern and shared sorrow, they in themselves can be valuable to the sufferer, independent of their instrumental value in improving the sufferer's condition.⁵

5. DISSATISFACTION WITH THE PRESENT

In compassion we express our dissatisfaction with the present situation. In this respect compassion is similar to anger in which too we express our dissatisfaction. But in compassion we conceive it as unalterable in the short run. That is why we attempt to help the other endure the painful situation rather than change it which we think is not possible in the short run. But in anger there is intention to change and even destroy the situation in the short run. Pity lacks both the intense feeling dimension and orientation toward change, which are present in anger.⁶

6. NONVOLUNTARINESS

Both compassion and pity are associated with the belief that the other person does not deserve such a substantial misfortune. It is known that in compassion this belief is more dominant. The concern is not only with the undeserved severity of the misfortune but also with the presence of any misfortune. This difference comes because of the different attribution of responsibility. In pity we give more importance to the responsibility of the sufferer for the current situation, whereas in compassion we believe in the nonvoluntary elements of others' behaviour. With respect to compassion, even in cases of moral setbacks, we excuse the individuals involved and think that they are not entirely responsible for their condemnable deeds. Take for example someone who has become an addict to drug or alcohol and has become miserable. If we have compassion we believe that the person is not entirely to blame; the circumstances, the peer groups, his/her genetic predisposition, or his past are responsible for the present condition of the person. In a case like this, compassion may grant that there is justification for human suffering in general, but not justify a

particular person's specific misfortune. The same case can be considered from the point of view of pity, in which case, we will attribute some responsibility to the addict and say that the addict is responsible for his/her present miserable condition.⁷

7. DESIRE FOR THE OTHER'S RELIEF

The desire for the other's relief is present both in compassion and pity. This is possible because of the belief that the other person does not deserve such severe misfortune. In pity, however, we wish only for the relief of the other's suffering and not the inferiority of the other. On the contrary, in compassion we not only desire the relief of the suffering of the other but also wish to abolish the other's inferiority; this is typical of compassion.⁸

29

MERCY

Mercy is often confused with pity and compassion. Understanding mercy would help us understand pity and compassion as well.

A person may be seriously suffering or is about to undergo suffering. Suddenly you intervene and immediately alleviate the suffering without investing much time or effort. It is mercy. So an act of mercy first of all involves treating a person considerably less harshly than the person would have been treated, given the power of the mercy giver and the general course of action common in such cases. That particular course of harsh events is prevented by a particular action (or omission) by someone. This is an instance of mercy shown.¹

1. ATTITUDE CONVEYED BY ACTION

The question whether mercy is an emotion is in place. A negative evaluation of another person's substantial misfortune is involved both in pity and compassion. And in both, the negative evaluation is expressed in an emotional state, but in mercy it is expressed in a certain action. So mercy is essentially not an emotion like pity and compassion, but a certain attitude conveyed by action.

2. DELIBERATIVE ACTION

One of the major differences between mercy and pity or compassion is the absence of intense feeling. Pity and compassion are marked with intense feeling, but mercy need not have that intense feeling experience. Likewise, motivational state is essential in emotion, but in mercy we do not see motivational state of the actor. One can be merciful from the most deplorable motives. There is an intellectual deliberation in mercy, whereas in pity and compassion – and for that matter in emotion – there is no intellectual deliberations. Typical emotional evaluations in emotion are spontaneous rather than deliberate. Mercy has to be typically an

action –deliberate and intended. We cannot be merciful by accident; we can be merciful only deliberately. Pity and compassion come rather automatically without much deliberation.²

3. NONEMOTIONAL

Insofar as mercy is a partial and discriminative attitude, it is related to emotions. But its partial nature comes from its departure from an established course of events. If we depart from an established course, it may be due to emotional considerations and may even generate emotional reactions, but it need not be an emotional state. Thus mercy is not an emotional state.³

4. ABILITY TO HELP

Pity implies feeling sorry for the person; compassion implies being willing to become personally involved. Changing the miserable situation of the object requires many resources and time. Pity perceives that the required resources are absent, or that it is not worthwhile to invest them, or the resources are beyond one's reach. In compassion we have the readiness to invest resources while being aware that it is a demanding and long-term commitment, which may not be successful. In this way, compassion is of a longer temporal duration than pity. Because of the activity involved in compassion, the other's current miserable situation improves but the activity does not eliminate the misfortune totally. Mercy is not powerless like pity, and the relief to the misfortune of the other is immediate and does not require much time or effort as in compassion.⁴

5. ACTUAL HELP

In pity there is a favourable attention to the suffering of another, but that alone is not enough. In mercy there should be real help. We will only pity if we do not actually involve in doing something. If you are well off and somebody owes you a good sum of money, you condone the loan. In this case you have been merciful. On the contrary, you feel sorry for the poor man and yet demand your loan, and then it is only pity. There is a definite departure from an established general course of events in mercy.

Mercy is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as 'holding oneself back from punishing, or from causing suffering to, a person

whom one has the right or power to punish.’ This definition captures important elements of mercy. Holding oneself back from causing suffering is more crucial than refraining from punishment and the element of power is more essential than that of right.⁵

6. POWER IN MERCY

Pity, compassion and mercy differ in their ability and also in their emotional attitude towards the ability they possess. The one who pities revels in such power; the one who is compassionate is proud of it; and the mercy giver is embarrassed by it. There is the feeling of superiority in pity and it is the source of the subject’s satisfaction and gloating. In compassion there is no satisfaction and gloating since the focus is on the situation of the object. In compassion one perceives a great sacrifice required to effectively helping the other and that is a source of pride.⁶

7. OTHER’S INFERIORITY

Pity, compassion and mercy can be thought of on a similar plane. They imply negative evaluation of another person’s substantial misfortune and the belief that this person or animal needs our help; in this sense the other is inferior to us. Pity is usually a depreciating attitude. Compassion considers the inferiority of the object to be limited to specific circumstances and basically the other is perceived as similar to us. In pity we take this local or partial inferiority as essentially indicating the other’s character and hence the other person is responsible for his/her condition. So it is found easier to identify ourselves with the object of compassion than with the object of pity. If you take mercy, it is superior to the object and thus it is closer in nature to pity than to compassion. In mercy our superiority is often not limited to the specific aspect in question and we do not identify with the object. God’s attitude towards us is considered as one of mercy. God wants to help the unfortunate human beings. God cannot be said to pity since pity implies impotence on the part of the giver, which cannot be attributed to God. God may be said to have compassion; but compassion implies some kind of similarity, which God does by assuming a human perspective and thus God is compassionate towards humans.⁷

8. OTHER’S DESERVINGNESS

It appears that pity, compassion, and mercy have the belief that the other does not deserve this kind of substantial misfortune. This belief comes expressed in the negative evaluation of the misfortune of the other. Although they may believe in the undeservingness of the other, they differ with regard to whether the other deserves any misfortune at all. It is evident in pity that the object deserves some, though a lesser kind of misfortune; in compassion one does not typically believe that the object deserve any misfortune. In mercy the situation is complex. In some cases the object does not deserve the hardship, and in some other cases, the hardship imposed on the object seems to be justified from one perspective but unjustified from another perspective. In any case, in spite of the moral justification of harsh treatment, the object is perceived to deserve less harsh treatment.

To sum up, pity, compassion, and mercy have been distinguished on the basis of the following characteristics: 1. The emotional nature of the attitude – only pity and compassion are emotional attitudes; unlike typical emotions, mercy often occurs without an intense feeling, it does not take time and may be the result of intellectual deliberations. 2. The other’s inferiority – pity and mercy, but not compassion, include the belief in the other’s inferiority. 3. The ability to help – the ability to help is obviously present in mercy and hardly present in pity; compassion may also result in substantial help, but only after a considerable length of time. 4. The other’s deservingness of the bad fortune – in all stances, the other is conceived as not deserving such a severe misfortune; only in compassion do we often believe that misfortune not at all is deserved.

The difference between pity and compassion is clear scientifically. Nevertheless, it is a question of degree rather than kind. For example a shift in degree may turn pity into compassion. Mercy is clearly distinguished from pity and compassion. Yet borderline cases exist with regard to mercy. Here comes, for example, the case of mercy sex. One person does not feel attracted to another person asking for sex, yet accepts to oblige the person by engaging in sex. It is difficult to say whether it is an act of mercy or pity; it seems to have the properties of both. The scientific precision we have seen is not a major concern of common sense when we use

the terms 'pity,' 'compassion,' and 'mercy' in an undifferentiated manner.⁸

9. RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER EMOTIONS

Mercy is often associated with forgiveness. It is partially true because they both are same in the sense that they are not emotions. Forgiveness expresses the termination of emotions, often those of anger and resentment. In forgiveness we are concerned with overcoming a negative emotion anger or resentment but in mercy we are concerned with overcoming power. The emphasis in mercy is on actions and in forgiveness on attitudes. For example, avoiding harsh treatment, which is mercy, can be done without a change in attitude, but in forgiveness the attitude has to change. One may show mercy to another without forgiving that person. For example, a close associate or friend of yours has betrayed you. You may again take him back and accept him as your friend out of mercy without forgiving him. Perhaps in most cases, mercy implies partial forgiveness but it does not necessarily imply full forgiveness. Forgiveness practically implies mercy. When there is a change in our attitude, which is typical of forgiveness, there is going to be change in our actions as well, which is typical of mercy. But these need not go together in all the instances.

Pity and compassion are associated with sorrow and sympathy for the other's suffering and a tacit fear that we, or some persons close to us, may suffer such misfortune. The difference between pity and compassion in this respect is in degree. Thus sorrow and sympathy are more intense in compassion, whereas fear is more intense in pity. Typical cases of pity do not involve respect but rather contempt. People say to one another 'I pity you' in contempt.

A feeling of satisfaction is seen in typical pity based on the favourable comparison made between our situation and that of the other. We realize that we are lucky in pity with the awareness of and may be even the pleasure, in being lucky. Our lucky position is a credit to us and this satisfaction engenders pride in us. This satisfaction coupled with the belief in the other's inferiority is not present in compassion. In compassion we are dissatisfied with the current situation. It is said that for similar reasons, grief may sometimes be pleasant, not in its own right, but owing to some elements associated with it. One such is that one is at the centre of other persons' attention and the sympathy one receives from others.

Satisfaction in pity is somewhat similar to delight in pleasure-in-others'-misfortune. But these two complex emotional states are quite different. In pity there is sorrow for the other's substantial misfortune, but in pleasure-in-others'-misfortune there is delight in the other's relative minor misfortune.

The group of negative emotions we experience toward the bad fortune of others are pity and compassion, and besides these two, we also have the emotion of sympathy. Sympathy is a general emotion. In fact, compassion and pity require some sort of sympathy. Sympathy is isolated from other emotional attitudes. It usually addresses slight misfortunes. If someone has got a slight illness or very minor accident, we feel sympathy. Since sympathy is addressed to light misfortune, the emotional intensity in sympathy is usually lower than that of pity and compassion.

Pity can be directed at the dead because of the element of helplessness typical of our attitude toward the dead. Compassion is not directed at the dead. Compassion is 'suffering with' another person. This difference between pity and compassion is essential.⁹

10. MERCY AND PUNISHMENT

Punishment, which is imposing harsh treatment on wrongdoers, is associated with two major ideas. One of them is deterrence, which has an instrumental value in preventing the same person and other persons from committing similar offences. The second is the idea of retribution, which has an intrinsic value of giving perpetrators their due. The focus of deterrence is the future behaviour of the wrongdoer and other people. The focus of concern in retribution is the past behaviour of the wrongdoer. Mercy is relevant to both ideas.

Since the idea of deterrence involves the wrongdoer and other people, the extent of the punishment is determined not merely by specific considerations fully relevant to someone's offence or crime but also by instrumental considerations intending to prevent other people from committing similar offences. Since the idea of retribution concerns only, or at least the essential element of justice, individual considerations have greater weight. In retribution, one gets what one deserves, and in this case if considerations determine that one should not be severely punished, then no other external considerations should be relevant in this regard.¹⁰

PART - II

1. Actions of Agents

In this second part dealing with the actions of agents, we have first of all emotions concerning the actions of agents, and secondly emotions concerning the actions of agents and the agent as a whole going together. These again can be divided into emotions that are directed to oneself or to others.

A. Oneself

Emotions directed to oneself include pride, and regret which comprises remorse, guilt and embarrassment.

30

PRIDE

In this chapter, I describe emotions directed at our own specific deeds. These deeds can either be in the past or in the present. When we negatively evaluate our past deeds, we may experience the emotions of regret or fear; when we positively evaluate them, the emotion of pride may emerge. Our present deeds may evoke in us the emotions of embarrassment, guilt, and pride. We can see that 'pride' is used to denote our positive attitude toward both past and present activities. In the negative realm, the terms are more differentiated; whereas, regret is clearly directed at past activities, embarrassment is concerned with present ones; guilt may arise from reflections upon both our past and present actions.

Pride and regret are emotional attitudes directed at our particular actions; pridefulness and shame are emotional attitudes directed at our more general characteristics. Pride and regret are then correlated with gratitude and anger, while pridefulness and shame are similar to love and hate. The first group of emotions are directed at ourselves, and the second group at others. In everyday language, we sometimes use shame to refer also to specific deeds; thus, we say that we are ashamed of what we did. In everyday language, we also use pride, rather than pridefulness, to express our positive attitude toward our general characteristics.¹

1. MAJOR ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS

To experience pride, one must receive or take credit for the positive event and experience ego-enhancement. It is enhancement of one's ego-identity by taking credit for a valued object or achievement, either our own or that of someone else or group with whom we identify.

Pride is known to have two major essential elements. One is that one evaluates something as positive. Secondly, one considers oneself as somehow connected to that positive thing. For pride,

both elements are necessary. If one of the elements has an increase, the increase can compensate for the lower degree of the other element. But in the absence of any one of the elements, there will not be pride. Our connectedness to the positive thing can be in various ways. For example, I may feel responsible for the generation of an event, or I may own a thing, or I may be associated with a person who is responsible for an important event or owns a thing.²

2. COMPARATIVE CONCERN

For emotions, we always need a comparative concern. The comparative concern is especially important in pride. There need not be an absolute value but a comparative value. It is not necessary there need be exclusivity; pride only presupposes some sense of a comparatively high value, and at times even superiority. Sometimes we may be proud of a thing of which many people will be proud of, as for example, our nationality. Most people in a country are likely to feel proud of their country. Though we share the same object of pride with many people, still we should feel that we are better than others with whom we compare ourselves. The one who experiences pride should be at least slightly higher than the other person's level with whom comparison is made. I know a disabled person who was on wheel chair. With much effort and training he learned to walk on crutches, which was a great feat for him in comparison with others who could not learn to use the crutches. Therefore, experiencing pride is always in comparison with some others, always taking into account one's own level.

Usually the more exclusive a certain quality is, the more proud we will feel. But it is not sure which one will generate greater pride between comparison of two achievements of different magnitudes and two achievements of different degrees of exclusivity. Will an event with greater achievement but lesser exclusivity, or an event with lesser achievement but greater exclusivity, give more pride? Perhaps such determination depends on the context, achievement and exclusivity.

We realize that the comparative concern indicates that pride is directed at ourselves, yet the opinion of others is of crucial importance. Sometimes we are aware of the inferior quality of our performance, but people around us may praise us for its excellence

at which we feel pride. Pride is long-lasting if the things we are proud are compatible with our values and beliefs, otherwise they do not last long. For example, one may feel proud of some immoral acts like having raped five girls, but that pride lasts only for a short while.³

3. PUBLIC RECOGNITION

Normal feelings of pride are generally known to be quiet, although they are warming experiences. We do not necessarily always experience pride as a special feeling in the solitary pursuits that warrant the emotion. Pride is most readily identified when it is heightened and augmented by public recognition. Therefore, recognized feelings of pride are often associated with the public acknowledgement of some achievement. Achievement, even when not recognized, generates pride. Nevertheless, we particularly enjoy pride when it accompanies public approval.⁴

4. NATURAL GIFTS

We feel pride not only for our achievements by our hard efforts but also for gifts of nature – the things we have biologically and socially inherited. For example, our pride about our good looks and health are natural gifts. We should also remember many of the achievements are based on our natural gifts. In the ultimate analysis everything we are and everything we possess are gifts.

When we compare natural gifts with our achievements, our responsibility towards both of them differs radically. I am not responsible for the gifts of nature. They were not directly under my control or effort. They are there without my ever asking for them. Towards my achievements I am responsible. It is through my hard effort I achieved them. The greater degree of controllability and effort increase the intentional intensity of pride. This is precisely the result of accountability, which is an important intensity variable. We feel proud of things for which we are responsible in the sense we aimed at them, made efforts and used every means towards their attainment.

Curiously, we are proud of our health and good looks but are not ashamed or feel guilty of our illness. Perhaps we believe that our health and good looks are due to our effort, whereas our illness

is due to some external factors. This tendency illustrates that we tend to take credit for our success and attribute our failures to others or to external factors.⁵

5. SELF-ASCRIBED GIFTS

There is something called 'self-ascribed gifts.' Pride is a kind of pleasure we experience in the possession of some quality that we think are valuable. We also have the tendency to increase this pleasure either by imputing to ourselves qualities, which we may not possess or by simply valuing too much the good qualities we have. This tendency of self-ascribing gifts to us has an important function in maintaining our self-esteem.

Pride is the consequence of a successful evaluation of a specific action. It is a phenomenological experience of joy over an action. The focus of pleasure here is specific and is related to a particular behaviour. Just like in guilt, in pride too, the self and the object are separated.

To conclude, we can safely say that the pride of achievement seems to be one of the basic mechanisms of human survival. We do not think that we are only driven by mechanisms of pain avoidance. We also recognize that we are reward-seekers. Like lower forms of life, we are not just seeking rewards, which are simply the nutrients of biological survival. We are aspirers. We crave achievement, mastery, and purpose; for, this is what extends the meaning of human life beyond the mere perpetuation of a biological survival or existence.⁶

31

REGRET

For every action we undertake, there may be many alternatives available. Regret is basically a sorrow over a past alternative that was available to us, but somehow we missed it. When we miss an available alternative, we feel regret about it. If a student who got 99 marks in maths out of 100 and missed one mark by carelessness, then his/her regret is more than a student who got 60 marks. You regret having missed the train just by two minutes than by 30 minutes.

People tend to ignore the past and invest more in the future. But it was the past that shaped our personality and emotions in particular. Taking stock of the past is beneficial even if only out of consideration for the present and the future. Family systems theories take into account our past three generations because we are what we are due to our past. Our present problems may have connections to earlier life situations and learning.¹

1. TEMPORAL DISTANCE

In regret, the past and the present are bridged together in view of the future. Regret is about the past evaluated at the present in a negative manner, about something we did or refrained from doing. The evaluation of our past doing something or not doing something is evaluated in the light of the present and the future considerations. Since our emotion is directed at the past, there is a temporal distance between the present time and the time of our commission or omission of an act. Because of this temporal distance, the emotion intensity will be less. For, in many instances, time heals wounds. Any temporal distance will reduce the intensity of an emotion. As time passes by, we are lenient towards people who committed crimes in the past. One of the reasons why we are lenient towards them is the factor of time distance.²

2. REGRET-MINIMIZING CHOICES

It is not only after an act we regret, but we also regret before we make a decision about the future action. Here we may anticipate the regret we may feel later. That is why many of us are engaged in regret-minimizing choices by which we avoid risk-taking. There are people who will not exchange their lottery tickets lest they should regret later if by chance their former tickets got the prize. Although regret-minimizing choices are typically risk-avoiding, some of them are risk-seeking. Regret is there just because we have made a decision either for or against an action. Where there is no personal responsibility for the action or non-action there is no regret. That is why people tend to take risks at times rather than feel regret later. For example, you run a business, which is not flourishing. Therefore you think of starting another business. Who knows if your new business will not bring greater failure? Now you may risk the failure of the old business in order not to feel regret. So you may rather stick to your old business and in its eventual failure you may not feel that much regret as in the case of the new business, which might fail. For, we usually feel more personally responsible for our actions than our inactions. There will be regret in both the failures of the old and the new businesses failing. But the regret in the old business failing is less compared to the regret in the new business failing. There are, of course, some people who do not want to minimize regret; they are motivated to maximize joy. For, the tendency to minimize regret may have negative consequences as it may prevent us from experimenting and learning new things.³

3. SHORT- AND LONG-TERM REGRETS

We can also distinguish between two types of regret. They are short- and long-term regrets. It is interesting to note that reducing one of them will increase the other. In a short-term regret, we are concerned with loss caused by a specific change. Like any typical emotion it will have instability, great intensity, a partial perspective and brief duration. The long-term regret is a sentiment, which is termed 'wistful regret.' It is concerned with a loss in the past and the loss has bearing on our general course of life. It will have the opposite qualities of emotions like more stability, more security, less intensity, a more general perspective, and longer duration. A

short-term regret can occur when you gave a medicine to your child and the illness became worse. A long-term regret can occur when you had a chance to become a physician with an educational loan. But you did not choose that course. A lost opportunity that would have made your life more enriching maybe regretted all your life. In the short-term regret, we tend to regret our actions rather than our inactions. But when it is the question of long-term regret, we regret our inaction. Most of us regret very much what we have not done than what we have done. The road not taken torments us rather than the road we did take. That is why in most instances any regime or government is criticized at the end of the term for what they could have done but did not do than by what they actually did.⁴

Now let us consider what makes us regret in the short-term our failed action and in the long-term our failures to act. There are two types of mechanisms that are responsible for this phenomenon. They are: 1. elements that reduce the pain of regrettable actions, and 2. elements that bolster the pain of regrettable inactions.

4. REDUCING THE PAIN OF REGRETTABLE ACTIONS

In any situation, we take steps to ameliorate regrettable action more than regrettable inaction. This is responsible for reducing the pain of regrettable actions. There seems to be a tendency to rigorous effort to reduce dissonance in regrettable action than in regrettable failures to act. Thus most of us focus our attention on the secondary gains or positive by-products of a regrettable action. We think how much we have learned from a regrettable action. A man had a chance to go abroad and earn his living. Somehow he decided not to go and remained at home. Later he regretted his decision. His life at home was a misery financially. Yet he could later boast of his presence at home caring for his aged parents and his children. He would not have provided such a care had he not been here. This type of thinking reduces the dissonance in regrettable action. The pain of regrettable action may be reduced in the short run by reversing some of its consequences; but in the long run, it is reduced by noticing some of its positive outcomes.⁵

5. BOLSTERING THE PAIN OF REGRETTABLE INACTIONS

When we consider the consequences of regrettable action, they are often finite. The consequences are already seen and they are bound by what actually happened. There is nothing more to it. But in regrettable inaction, the consequences are infinite. What could have happened is bound only by our imagination. We think of the infinite number of good things that could have happened had we acted. Besides, the passage of time often instils in us increased confidence that we could have performed the overlooked course of action successfully. Just as we are preoccupied with incomplete tasks than completed ones, regrets of inaction occupy our mind more than the regrettable action. The stories of inaction often involve ambitions that were never realized and yet were open to our option.

Often it is realized that in order to avoid short-term negative emotional states, such as shame, fear, anger, and humiliation we may refrain from doing what may bring us positive emotional states, such as happiness, love, and pride. Here we tend to behave in a risk-avoiding manner. Risk-avoiding behaviour saves one from short-term pain or embarrassment, or ridicule, but robs one of long-term joy.

The most common regret seems to be centred on education. This is true of people who are relatively well educated. The next regretted items are work-related and family-related regrets. The family-related regrets are concerned with marriage and parenthood. Education, work and family are choices perhaps made too prematurely by individuals. Education and work are expressions of our capacities. Had we exercised them properly we would have been well off and happier, we think. With regard to family, we regret that we did not or could not provide enough developmental opportunities to those who are close to us, and also had not expressed sufficiently our love.

Though in typical regret we worry about the missed opportunities, which we could have had if we had taken a different road, at times we also regret missed opportunities that have nothing to do with our behaviour or choices.

Regret is basically a counterfactual emotion since it is concerned with missed opportunities. Our capacities are limited.

At a crossroad we can take only one road and therefore there will remain three roads that we could not take. We are always faced with a number of alternatives and it is not possible to fulfil all of them at the same time, taking into account our resources and time factor. Therefore, there will always be regret about things we have missed in our life. The more the alternatives at the time of inaction, the more the regret in future.⁶

6. REMORSE

Some dispute the distinction between regret and remorse. Some identify them as one and the same emotion. Regret is a broader notion. For remorse, personal responsibility for moral wrongdoing is a defining feature, but for regret personal responsibility for moral wrongdoing is not. We may regret events over which we have no control and which are morally innocuous. But, remorse refers to one's own past, to voluntary, overt, and morally wrong acts or to failures to act. Regret, for example, includes the items mentioned in remorse and other items like one's unexecuted intentions, one's own future, involuntary, morally innocuous, or virtuous acts. Thus regret is broader than remorse.

Remorse is focused on the deed and not on the self. In this respect, it is like regret. Remorse is also similar to guilt insofar as it gives importance to the moral aspect. Though guilt gives importance to the moral aspect, it is focused on the self as does shame. Since remorse and guilt have different focuses, they may be directed at the very same deed. Yet there may be instances in which individuals may feel remorse about something they have done and do not feel guilt. In such situations they negatively evaluate their deed, but do not perceive themselves as burdened or stained by their wrongdoing. It is not necessary that all actions we consider to be morally wrong will make us feel guilt. Guilt often involves remorse. However there are cases of feeling guilt, which are concerned more with violating norms than with doing harm to others; in this there is no remorse.

In regret there is 'acceptance' which remorse does not have. We may regret something we have done, but accept the given circumstances in which it was done: we had no plausible alternative, or it was the best thing to do considering the information available to us at that time. On the contrary, remorse does not imply

acceptance at all. We cannot feel remorse and at the same time believe that the action we had taken was the best choice given the specific circumstances. Supposing at that time, the action taken was the best thing to do, then our action will not be perceived to be morally reprehensible.

When we consider the relationship between regret and remorse, it is somewhat similar to that between envy and resentment. They are different in the sense, that envy and resentment are directed at other people, whereas regret and remorse are directed at oneself. As in resentment, remorse is usually directed at perceived moral wrongdoing. As in envy, the main concern in regret is undesirability or dissatisfaction and not necessarily immorality. In addition to these, resentment and remorse presuppose some kind of responsibility on the part of the agent. In the case of resentment, the responsibility rests on others and in the case of remorse, the responsibility rests on ourselves for the immoral behaviour. It is noted that in some cases, such responsibility may be absent from envy and regret.⁷

3 2

GUILT

Guilt refers to a specific deed (or omission). It is similar to regret insofar as it refers to a commission or omission. But there is a fundamental difference between them. In guilt our focus of concern is a deed, which has violated certain norms; whereas in regret, it is a deed, which was harmful. Guilt emerges when we have done something, which is forbidden. Regret emerges from doing something, which was basically a failure. The forbidden thing in guilt may involve some harm to a person or it might have merely violated a certain norm without doing harm to anyone. Emotions are mostly concerned with those who are close to us. In guilt, as well, the relationship to our intimates is also central. Guilt-inducing situations often highlight the neglect of a partner or of other intimates, or failure to live up to the conventional standards of interpersonal relationships.

Guilt is concerned with the action of an agent –not the agent as a whole. In this way it resembles anger. Guilt and shame often stem from similar situations. When we lie to someone, we feel shame; and when we hurt someone we feel guilt. Thus in shame our negative behaviour is perceived to express our global personality, whereas in guilt it is perceived to express an isolated act, which hurts the other person. Here we notice that the specific actions associated with guilt are of a more voluntary nature, whereas the traits associated with shame are more permanent and less voluntary. Guilt involves being associated with what is morally wrong, whereas shame is associated with being in a disadvantageous situation. Guilt and shame are concerned with ourselves. Shame is concerned more about fundamental traits of the self, whereas guilt is more about the impact of our actions, typically, but not necessarily, upon the other. Considerations of actual damage to the other person are less important in shame than the reflection on our own personality. Shame-prone persons are more likely to focus on their personal

qualities, and guilt-prone persons on specific aspects of their behaviour.

Guilt involves a partial negative evaluation of specific actions, whereas shame involves a global negative evaluation. In that way, shame is a more powerfully negative emotion than guilt. That is why guilt provides a sense that one can rectify the situation through corrective action, whereas shame does not. As we believe that we can undo the wrong we have done or caused, repayment and punishment are in place for guilt. But by means of repayment and punishment we cannot undo shame, because shame expresses more fundamental flaws. In accordance with what we have been saying, when we feel guilty, we try to repair what we have done by apologizing, explaining ourselves to the others concerned, offering excuses, confessing, and making amends. These activities have no place in shame.¹

1. A CERTAIN CAUSAL RESPONSIBILITY

We do not feel guilty of the deeds of others. To feel guilty I should have done an act over which I had a certain causal responsibility. If you as a parent had been negligent in bringing up your child, you will feel guilty for not having brought up your child properly; but you will not feel guilty for the misdeed of your child. You may feel shame regarding the misdeed of your child since you believe your upbringing of your child was deficient in this regard. Your child would feel guilty about his/her misdeed. Therefore, there should be a clear causal connection between the deed done and the feeling of guilt.²

2. TYPES OF GUILT

There is a phenomenon called 'survivor guilt.' It refers to the guilt experienced by people who survived certain dangerous situations while those who were with them met with a great disaster. After a tsunami, those who survived would feel guilt because in their family the other members were washed away. In a plane crash, car accidents, sexual abuse, suicide, murder, war and Holocaust, the survivors might feel survivor guilt. Somehow they believe they are responsible in some mysterious way for the fate of others who were killed or victimized, though there is no trace of any causal connection between their deeds and what had happened. Somehow

they hold themselves responsible for the deaths of those others, although no one else holds them responsible. Survivor guilt was not only noticed in cases of death but also in other instances like a job, which you hold while others who worked with you, were fired. It could be in your dysfunctional family; you managed to come up in life while your siblings did not make it and they are in a miserable condition even now.

There are various kinds of guilt which we find in the grieving parents. Such parents because of their belief that they contributed to the death of their child feel 'death causation guilt.' Since they believe that they should not outlive their child, they feel 'survivor guilt.' When they believe that they are punished for a prior act, they feel 'moral guilt.' Since they might believe that they are not grieving properly, they feel 'grief guilt.' So bereaved parents could feel all or some of the above-mentioned guilt. The same thing applies to cases of grown children caring for an elderly parent, or family members dealing with the serious illness of a loved one, and parents raising a child with disabilities.³

3. CAUSAL OR BLAMEWORTHINESS RESPONSIBILITY

The cases of guilt we spoke of without apparent personal responsibility may be perceived to be irrational. But a closer examination indicates that they are rational. Considering responsibility there are two major aspects. They are causal and blameworthiness. You urged your friend to go on a vacation and the plane carrying your friend crashed without any survivors. At most your responsibility may be considered as a partial causal responsibility, but you may consider your responsibility to be that of blameworthiness and hence blame yourself and feel guilty about the death of your friend. When you feel that you need not have urged your friend and thus prevented the death, you are making a switch from causal responsibility to blameworthiness responsibility. You attribute to yourself partial causal responsibility since you urged your friend and this partial responsibility is sufficient for considering yourself to be, in one sense, responsible for the death and hence to feel guilty about it.⁴

4. COUNTERFACTUAL IMAGINATION

It is through counterfactual imagination, we attribute an accidental, causal responsibility, which may turn into

blameworthiness responsibility. This type of switching is possible in almost all types of accidents and disasters. Therefore, guilt is likely to emerge in these circumstances. For us seeing from an external, detached perspective, this kind of guilt may be a source of pointless suffering, but from the agent's perspective the suffering refers to a loss of someone/something dear to him/her which could have been prevented by him/her, although he/she could not know in advance how to prevent it, and it is highly improbable that it could have been prevented at all. This is not a typical case of guilt since it is not necessarily connected with a specific act, which has an available alternative, and hence the possibility of avoiding the problem hardly existed. In such cases, the emotion of guilt becomes a sentiment of guilt and at times goes into depression, which is typical of helpless situations.⁵

5. IMAGINATION IN GUILT

Imagination plays a very great role in inducing guilt, and so we have to take steps to prevent guilt. We may avoid situations in which we believe we are likely to feel guilty.

The importance of imagination in inducing guilt is so evident in the types of actions one takes to prevent guilt. We try to avoid situations which we believe are likely to induce guilt. Even if I do not have any money with me, I may cross the street to avoid coming face to face with a beggar whose visible misery would induce the unpleasant feeling of guilt. Even if I can do nothing at the moment to help the beggar, it is not hard to imagine actual or counterfactual situations in which such help may nevertheless be possible.⁶

6. ACCIDENTAL ACTION

Sometimes our intended actions do not elicit as much guilt as that elicited by accidental action. I remember an old couple who were very loving towards each other. One day accidentally the man stretched his leg, which made his wife fall down and break her hip. With that fall, she never recovered and eventually died. The old man was inconsolable, feeling tremendous guilt about his accidental action. It looks surprising and paradoxical to realize that accidental actions can cause greater guilt than intended actions. In fact, in intended actions there is responsibility, and the greater the responsibility the more intense is the emotion of guilt. Then how

do we understand the paradox? Perhaps the explanation could be like this: in the intended action, I consider all its possible ramifications and take the best available option. In spite of my careful considerations, my action would have harmed a person. The factors that were involved in this case were beyond my knowledge and control. When accidentally I have harmed someone, I may not have seen all the possible alternatives and chosen a better alternative. Thus, I think, my responsibility in this is greater. I could have prevented the harm merely by considering the alternatives to my action. But in the intended action, I did everything I could and hence I was bound to act the way I did in those given circumstances.⁷

7. RESPONSIBILITY OF INTENDED ACTION

When we blame others for the harm done to us, intended actions are associated with greater responsibility, and hence with more intense blame. For example, our partner's transgressions, when viewed intentionally hurtful, had more negative emotional impact on us than those seen as unintended. This is because, when others are concerned, we do not perceive their intended actions as stemming from cognitive miscalculations of its consequences, but as arising from immoral purposes. Therefore the other's blameworthiness is considered greater and our negative emotional attitudes towards that person are more intense. It will be the same with regard to us in guilt too. Definitely our guilt will be greater when we realize that our harmful deeds stemmed from immoral purposes than if the actions were accidental. There seems to be a tendency in us that we tend to attribute our misdeeds to innocent mistakes and the misdeeds of others to immoral intentions.⁸

33

EMBARRASSMENT

Embarrassment being similar to regret, guilt, and shame involves a negative evaluation of oneself. It is also similar to anger and guilt in terms of being specific. Yet it is associated more with social, rather than moral, circumstances. Embarrassment is more transient than shame and hate.

1. ACUTE SELF-AWARENESS

Acute self-awareness is a dominant feature of embarrassment. When we become the centre of attention and are being judged, we feel embarrassed. The judgement involved can be positive or negative, but it is perceived to express a certain social discrepancy. The embarrassing situation can be incompatible with different states. Examples of different states will be: the accepted behaviour in such circumstances, the ideal behaviour, our past or future behaviour, our expectations, and the expectations of significant others.¹

2. BELIEF IN EMBARRASSMENT

There is a belief associated with embarrassment. It is that we have responded inappropriately to the requirements of the given social situation, or that our privacy has been violated. Embarrassment is social in nature. For example, we cannot feel embarrassed if we are alone –unlike in shame and guilt, which can be had independently of an audience. Typically embarrassment is always known to require an audience. It is an actual audience, but sometimes an imaginary one too. We perceive that the audience wants to impose on us certain social requirements we would like to meet but we fail to do so.

In shame, there is a self-awareness of our profound values; but in embarrassment, we are not focused on our profound values but rather on more superficial conventions and customs concerning our interactions with others. Therefore shame will mean that we

have failed in our character, but in embarrassment we have violated certain convention or breached certain manners. Consequently because of the superficial nature of this failure, the failure in embarrassment can be removed, but in shame the failure indicates a much more profound flaw which cannot be easily removed. The strategies used in coping with embarrassment are escape devices, such as crying, laughing, changing the topic, denying failure, scapegoating, excuses and withdrawal.²

3. PUBLIC EXPOSURE

Sometimes it will happen that embarrassment is generated simply from public exposure of a deed, which may in itself be quite positive and not from a negative self-evaluation of one's own actions. Shame on the contrary is concerned with significant misdeeds. In embarrassment we are merely concerned with unwelcome attention from the audience; shame is concerned with a perceived serious flaw. Since social context gives rise to embarrassment, it may also be associated with positive events. For example, a person may achieve success by breaching the conventions of modesty. Here achieving success is a social context.³

4. EMBARRASSMENT ABOUT EMBARRASSMENT

We may be embarrassed at being embarrassed but we are not ashamed of our shame. This is because in shame though we violated certain norm, we care about the norm we violated. Hence there is nothing to be ashamed of in our 'shame' and we are proud of it. On the contrary, we are not connected with profound norms in embarrassment and we are merely connected to unwelcome attention by others. Our embarrassment may attract further unwelcome attention, which will generate embarrassment at our embarrassment.⁴

5. BEHAVIOUR DISPLAY

In embarrassment there is a fairly well-defined behavioural display. There is reducing eye contact, which is to decrease contact with others. There are blushes, increase in body motion and speech disturbance, which are regarded as nervous responses. Smiling, in some cases, is an attempt to protect one's image. Because of its behavioural display we easily identify embarrassment in others.⁵

6. EMERGENCE OF EMBARRASSMENT

The experience of embarrassment is by people in all cultures and in almost all age groups, especially during the period of adolescence. In very young children embarrassment is absent. Emotions as such appear by the age three. Before age three, children feel only shyness, rather than embarrassment. Between age four and seven years, embarrassment is more likely to be concerned with the child's view of what appears to be right to him/her, rather than by what appears to be right to other people. From about the age of eight years, children are more likely to be concerned with conveying to others a particular self-impression. This will be the main discrepancy, which gives rise to embarrassment.

Though in embarrassment there is lesser intensity than in shame, the intensity may depend upon certain things like the number of observers and their status. If there are more observers in the audience, embarrassment is greater; and likewise if the observers' status is higher, then correspondingly there will be higher intensity of embarrassment.⁶

7. EMPATHIC EMBARRASSMENT

Embarrassment is contagious. It is not only the person who violated a minor convention who feels embarrassed but also those who observe the embarrassed person even though the observer's self-esteem is not threatened. Because of the social nature of embarrassment, when we observe someone embarrassed, we identify ourselves with that person and feel embarrassed. The closer the embarrassed person to us, the greater the embarrassment we feel. If your family member immodestly walks on the street and feels embarrassed; and witnessing that you too will feel more embarrassed than witnessing some stranger being embarrassed on the street by the same deed. Since embarrassment is infectious, we too feel embarrassed by witnessing someone being embarrassed. The intensity of our embarrassment as observers will depend upon the closeness we feel toward the embarrassed individual.⁷

8. INTENTIONAL EMBARRASSMENT

Sometimes we intentionally create embarrassment in others. This intentional embarrassment appears in various forms. We may

embarrass partners, associates, or rivals in order to highlight behaviours disliked. Though we create a negative emotional state in others, this is intended to correct their behaviour. Because of the positive value of its goal, this may be accepted.

Sometimes our intentional embarrassment may be to minimize embarrassment in others. It is like immunization shot so that the individuals do not feel greater embarrassment in other situations. It introduces a small dose of embarrassment to prepare the person to cope with a larger dose of embarrassment later.

Intentional embarrassment and pleasure-in-others'-misfortune are similar. These two emotions are concerned with minor misfortunes. Since they are of minor misfortune, they are not going to hurt the other person substantially and so we are justified in our enjoyment. Since in the long run what we do is going to benefit the other person, we do not feel too bad about our behaviour.⁸

9. RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER EMOTIONS

Some may find that embarrassment and shame are closely associated. The major difference between these two is the level of intensity. Shame is an intense and disruptive emotion, but embarrassment is clearly less intense and does not involve disruption of thought and language. Secondly, there is a difference in body posture. People who are embarrassed do not assume a posture of one wishing to hide, disappear, or die. Their bodies reflect an ambivalent approach and avoidant posture. There are repeated 'looks at' and then looking away, accompanied by smiling behaviour. In 'shame situation,' there is no smiling behaviour.

Phenomenologically, embarrassment is considered as a less intense experience of shame. In this respect, it is good to keep in mind the distinction between two types of embarrassment. One is embarrassment as self-consciousness, and the other is embarrassment as mild shame.

In certain situations we are embarrassed when we are complimented. In this situation, praise, rather than displeasure or negative evaluation, elicits embarrassment. Another type of embarrassment is reaction to public display. When we observe someone looking at us, we become self-conscious, look away, and

touch or adjust our bodies. Though we feel embarrassed, we feel pleased by the attention we get. A third example, if you close your eyes and you say that you will just point out one in the audience and you do it, then the one pointed at will feel embarrassed. In these cases, there is no negative evaluation of the self. The experience of embarrassment in these cases is simply due to public exposure.

Embarrassment as mild shame is related to a negative self-evaluation. Embarrassment may not be the same as shame. On the other hand, there is the possibility that embarrassment and shame are in fact related, and that they only vary in intensity.⁹

10. RESPONSES TO EMBARRASSMENT

We are likely to find ourselves in embarrassing situations. When we are in a predicament, we resort to many ways of overcoming the situation. The strategies we may make use of will range from the deliberate to the panicky and from the conciliatory to the antagonistic. When we are thoroughly mortified by an embarrassing situation, we simply flee the scene with no explanation. When we retreat physically, we end an encounter abruptly and leave in haste and obvious disarray.

Another response could be to ignore the embarrassing event at all. This is to act coolly without acknowledging any predicament and we try to act as if nothing has really happened. One could do this deftly or awkwardly. A clumsy way of doing it is to allow the predicament to interrupt our activity while remaining silent and offering no explanation or apology.

A third response could be to acknowledge our predicament but treat it lightly as part of humour. In humour we admit that unwanted events have occurred, but by making a joke or laughing at ourselves, we indicate that our transgression is relatively trivial, needs no explanation, and can be readily overcome.

A fourth response is to acknowledge our predicaments, and try to explain them to others, providing accounts that are designed to reduce the apparent severity of their transgressions. This is done by two means. One is by excuses. We offer excuses, try to shift some of the blame for unwanted predicament to somewhere else, reducing their apparent responsibility for the embarrassing events.

Another way of doing is by justification. Here we accept the responsibility for a predicament but assert that it is not so bad, downplaying the negative ramifications of the event.

A fifth way is to offer apologies. We accept responsibility for our predicaments, sometimes specifically citing our culpability, but we also seek atonement. Sometimes we combine verbal apology with behaviour remediation. At times, behavioural remediation can occur without explanation or apology. Supposing you spilt coffee on the floor, you clean up the spill perhaps saying 'sorry.'

A sixth strategy is aggression. This is rare but possible especially when embarrassment is the result of someone else's meddling, teasing, or practical joke. When it does take place, it is antagonistic, further disrupting the situation.

A seventh type of response is when we are intentionally embarrassed by others; we merely comply with the others' behaviour, passively allowing ourselves to be a conspicuous and/or laughable target.¹⁰

B. OTHERS

Under the actions of agents, emotions directed to others include gratitude and anger.

34

GRATITUDE

Gratitude involves positive evaluation of others. When we accomplish something and feel we are successful we experience pride. In feeling gratitude we attribute our personal success, at least in part, to others rather than to ourselves alone. Gratitude can arise when we receive or about to receive from others a gift in the form of an action or object. Cicero said that gratitude is not only the greatest virtue, but also the parent of all the other virtues.¹

1. TWO BASIC DESIRES

There are two basic desires that are involved in gratitude. One is the desire to reward the object personally and the other is the desire for the positive evaluation of us by the object. The first desire gives expression to the positive evaluation of the object and the second indicates our wish to be on an equal footing with the object. In fact, the subject-object relationship in gratitude often involves inequality, because the receiver is in an inferior position. Therefore, there is the possibility of the presence of envy, resentment, and hostility associated with gratitude. It is likely that the recipient will feel resentment and hostility all the more if the recipient perceives that the donor wanted to make him/her feel inferior.²

2. RECIPROCITY

In any case, there is a strong desire for reciprocity in gratitude. If we have received a gift in any form, we would like to return that gift in some other form. It may happen that we are unable to return the gift immediately and so there is a tacit promise of future return of the gift. We often tell the donor that we will never forget the kindness and on the other side, the donor may not like to make us feel inferior and so feels uncomfortable with our thanking and makes excuses saying that it was nothing and not a big thing after all.³

3. CONDITIONS OF GRATITUDE

One does not feel gratitude for every gift. There are a few conditions required in order for gratitude to be generated. They are: 1. the attitude of the benefactor – the act of the benefactor is under volitional control (or the benefactor is at least partially responsible) and the action is intended to benefit the recipient; 2. the attitude of the recipient – the recipient should receive the gift favourably; 3. the nature of the gift – the gift should seem to be extra, that is, something beyond what we normally expect or what justice requires.

If you take the attitude of the benefactor, it is required that the donor has the good intention and responsibility. We feel all the more grateful if the gift is given deliberately rather than accidentally. The gift should benefit the receiver instead of enhancing the reputation of the donor. Sometimes we notice politicians donate things to the poor and the needy with great ostentation. This is meant to enhance their reputation so that they may receive votes from poor people. We can see resentment rather than gratitude when the donor's intention is found to be morally wrong. If you take the attitude of the recipient, the recipient should not find the gifts burdensome. If you receive gifts, you are obliged to return the favour. By giving gifts one may intend to bribe others. If you consider the nature of the gift, we see that we exchange gifts with one another. For gratitude to be generated, the gift should exceed what is normally expected. Otherwise there may not be intense gratitude. It is likely that if the gift is less than what we normally expect, then resentment may emerge. It is easy to understand the first two conditions. They describe the attitude of two parties, the giver and the receiver. In good relationship, getting a special gift is usually appreciated and seen as the good intention. But at the same time, any excess may be also understood as a psychological burden to the recipient. It is difficult to determine the third condition, since it is difficult to determine the baseline against which actions or objects can be extra.⁴

4. LOAN-DEPOSIT COMPARISON

Our neediness is not enough for the generation of gratitude. If we regard our baseline inferiority as unjust, then we may resent

the gift and its giver. Since sometimes what the other gives us is beyond what we formally deserve, gratitude will mean unpaid debt. Sometimes gratitude is like having accepted a deposit rather than like having taken out a loan. If one considers a gift as a loan, one will feel inferior and if one considers a gift as a deposit, one will not feel inferior to the object. Loans are usually associated with shame, whereas deposits are associated with pride. Gratitude in general involves both types of situations – namely of debtor and trustee. In friendship and close relationships the idea of deposit predominates, but in less close relationships the concept of debtor predominates.

In gratitude we find that the giver has performed a praiseworthy action, and secondly, the recipient desires the praiseworthy action. Praiseworthiness of the action and desirability on the part of the recipient are important. If the recipient does not desire the praiseworthy action of the giver, then there is only approval, no gratitude. In gratitude one believes that one does not deserve the gift.⁵

35

ANGER

Anger is directed towards the action of another person. Anger involves a negative evaluation, but this evaluation is of the specific action of another rather than a global attitude. One of the causes of anger is the feeling of being either physically or psychologically restrained from doing what you intensely desire to do. The restraints could be anything such as physical barriers, rules, regulations or your own incapability. There are other causes of anger too such as personal insult, everyday frustrations, interruption of interest or joy, being taken advantage of, and being compelled to do something against one's wish. Prolonged and unrelieved distress is known to be the inborn activator of anger. One of the causes of anger is in relation to a person's desired direction or goal. So anything that deflects a person from his/her path to the goal can trigger anger. It is also noted that aversive stimulus is a sufficient cause of anger and aggressive inclinations. Physically pain is a direct and immediate cause of anger. Thus discomfort from any source like hunger, fatigue or mental stress can make us angry while we are unaware of the causes. It is not surprising to note that mild discomfort, when prolonged, can make us more irritable and thus lower our anger threshold.¹

1. SPECIFIC UNDESERVED OFFENCE

It is an offence that arouses anger. That offence should be specific and undeserved. If I deserve an offence then there may not be anger. I should perceive that offence as undeserved on my part. Therefore anger is a response to a specific, undeserved offence. The offence might have been deliberate or due to negligence or lack of foresight. The other person's action is not only perceived as unjust but also depreciating of us. For example, think of a situation in which you have given a wonderful public speech worthy of praise. There is someone who criticizes you very much. You not only feel that the criticism is unjust but that the other person depreciates

you. Your value is minimized. The person criticizing you conceives of you as inferior in such a way that your position, needs and values are considered worthless.

In all likelihood, we will not get angry if we judge that the other person to be justified, is nonarbitrary, or not in control. Those who provoke anger are often viewed as doing something voluntarily that they had no right to do, or as doing something that they could have avoided, had they been more careful. If you are the target of anger, you feel that either you are justified in your actions, or that the incident was beyond your control. The one who gets angry feels that the personal harm was inflicted by a blameworthy person. We do not get angry at inanimate things that may damage us, unless of course, we consider them as agents rather than inanimate objects. Inanimate objects have no capacity to treat us improperly and so we cannot be angry with them.

Typically anger is an immediate response to what we consider as unjustified harm, which someone has inflicted upon us, or those related to us. Harm in anger is a personal insult, and so the wish for revenge too is personal. By nature hate is more general. It can be related to more potential and nonpersonal circumstances. In fact, in hate, the person we hate may not have harmed us at all, neither in the past nor in the present, but because we conceive of the person's character negative, we think that this person is capable of such harm. If you take the object of anger, it is usually a person well known to us, but hate is not personal in this sense. Even we may be unaware of the particular nature of the hated person – the object. We can say that to a certain extent, hate involves depersonalisation. As it happens in prejudice, hate feeds on partial or distorted information of the object and ignores the object's real character. Because of the general nature of hate, it is directed at groups and not at individuals, regardless of the individual differences among group members. Aristotle distinguishes between anger and hate. According to him, anger is always concerned with individuals, but hatred may be directed against classes, e.g., any thief, any informer. Anger may calm down as time passes, but not hatred. For him, anger is supposed to be accompanied by pain, but hatred is not.²

2. SPECIFIC ACT

When we feel angry, we direct our anger towards a person who has committed a specific, blameworthy act. When we hate a person, the person's basic traits are more crucial. The perception of having been treated unfairly elicits anger. In hate, the emphasis shifts from unfair to bad treatment. In hate, the harm involved is perceived to be more profound than that in anger, and also it is believed to stem from more fundamental traits of the person hated. Therefore, in hate, the negative character of the other person and the danger inherent in the other person's continued power are more central to hate. In anger, we want the other person who hurt us to suffer as a corrective measure. But in hate, we do not believe in the corrective measures and their success; we simply wish that the other person would just cease to exist.

Both anger and hate are not only elicited as the result of the hurt that the other persons inflicted upon us, but also by the consequences of the hurt we inflict upon other persons. We tend to blame them for putting us in such a situation that we did not like, a situation in which we were in a way forced to hurt them.³

3. CONCRETE THREAT

The threat in anger is supposed to be more concrete. In most cases, the threat has already materialized. In the case of animals, anger stems from an existential physical threat. With regard to humans, the threat is more socially induced, referring to depreciation of our worth. Because of the social nature, anger is usually directed at persons within our social group. The threat we perceive in hate is often understood as directed at the foundations of the social framework in which we live rather than merely at our status within this framework. In hate, the threat comes from someone outside the framework; hate is typically directed at those who are socially more distant. That is why in hate we may not confront the other person, but in anger we wish to correct the person's behaviour so that we are able to sustain social bonds. The threat we experience in hate can be either in the form of an intended threat by another person, or of an unintended formidable obstacle to our well-being.

If hate and anger are compared, we notice that hate is more complex than anger. This is so because hate often does not refer to concrete harm inflicted upon us but to a potential threat posed by some fundamental negative aspects of the other person. When we consider the evaluative patterns in anger and hate, anger employs only one basic evaluative pattern, namely praiseworthiness, whereas hate requires two: appealingness and praiseworthiness. Animals may experience disgust and anger (or more precisely rage), but not hate.⁴

4. BOUNDARY

The boundaries of anger and hate at times overlap. Therefore the borderline between anger and hate is not always clear. The central hostile attitude of hate is present in anger; annoyance typical of anger is present in hate too. Sometimes, anger persists in a way that develops into hatred. Anger is directed to specific action and hate to the person. Sometimes we may evaluate someone's bad action as stemming from that person's basic character in which case anger turns into hate. There are times when anger will last longer than usual, if revenge is seen sweeter if achieved later. Similarly when hate stems from a specific case, it may last for a short-term.⁵

5. BLAMEWORTHINESS

Blameworthiness of the agent is more dominant in anger than in hate. What is presupposed in blameworthiness is the agent's ability to act otherwise. We usually perceive the availability of an alternative—more so in anger than in hate. In hate, for example, we take for granted that the negative character of the other person is more or less permanent and so difficult to change. Hence, there is no blameworthiness or responsibility of the agent for the negative character.⁶

6. MOTIVATIONAL COMPONENT

In anger and hate, the motivational component, represented by the various desires, is quite differently expressed. In anger we usually believe in the effectiveness of our actions and so the motivational domain is strong and is often expressed in a non-

standard aggressive act. We would like to punish the other person in anger since the other person is perceived to be deserving of punishment. The urge to attack is essential in anger, even in cases involving nonaggressive behaviour. Though hate involves an intense desire, since we believe that changing the other's basic fault is beyond our power, it is associated with self-impotence and is not always expressed by non-standard aggressive behaviour. The desire to become personally involved is much weaker in hate, because we believe that it is difficult to change the undesired circumstances. Hence, hate is more passive than anger. Hate is more negative in nature than anger and yet often we are not as aggressive to the object of hate as to the object of anger. Nevertheless, in extreme cases of hate, physical elimination may be seen as the most effective way to fight the dangers associated with the hated person. We realize that typical hate implies an extreme type of intolerance and opposition to diversity.⁷

7. ANGER TOWARDS THE DEAD?

If we take dead persons, we often hate people who no longer exist, but it is not likely that we feel anger at such people. Dictators in the world even though they are dead and gone are still hated by many people. This is because anger requires the belief that the object can be changed. With regard to dead persons, this possibility is not there. There is perceived self-impotence with regard to dead people and self-impotence is associated with hate. The availability of an alternative is weaker in emotions toward dead people. A general type of love may also be directed at dead people, but it is not common for specific emotions such as anger, jealousy, and sexual desire, to be directed at dead people.⁸

8. FUNCTIONS OF ANGER

With regard to the functional value of anger and hate, we find anger has got a higher functional value. In anger we are able to mobilize our resources and there is also social communication. Anger can be an energizer and organizer of our behaviour. In a way anger is essential for this energizing and organizing of our behaviour. There is also a social function associated with anger

since it strengthens or readjusts a relationship and we regard it as beneficial in the long run, even though for the moment it is unpleasant. Anger can provide the basis for reconciliation between parties on new terms. Like any other emotion, anger should be in the right proportion; otherwise its excess may be harmful. Research has shown that high levels of chronic anger and aggressive behaviour can be harmful and are related to higher mortality and in particular to coronary heart disease.

Anger appears rather very early in our development. It is primarily an interpersonal emotion and is understood in its interpersonal functions. The interpersonal nature of the modification and regulation of anger is apparent even in the earliest months of life. Children of 4 months are credited with anger as a well-defined response to goal-blocking stimuli. In 7-month-olds we find the interpersonal nature of anger. They direct their anger displays at a social target. When they are in preschool and school years, their anger to distressing environmental stimuli becomes stronger. In later years, they learn to control their anger.

Parents and peers are major socializers of anger. When to show anger and when not to show is learned from parents. In social setting, children learn from peers that inappropriate display of anger resulted in rejection, and appropriate display of anger was welcome. As children grow older they become more socially involved and aware, and thus experience more inducements to anger. An increasing skill of emotion regulation facilitates their acquisition of control.

Sometimes the normal socialization process by parents and peers is not successful. Deviant development of extreme anger and chronic aggressive behaviour is generated by chronic environmental conditions of exposure to stress, and by the failures of socializing agents to teach skills of social information processing and emotion regulation.

The principal function of anger is to make bad matters worse and increase the probability of an anger response. Nevertheless there is no necessary connection between anger and aggression.

Anger expression may prevent aggression. For example, when two children are getting ready to fight, an angry stare from the parent will prevent aggression in the children. In adults, anger expression toward another adult may even truncate anger-related response of the angry individual. This is the case when the other displays a sad expression or makes an apology.

There is nothing like anger mobilizing and sustaining energy at high levels. There are some emotions that mobilize and sustain energy but not at the intensity of anger. For example, positive emotions such as interest and joy do mobilize energy and sustain goal-directed activity, but not at a similar intensity. Intense interest/excitement can speed mental and motor functions and do sustain them for long periods, but they are not equal to anger in these respects. Anger can increase and sustain extremely high levels of motor activity with great consistency and vigour.⁹

2. Action of Agents & The Agent as a whole

Under actions of agents and the agent as a whole, we will deal with emotions that are generated by the actions of agents as well as the agent as a whole.

A. Oneself

Emotions generated by the action of agents and the agent as a whole can either be directed to oneself or to others. If they are directed towards oneself, they include pridefulness, shame, and modesty which comprises humiliation and arrogance.

36

PRIDEFULNESS

Aaron Ben-Ze'ev uses the term 'pridefulness' besides the term pride. Let us consider the precise nature of pridefulness. Pride is directed at one's action, whereas pridefulness is directed at the whole personality.

Pridefulness is the emotion resulting from the belief that one is a good person and pride is the emotion arising from the belief that one has done a good thing. There is no doubt that a reference to the self is central to pridefulness and shame. Two problematic issues in this regard are 1. what kind of relations to the self are constitutive of these emotions? And, 2. what are relations to others constitutive of these emotions?¹

1. REFERENCE TO THE SELF

Pridefulness and shame are associated with some fundamental properties of the self. Therefore, a reference to the self is required for the emergence of pridefulness and shame. Something that is not connected to us will not imply either pridefulness or shame. Thus, we are not going to be proud of a beautiful lady in a far off land or ashamed of the behaviour of some primitive people in an isolated area. A positive reference to the self, generates pridefulness and a negative reference to the self creates shame. But not every positive and negative reference generates pridefulness or shame. In order for pridefulness and shame to appear, the positive reference should enhance our self-esteem to a considerable extent, and in the same way the negative reference should detract from our self-esteem. Just being pleased or displeased about something is not enough, but a profound evaluation of approval or disapproval is required for pridefulness and shame. It is also likely that we may take pleasure in something but may not be proud of it, as, for example, we may enjoy our many possessions but may not be proud of them since

material things do not necessarily give a boost to our self-esteem. Likewise we may suffer from supporting a large family but may feel proud of it since it is a source of strength.²

2. A STANDARD AS BASELINE

Does the global positive evaluation typical of pridefulness imply negative evaluation of others? Does the global negative evaluation typical of shame imply a positive evaluation of others? Are other people constitutive to these emotions?

Pridefulness need not involve the overestimation of our value and the underestimation of other persons' value. Modesty too need not imply underestimation of our value and overestimation of other persons' value. These three things namely pridefulness, shame and modesty may involve accurate knowledge of ourselves, where pridefulness is focused on our merits; shame on our flaws; and modesty on our limitations. The global evaluation which we speak of and which is involved in pridefulness and shame may not involve a comparison with others, but a comparison of standards. One thinks of a certain standard, the lowering of which one would regard as a threat to one's self-respect. One can feel proud without thinking oneself as superior to others. For example, a person will not take to unethical means to satisfy his/her dire needs and the person may take pride in such an attitude. Here we do not see any comparison with other individuals. The person only holds a certain standard and measures his/her behaviour against that baseline. Here the person does not think him/herself superior to others. It is in being what one is, and comparing oneself against a standard that results in pridefulness.³

3. FUNDAMENTAL NORMS

All that is required is the comparative concern in pridefulness and shame referring to some fundamental norms. Thus the degree of compatibility of our personality and behaviour to these norms is a crucial factor in determining pridefulness and shame. In comparison with these norms, when the comparison exceeds the norms, then one feels pridefulness; when it goes below the norms, then one feels shame. There are times when these norms could be

the behaviours and achievements of other persons in which case the comparison to others is constitutive of pride and shame. In other instances the personality and behaviour of others act as stimulus or the immediate cause and so they are not the constitutive elements. Therefore one can have pridefulness and shame without any reference to others but merely to moral, religious, aesthetic or other normative values.

If we take pride and regret, which are partial evaluations, they may be directed at the same object at the same time, as they may also refer to different aspects of the same object. For example, you may be proud of your beautiful wife but may regret her poor family background and poor manners. Here one is proud of something and at the same time regret another aspect of it. But pridefulness and shame cannot be directed at the same object at the same time since they express contradictory global evaluations, which cannot refer to different partial aspects. By nature pridefulness and shame are global evaluations.⁴

37

SHAME

Shame results from a global evaluation of oneself in the negative sense. In shame one thinks of oneself as a bad person. If one thinks of having done a bad action, there would be guilt. In guilt and regret the evaluation is less global. The phenomenon of hiding or covering oneself in shame is typical, since it is a global negative evaluation of the self. That is why people who are arrested on criminal charges feel shame and tend to avoid facing cameras and cover their faces with a cloth or hands. In contrast, people who feel guilty exhibit action tendency to atone or confess. The hiding in shame is seen in a shrinking of the body as though to disappear from the eyes of oneself and others. If avoiding others seeing us in shame is not possible for the individuals, they choose the ultimate solution of suicide by which they disappear from the gaze of not only others but also from the gaze of oneself. In characteristics, hate is similar to shame. Just like in shame we hide ourselves from others and ourselves and take the ultimate step of suicide, in hate we avoid the emotional object and if that is not possible we attempt to kill the emotional objects. Hate also is a global negative evaluation. Both in shame and hate there seems to be a belief that coexistence with the emotional object is no longer possible.¹

1. NORMS

In shame we view ourselves against certain norms. These norms are also adopted by others. While shame for the most part is derived from an interest in how others regard us, sympathy and envy are experienced from an interest in how we regard others.

Though people usually feel ashamed of comparing themselves with others and finding themselves inferior, one can also feel ashamed without thinking oneself inferior to others. Such people usually have a high standard for themselves and when they find themselves deficient, they feel ashamed. That is why we find artists

and writers feeling shame not because they compare their work to that of others, but because their works fail to meet their own high standards.

Shame is thought of as a product of a complex set of cognitive activities. This set of cognitive activity involves standards, rules, and goals and their global self-evaluation. Every one has a belief about what is acceptable for others and for oneself in regard to actions, thoughts, and feelings. This set of beliefs (or standards, rules, and goals) constitutes the information one acquires through culturalization in a particular society. These beliefs can differ across societies, groups, epochs and individuals. Of course, they are acquired through a variety of processes. Culture and groups such as family and peers prescribe these beliefs and influence the individuals.

It is the interpretation of an event by an individual that generates shame and not any specific situation per se. It is not a matter that shame should be related to events being made public or held private. We usually think that shame is related to a public failure but it need not be so. When failures are attributed to our whole self, they can be either public or private. Shame can be related to moral action too. That is why when we violate standards, rules and goals, we feel ashamed.²

2. AUDIENCE

In shame we seem to imagine an audience watching us. There is typically a causal connection between what others actually feel and what we feel. Guilt and pridefulness are related to what we imagine others would feel if they knew what we did and what we are.

It is also noted that the audience we speak of in shame, not necessarily be there, even though in many instances there is an audience with certain norms and points of view. That is why we may feel shame even when we are alone. This happens when we imagine an audience and thus feel shame. It is also noted that in the absence of real or imagined audience, one can feel shame, because we may focus our attention on our own high standards. Here of course, the audience is oneself. Therefore shame involves self-perception or self-consciousness. The deepest shame is exposure to

oneself even though no one else may pay any attention to or even know of it. Thus shame is the outcome not only of exposing oneself to another person but of the exposure to oneself of parts of the self that one has not recognized and whose existence one is reluctant to admit. Shame is a powerful emotion. It has a tremendous impact on the individual. When experiencing it, the individuals feel that their ongoing behaviour is disrupted, have confusion in thought, and inability to speak. Shame involves more than our specific acts as in guilt, or how we present ourselves in social context as in embarrassment. Thus shame is more intense an emotion than guilt or embarrassment. That is why the extreme measure taken in shame is suicide, which is not often the case in guilt and embarrassment. Those who commit suicide due to shame overrate the impact of shame. There may be people who may not know that shame need not last long or may know that it will not last long, and yet the intensity of shame is so strong that they commit suicide.³

3. NEED TO HIDE AND DISAPPEAR

The need to hide or even disappear is often connected with sight and being seen. Some people feeling shame also escape to another place. There was a man in a village set-up who borrowed money from many people. On a fine day he disappeared and started to live in a far off town. A young woman who became pregnant before marriage committed suicide because she could not face the people around her. Thus hiding, attempting to disappear, or escape to another place or wanting to take measures like these, are a manner of coping with shame or even embarrassment. In shame and embarrassment there is a tendency to avoid eye contact. Likewise in embarrassment and in unwanted intimacy we avoid eye contact.⁴

4. SITUATIONS OF SHAME

Shame can emerge out of diverse situations, as the significant factors constituting our own global evaluation differ. Yet, some situations are identified as more common. For men, it has been identified that two situations usually generate shame. They are failure over a task deemed important and sexual impotence. For women the situations are related to their physical attractiveness and failure in interpersonal relationships. In sum, they indicate what men and women deem as important factors constituting their self-esteem.⁵

5. SHAME IN THE YOUNG AND THE OLD

For young people emotional experiences are intense. Young people are inexperienced. Besides, during youth even normal events are considered to be very significant. In fact there are more instances of pridefulness and shame for the young people. Older people tend to accept success and failures with equanimity since they might have experienced quite a number of those experiences. For older people, success is not that great; and in the same way failures are not that great either. In a way they are desensitised. But this is not the case with young people, for whom a small change in their experience is perceived as the greatest event, and correspondingly they feel intense emotions. In addition to that, young people are sensitive to issues of pridefulness and shame. For old people, retrospective emotions like a long-term regret are experienced more dominantly than young people because there are fewer opportunities to undo the damage of the past.⁶

6. BEHAVIOURAL MEANS

Coping with shame essentially involves removing ourselves from the shaming situation; this can be done in various manners: 1. Behavioural: humour and confession; 2. Cognitive: denial and forgetting, and attributing the failure to an external source; 3. Evaluative: reducing the weight of one's flaw.

Behavioural means for reducing or eliminating shame contain mechanisms such as humour and confession. We take a new perspective in humour. The new perspective is incongruent with the present experience of shame. Therefore laughing at oneself serves to distance oneself from the shaming situation and invite others in taking a fresh perspective on the situation. The new humorous perspective reduces the significance of the shaming situation. When the significance is reduced, then automatically the intensity of the emotion of shame too decreases. At this level one is able to take a shaming situation lightly without getting too much affected. Confession too serves as a remedy to reduce the intensity of a shaming situation. When we share with others a shaming situation we have encountered, we join them in a distanced observation of the event, and in a way share with them some of the responsibility. Besides, it is believed that in confession we are involved in an explicit

negative evaluation of the deed, which distances us from the event. If we do a negative evaluation of our deed, we consider it as a specific isolated failure rather than a global evaluation of ourselves.⁷

7. COGNITIVE MEANS

Cognitive measure for coping with shame consists of both a mechanism for diverting attention, such as forgetting, and a mechanism for interpreting the shaming situation differently. The usual strategy of diverting attention from a shaming situation is quite common. If we pay less attention to a certain situation, we thereby reduce the significance and relevance of that situation and thus reduce our global self-evaluation. Forgetting is not always helpful, since what seems to have been forgotten returns to the consciousness.

Another group of cognitive means for coping with shame are those in which we interpret the shaming situation differently. One of the means is attributing responsibility to external factors. By doing this, we reduce or even eliminate our responsibility. It has been repeatedly noted that those who do not often blame themselves for failure and in the same way not credit to themselves for the success they achieved, are less likely to experience emotions such as shame, pridefulness, guilt, and pride. Likewise those who do not blame others for failures and do not credit others for success are less likely to experience emotions such as hate, love, anger, and gratitude. There is yet another cognitive means of coping with shaming situation. It is simply denial. In denial, we do not deny the occurrence of the shaming situation, which is difficult to do, but we only deny that our activity in that situation violated any norm, and so we justify that there is not enough reason to feel shame. Typically denial operates after the shaming situation has taken place, and in some cases it can take place prior to the event too.⁸

8. EVALUATIVE MEANS

A central evaluative measure for coping with shame is that of reducing the weight of the relevant flaw in our global self-evaluation. Consider, for example, a person caught red-handed in stealing. He feels shame naturally. He could say that after all what he stole was not a big thing but only a small little thing. Here the person tries

to reduce the weight of the norm he has broken. By doing this he believes that his global self-evaluation is also reduced. Usually such measures reduce the intensity of shame but do not totally eliminate it.⁹

9. SHAME IN EXTENDED SELF

There are emotions that concern our own private fortune. In the same way, there are emotions that concern the fortune of our extended self. Our self is not only the end of our skin –but institutes, groups, countries can become part of our extended self. As we feel pridefulness and shame concerning our activities, we can also feel proud of the activities of our extended self. That is why when our national team plays a game with another team of a different country, we feel pridefulness when our team wins, and feel shame when our team fails. We are also proud or ashamed of the activities of our ancestors. If any one of the leaders in our country was responsible for genocide, we would feel ashamed, and if any one of us wins a Nobel Prize, then we feel proud of that person.¹⁰

10. FUNCTIONS OF SHAME

Shame acts as an agent of social sanction whereby social conformity and social cohesion is achieved. The capacity for experiencing shame indicates our vulnerability to sanctions and criticisms of parents, other adults and peers. When people fail to fulfil their responsibility in the community, they are ridiculed which generates shame in individuals. Shame-avoidance behaviour motivates individuals to accept their share of responsibility for the welfare of the community. More than any other emotions, shame calls attention to failures and weakness of the functioning of the self. In shame there is a heightened self-awareness. We feel ashamed when our exposed self is found inadequate. There is a relation between the vulnerability of the self and proneness to shame. That is why shame anticipation and shame avoidance motivate us to acquire skills and competencies. Thus shame plays a very important role in the development of self-adequacy.¹¹

38

MODESTY

This chapter begins with a discussion of modesty, which is often perceived to be the opposite of pridefulness; defining what is meant by modesty will be useful for understanding the related attitudes of humiliation and arrogance and the differences between them and pridefulness and shame. Modesty is considered to be the opposite of pridefulness and to be similar to shame. But in reality the opposite of pridefulness is shame not modesty.

1. LIMITED AND UNEXAGGERATED

Modesty is associated with the sense of a limited and not exaggerated estimate of one's abilities or worth, free of vanity, egotism, boastfulness, or great pretensions. In this description we observe two features: being limited and not exaggerated. Being limited and not exaggerated are not identical concepts. An accurate estimate is not exaggerated and at the same time it is not limited. If a description is too limited, then it is an exaggerated estimate. Therefore modesty should be characterized as connected to unexaggerated evaluation rather than a limited one.¹

2. FOUR MAJOR COGNITIVE ACCOUNTS

We have four major cognitive accounts of modesty. 1. *Insincerity*: We know our superior worth but we do not reveal it in speech or behaviour and sometimes even offer misleading information. In this sense it is insincere. 2. *Ignorance*: We underestimate our worth. It seems we are ignorant of what we are. 3. *Realistic*: We do not overestimate our worth. We acknowledge what we truly are. In this sense it is realistic. The first two types are false and the third one is correct. But it is a cognitive virtue not an evaluative type. Modesty should be an evaluative type. 4. *Egalitarian*: We evaluate our fundamental worth as similar to that of other people. In this sense it is egalitarian.

In the first two accounts, self-knowledge is a crucial obstacle to achieving modesty. The third one, though accurately describes the cognitive aspect of modesty, does not pinpoint the essential aspect of modesty, which is evaluative. Modesty, and realism in self-appraisal are not identical, but they are compatible with each other. The difficulty here is that one could accurately appraise oneself and still be immodest in the sense that one considers others inferior to oneself. Thus, there are people who are accurate in their knowledge of their accomplishments but are immodest.

In the fourth account, there is an evaluative concern rather than a cognitive one. The evaluative belief involved in modesty according to this account is the fundamental similar worth of all human beings. This rests on a belief in the common nature and fate of human beings. Therefore, modest people believe first of all that with regard to the fundamental aspects of human life, their worth as a human being is similar to that of other humans, and secondly that all humans have a positive worth which should be respected.²

3. EVALUATION OF SIMILARITY

Modesty does not require of us that we deny a superior position within a given evaluative framework, and at the same time, it does not require us not to exaggerate the value of this framework in comparison with other possible evaluative frameworks. Thus modesty requires a realization of the fundamentally similar worth of all humans, and the evaluation of this similarity as more significant than the differences resulting from the accomplishments of different humans.³

4. COMPETITION NOT SIGNIFICANT

There arises a question if modesty is compatible with being competitive or with the attempt to be the best in our field, that is, excellence. In modesty we want to have egalitarian evaluation and this does not mean that all humans are equal in their capacities and accomplishments. In spite of these differences, we can still maintain the realization of similar human worth. Therefore, there is no contradiction in being modest and in being one of the best and in knowing this. With regard to professional work, modest persons are probably not motivated by the desire to be the best. This is

because they do not attach much significance to social comparison. But they desire to do their work better and to derive greater satisfaction from it. They are known to be accomplishment-oriented but they are less likely to be competitive. Modest people do not think of their work as a means of attaining material and social benefits but they think of their work as an end in itself. They may get material and social benefits and even enjoy them but they may not overrate their significance.⁴

5. HUMILITY

Being modest and being humble are not the same. But in common understanding they can both be identified. Modest people do not overrate themselves while humble people underrate themselves. Being humble as a virtue may promote social harmony. Nevertheless, its value is instrumental and limited to specific circumstances. Modesty is a more profound virtue.

It is not necessary that modest people have a humble way of life – such as having simpler life style in dress, owning house or car. But in fact, modest people since they attach greater significance to deeper sense of human worth will not pay much attention to external features associated with their way of life. Modesty is not the same as asceticism. In asceticism, we withdraw from the active everyday life, but in modesty we continue such activity while remaining sensitive to others' needs and inherent worth.

It is also possible that we are both proud and modest, but we cannot be proud and ashamed at the same time. People even take pride in their modesty.⁵

6. CHARACTER TRAIT

When we compare modesty with shyness, embarrassment and shame, it is closer to shyness and differs from the three of them. These three attitudes involve a negative evaluation but modesty does not involve a negative evaluation. Since it does not involve negative evaluation, it does not have unpleasant feelings. Modesty appears to be a character trait in being general and not highly sensitive to contextual circumstances. It should not be thought of as an innate trait, which cannot be acquired. Certain natural disposition, such as shyness may facilitate the acquisition of modesty

but they are not necessarily connected. One can be modest and yet not be shy.⁶

7. HUMILIATION AND ARROGANCE

When we are humiliated, we think of our position to be inferior and that too undeservedly inferior. In arrogance, on the contrary, we think of our position to be deserved superiority. Comparison with others is at the centre of humiliation and arrogance. In modesty we are concerned with our equality with other people.

We should not think that humiliation, arrogance, and modesty are emotions. They are not emotions but general evaluative attitudes, which may or may not be associated with certain emotions. These three are evaluative attitudes and they involve both cognitive and motivational components like emotions, but unlike emotions they do not necessarily involve an intense feeling component. When they do have feelings, they are associated with emotions. It is likely that humiliation and arrogance have an intense feeling component, since they have comparative concern.

Feeling humiliated often may go with envy and anger, because all of these attitudes are concerned with some undeserved hurt done to us. If it is a question of envy, we think of undeserved inferiority. If it is anger, then we think of undeserved offence. When humiliation is associated with the belief that our inferior situation is deserved, then we may feel shame. Arrogance is often associated with pridefulness and contempt. Modesty may go with love and compassion; compassion believes that all humans are essentially equal. The equality we speak of here, mainly concerns our profound limitations and our common susceptibility to misfortune.⁷

B. Others

Emotions generated by the action of agents and the agent as a whole can either be directed to oneself or to others. If they are directed towards others, they include romantic love and hate.

39

ROMANTIC LOVE

When we consider emotions, we notice that romantic love and sexual desire occupy the central stage in our lives. They are so vital for human existence. Let us analyse the basic characteristics of romantic love and its connection with sexual desire. There are some psychologists who equate these emotions and yet others who consider them to be completely different. There are different types of love. We have romantic love, parental love, sexual love, and love of friends, love of religion, love of country and love of food. Thus the list can go on. But not all these attitudes are emotional. Since we are concerned only with emotions, we take loves that are emotional not merely attitude. Under this category come romantic love and sexual desire. In this chapter we shall deal with romantic love. Even in romantic love there are various stages like falling in love, being in love, and staying in love. We consider romantic love and sexual desire as two different emotions. In this chapter the term 'love' means 'romantic love' since that is our consideration.

If you take the positive emotions of humans directed at others' actions and personality, there are three major emotions –namely gratitude, sexual desire, and romantic love. If you consider the basic evaluative pattern in gratitude, it is praiseworthiness of the other person's action; in sexual desire, it is appealingness of the other person; and in love, we find both praiseworthiness and appealingness. In negative emotions too, we find a similar structure. Anger is concerned about the praiseworthiness of the other person's action; disgust is related to the appealingness of the other person, and hate involves both praiseworthiness and appealingness of the other person. If you consider the specific-global issue, the relation between love and gratitude is similar to that between hate and anger. Love and hate are said to be long-term attitude referring to another person as a whole entity. However, romantic love is more specific than hate since it requires a more specific knowledge and a more

personal relationship. As compared to love and hate, gratitude and anger are short-term states, mainly referring to the specific actions of another person. In as much as hate entails a kind of anger at the object, love involves some gratitude for the object. Similar to disgust, sexual desire is based on the other person's appealingness and is also directed at the whole person.¹

1. EVALUATIVE PATTERNS

When we consider the two basic evaluative patterns of appealingness and praiseworthiness, different kinds of love carry different weight. For example, appealingness is more dominant in romantic love, whereas praiseworthiness is more important in friendship. In the same way, in different instances of romantic love, different weights are attached to these patterns. Some people attach more weight to appealingness and thus want to have their love more spontaneous and less calculated, and others attach more weight to praiseworthiness and make their love more calculated. In any case for romantic love, some weight should be given to both appealingness and praiseworthiness, otherwise it will only be one of gratitude, or sexual desire, or other types of positive emotions.

It is also observed that the relative weight of praiseworthiness and appealingness depends on personal and social factors. Young people may be taken up by appealingness and as they grow old they may appreciate praiseworthiness. I have often observed that very rich and highly educated persons with a high social standing, due to social factors, marry someone appreciated for beauty, education and riches but may not feel attracted to the married partner for sexual satisfaction for which appealingness is more important. In varying situations the one and the same person may give different relative weight to praiseworthiness and appealingness depending upon one's personal and social factors.

Empirically, there seems to be gender differences in these two evaluative patterns. Men are known to give more weight to appealingness and women to praiseworthiness. Thus men are drawn to those whom they are attracted, whereas women to those whom they love. Thus physical attractiveness is more important in determining men's love for women than women's love for men. This truth is borne out by the observation that when a man and

woman meet each other for the first time, the man looks at the body of the woman, and the woman looks at the eyes. Perhaps body is central for sexual attraction, whereas eyes are indicators of one's character. In our sexual preferences, we are differently gifted. One may be visual oriented, another may be auditory oriented, a third will be kinaesthetic oriented, a fourth one will be olfactory oriented and a fifth one may be gustatory oriented. This being the case in general, in particular there seems to be a difference between genders. Vision is seen as the most important sense underlying sexual desire in men, and hearing is the most important for women. Thus vision and hearing are related to physical attractiveness and comprehensive attraction of intellectual aspects, respectively.²

2. VISUAL STIMULI

Emotional system is more easily activated by visual than by verbal stimuli, whereas the intellect is more susceptible to verbal stimuli. Thus when in December 2004 there was a terrible devastating tsunami, people all over the world were moved more by what they saw on TV than what they heard on radio. This is because our emotional system more readily responds to visual stimuli than to auditory stimuli. Men are generally known to be less emotional than women, and yet with regard to falling in love men are more influenced by emotional aspects than women. That is why in advertisement, women exhibit their beauty whereas men want to attract women by their sincerity, friendship, and financial security. There is a saying that 'men look at pictures, and women actually read the thing.' In general, both men and women want good-looking partners, women seem to consider other qualities like status, and money to compensate for the lack of looks. This does not seem to be the case with men when they evaluate a woman. Men do not seem to prefer unattractive women.

The gender differences we spoke of regarding the evaluative patterns of appealingness and praiseworthiness seem to change considerably as men and women get older. Older women tend to report physical arousal and less likely report love, as their motivation for sexual intercourse and this pattern does not seem to be true of men. In any case, in later life, both for men and women, there is a balance between appealingness and praiseworthiness.³

3. INTERDEPENDENCE OF EVALUATIVE PATTERNS

The two basic evaluative patterns of appealingness and praiseworthiness are not independent. At least praiseworthiness seems to depend upon appealingness, which is attractiveness. Usually attractive people are in an advantageous position. When it is the question of rating them, people tend to evaluate them as intelligent, sociable and moral. We can observe preferential difference of attractive people in society: they are evaluated positively, find sexual partners more easily, they are leniently judged in courts and treated favourably even by strangers. On the contrary, unattractive people are at a disadvantageous position socially and suffer discrimination. The same thing also is noticed in counselling situation. Clients who are attractive receive more attention from counsellors than clients who are not attractive. Studies indicate that attractive individuals are given more praiseworthy personality attributes. They are considered as being more honest, more likely to hold prestigious jobs, experience happier marriages, enjoy more fulfilling social and occupational lives, be better in bed, and healthier. There is one area in which they are not considered better. It is with regard to parenting. They are perceived as making worse parents than unattractive persons.

If a person is unattractive, he/she is not preferred in jobs. I knew a woman who had a burnt scar around her neck. In spite of her high qualification, she could not find a job. Attractive criminals usually receive lighter jail sentences and ugly suspects have more difficulty proving their innocence and if found guilty, they receive harsh treatment.⁴

4. PATTERN OF DESIRABILITY

In romantic love, in addition to the patterns of praiseworthiness and appealingness, there should be the pattern of desirability. When you own a new and beautiful car you feel you are rewarded. Here what is involved is desirability, which is crucial in judging the value of an attractive partner or a new car. Desirability is a comparative concern. When a man has an attractive wife, he feels that he is superior to other men and thus has a higher social status. Therefore there is a phenomenon known as 'trophy wives.' Generally men feel that they rise in status by having an attractive

wife more than women feeling when they have an attractive man. This is seen in general, but exceptions are there in individual cases.

Since praiseworthiness is involved in love, there is also learning involved. For praiseworthiness we go by social standards. This is not the case for sexual desire, which depends upon appealingness.⁵

5. THE EMOTIONAL OBJECT

In romantic love, the emotional object is a person with fundamentally attractive and praiseworthy traits who is a suitable partner to live with. The object in hate is a bad agent. Moral standards are essential to the generation of hate, or at least to its justification, whereas the generation of love involves aesthetic, economic, and physical ones. It is said that in romantic love, 'chemistry' is more important than moral concerns.

Attractiveness is more pronounced in sexual desire and disgust. In sexual desire, the emotional object is basically one-dimensional. In romantic love the emotional object is more complex and may consist of many evaluative concerns. In short-term sexual encounters, what is important is what the other person looks like and if that person is willing. These two things can be discovered instinctively by humans in a very short time. There is no need to find out what the person is really like, except that there is no danger involved in having a sexual encounter with that person. Of course, the fear of HIV positive and the danger of death or mutilation or betrayal from the object are looked into and not necessarily taken into serious consideration on account of the intensity of the sexual desire and the urgency. In long-term relationships and marriages, partners are chosen more carefully considering many aspects. When we compare with the emotional object of disgust, it is also one-dimensional like sexual desire and the emotional object of hate is more complex like love, though not so complex as in love, since the object is viewed from a distance and with a practical concern in mind.

Subject-object relationship in love is important as well as a concern for the emotional object's happiness. In love we are preoccupied with the beloved and have a kind of intrusive thinking. Though in romantic love we genuinely care for the beloved, it cannot be taken as a general concern for the beloved's happiness in all circumstances.⁶

6. KNOWLEDGE

Knowledge is important in love; we want to know the beloved and to be known by the beloved. We would like to be with the beloved for prolonged time. Away from the sight of the beloved, everything looks empty. We engage in many different types of loving activities like spending time together, having prolonged eye contact, touching and holding, caressing, kissing and making love. We would like to lose our identity and cross the boundary and fuse with the beloved. We get involved in the interests of our beloved. In contrast, when it is the question of sexual desire, our need for the companionship is superficial and very limited in the sense that we seek the object of our sexual desire as long as it is required to gratify our sexual desire and then there is hardly any concern.⁷

7. RECIPROCITY

Reciprocity is an element crucial in love. The lover wants to know if the beloved really desires him/her as much as he/she desires the object. If one kisses, the expectation is to be kissed by the other; if one holds the other, the expectation is to be held by the other. While one is exhibiting an action, the other remaining neutral weakens the intensity of love in the one who initiate it. Perhaps in an attempt to win over the beloved, one might increase one's intensity of love, but when nothing is forthcoming from the other's part, that is a great blow to our self-esteem, as it reflects a negative global evaluation of our worth. When there is no reciprocity, it is only an unrequited love in which one wallows in self-pity and feels bad about oneself.⁸

8. COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION

In romantic love, the positive evaluation is comprehensive. This evaluation refers to many aspects. In sexual desire the evaluation is only to a few aspects. Yet, a comprehensive positive evaluation in romantic love does not mean that all the aspects of the beloved are positively evaluated. The lover may be aware of the faults of the beloved. The positive evaluation may refer to some aspects, which are viewed by the lover as significant and they overshadow the shadow side of the beloved's personality. Thus in sexual desire some aspects are evaluated positively, and in romantic love many aspects are evaluated positively. In the same way, hate may allow

for a positive evaluation of some partial aspects of the object, but as a whole, the other is negatively evaluated.⁹

9. ENDURING ATTITUDE

By nature, sexual desire is more partial and transient than romantic love. It is because of the concern with particular aspects whose impact is limited to specific circumstances. On the contrary, love is an enduring emotion as it refers to global aspects. In fact it takes time to develop and maintain lasting love, which involves an intimate and reciprocal relationship. Therefore the enduring attitude towards the beloved is seen as ups and downs of the same loving attitude. But different instances of sexual desire towards the same person should be considered as separate states. Love endures but sexual desire emerges and disappears. A person's love for the beloved may last for many years in which case love has become dispositional, but that person need not have sexual desire all those years but only every now and then.¹⁰

10. INTRINSIC VALUE

The comprehensive positive evaluation involved in love indicates that the beloved has intrinsic worth. Genuine love is disinterested care for the beloved. This care does not have consideration for our own benefits.

Not only the beloved but love also by itself has intrinsic value. Love and sex are important factors in determining happiness. Sex is not as important for general happiness as love is. Although sex contributes to our happiness, the number of sexual partners and the level of sexual satisfaction one has, do not matter much. Of course, a different and new sexual partner increases sexual desire and its satisfaction; but it does not necessarily increase general happiness. For, happiness is more complex. A mere variety or greater quantity with regard to sex cannot guarantee happiness.¹¹

11. DETAILED PERCEPTION

Comprehensive positive evaluation of the beloved in love does not mean lack of detailed perception of the beloved. In fact there is so much of detailed perception of the beloved because of the close relationship, personal involvement and personal care. Paying

attention to insignificant details indicates our caring and personal involvement in the beloved. Sexual desire involves superficial knowledge and evaluation of many objects. Love implies a more profound knowledge and evaluation of very few objects. Sexuality tends to amplify indefinitely the number of objects, which satisfy it, but love tends towards exclusivism. In love consciousness contracts and is occupied by only one object. There is indeed depth in love.¹²

12. MORAL LOVE

Moral theories recommend that we have a general type of love by which we should love everyone. This moral love has nothing to do with the object's general characteristics. In this moral love, we love another person just because of the fact that the other person is a human being, or even merely a living creature. Moral love is an indiscriminate love of humanity, since all humans deserve to be loved. Contrary to moral love, romantic love is judgemental like other types of emotions. The evaluative component is essential to it. That is why romantic love is considered to be the opposite of moral love, since romantic love is not based on the general and repeatable characteristics of the object, but on the unique intimate history shared by the lovers. Romantic love ignores repeatable general characteristics like beauty, intelligence, wealth, or sense of humour because they are too general. These characteristics can be found in other human beings as well. Moral love ignores these characteristics because they are too particular. In any case, both types of love do not spring from the object's general characteristics.¹³

13. DISCRIMINATIVE LOVE

Romantic love is discriminative in the sense it involves a too particular description of love in which shared history is almost the sole factor. But shared history alone is not enough to maintain romantic love, otherwise how we will account for divorces. People fall in love with someone because of, among other things, this person's general characteristics, such as beauty, intelligence, wealth, and humour and the like. Therefore we can say that the object of love is a complex entity of particular and general features. It includes particular features because of its uniqueness of the object and general features because of its comparative worth. In love we cherish both aspects of the beloved.¹⁴

14. LOVE AT FIRST SIGHT

Now, let us discuss some pertinent questions concerning romantic love. They are: 1. Is there love at first sight? 2. Is love blind? 3. Is love replaceable and nonexclusive?

We need to distinguish between sexual desire at first sight and love at first sight. To activate sexual desire at first sight, it is enough to have attractiveness on the part of the object by which we mean appealingness. But love needs evaluations of appealingness and praiseworthiness. Appealingness can be had instantaneously, but for praiseworthiness we need to know the characteristics of an individual, which cannot be had at the first sight. Praiseworthiness can also be evaluated spontaneously. We might have a certain schema of an ideal person and the person we meet might activate such a schema. Not that this person will fit into the whole of the schema but some of it. That may be enough to guarantee the evaluation of praiseworthiness. Praiseworthiness can be evaluated when a person happens to activate the schema we have of an ideal person. Thus there is the possibility of love at first sight.

We know that emotions are immediate responses to typically new situations. Meeting someone for the first time is new, and therefore, emotional experiences can automatically take place and so love at first sight is not an exception but the rule of emotional realm. Of course we also realize that there will be deception present in our love at first sight, which does not mean that love at first sight is not genuine. The deception comes because of the characteristics of emotion –namely high instability, great intensity, a partial perspective and relative brevity. Due to these characteristics, there could be deception. Nonetheless, love at first sight is possible. Love can also develop over time. We might slowly discover characteristics, which were not evident at first sight. We may fall in love with a person once we come to know that person better. Thus we see love can emerge in diverse ways.¹⁵

15. IS LOVE BLIND?

We tend to idealize our beloved. We see their positive traits and magnify them to the detriment of not looking at the negative side. We tend to evaluate positively that which we desire. This phenomenon of idealization could be a defence mechanism. This

mechanism justifies our partly arbitrary choice. The initial ignorance of the shadow side of the personality of the beloved is later replaced with realistic knowledge. Newly married people first see the positive traits of their partner, but the divorcees bear witness to the negative traits of their former partners. Since lovers are not prepared to face reality, self-deception and errors are likely to occur. It is also possible that the beloved could hide negative traits or fake good traits, or we may be mistaken in our evaluation, or we are confusing sexual desire with romantic love. These things take place mostly in the first stage of romantic love in which sexuality plays a dominant role.¹⁶

16. IS LOVE REPLACEABLE AND NONEXCLUSIVE?

An important issue in the characterization of love and sexual desire is whether their objects are 1. replaceable, and 2. nonexclusive. 'Replaceable' is used in the sense of replacing the object after a certain period of time; 'nonexclusive' is used in the sense of having different objects at the same time.

From experience, one can say that sexual desire is both replaceable and nonexclusive. People are attracted to many people in their lives and even at the same time. There seems to be a certain gender difference –that is, men seem to desire to have more sexual partners than women. Whenever we see attractive people, it is natural we feel drawn towards them. Thus sexual desire is replaceable and nonexclusive. The fact that people could have group sex also bears witness to the replaceable and nonexclusive nature of sexual desire. Sexual desire aims at exclusivity but it is not bothered by sharing a partner with another. Otherwise we cannot account for wife swapping and people offering their sexual partners to others for money or some material benefit. There are also couples that invite a third party as a couple or as individuals to have sex with them. Even in a stable relationship, sexual desire is understood to be replaceable and nonexclusive. Romantic love is also replaceable but not as replaceable as sexual desire. Replacement of a partner may take place for any of the following reasons: 1. Knowing our partner better and consequently realizing that the partner is not as valuable as previously considered, 2. Finding someone who has higher emotional value for us; 3. Changing our evaluative patterns.

There is an underlying chemistry that accounts for the brief duration of passionate love. There are chemicals known, in particular phenylethylamine (PEA), which flood us in passionate romantic love. But PEA 'highs' do not last for long. After sometime, our body builds up tolerance to PEA. Therefore it will take more and more of the substance to produce the original 'kick.' Our body tolerates the presence of PEA only for two to three years. If that were the case, how is it possible for people to continue in their romantic love? There comes another set of chemicals by name 'endorphins,' which are smoothing substances. They are known as natural painkillers, which give lovers a sense of security, peace and calm. Now we are in a position to understand the difference between the heated infatuations induced by PEA and the more intimate attachment fostered and prolonged by endorphins. Of course the typical emotion is by the inducement of PEA.

There is no contradiction in saying that one can be in love with more than one person. This may be so due to the fact that the few people we may love are considerably different from each other and so comparison is less significant. Rigorously faithful pairs are formed by fewer than 5 percent of mammals. What about humans? Humans are known to have monogamy with clandestine adultery. Monogamous couples are not immune to the experience of romantic temptations. When they do resist the temptation, they do so from considerations external to the emotion of love itself.

What makes romantic love replaceable and nonexclusive is its component 'sexual desire.' There are people especially men who have extramarital affairs and still consider their marriage to be happy and sexually satisfying. If a couple in romantic love feels sexually attracted to someone else, it is not taken as a sign of weakness in their romantic love. It does not always happen in one's life that one's choice of life-partner and the person(s) giving greatest sexual satisfaction are the same. There are also men who have beautiful wives at home and are sexually satisfied and yet go after prostitutes. Perhaps they are able to give wild expression to their sexual desires and whims with prostitutes rather than with their wives.

We can make a distinction between the conditions for the generation of love and love itself. It is understood that these conditions tend to limit the objects of love and keep them exclusive,

but love itself is not limited in such a manner. Romantic love appears to be exclusive which is a mere deception because it only reflects the practical and social limitations of romantic love, and not romantic love itself. Exclusivity is not the inherent property of romantic love. In many cases, social norms and the wish not to hurt the partner and the children make love exclusive. These considerations are external to the attitude of love itself. Though people may love more than one person at a time, romantic love tends to occur with only one partner at a time.¹⁷

17. RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER EMOTIONS

People may confuse liking for loving. They are two different things. Most often the word 'love' is used to describe nonemotional attitudes or emotional states that are different from typical love. Liking seems to be more general, involving a less intense feeling dimension and a less specific and complex intentional dimension. We have already seen that love is directed at the whole person. But liking involves a partial evaluation. It can also refer to inanimate objects, situations, activities, and other things that are not typically objects of love. Therefore, liking is not an emotion, but a general positive attitude involving usually mild enjoyment. Liking may be part of the more profound attitude of love. Sometimes liking may be absent in sexual desire. Men are reported to have sex with women they disliked. It might happen that men may rape women out of revenge. If a man has enmity with another man, the former may rape the latter's wife. It is all done in dislike. Love normally involves respect for and admiration of the beloved, but sexual desire just lacks such attitudes. Admiration is not same as love and it implies distance, and hence there is no reciprocity in admiration.

Love is known to be ambivalent in nature. Joy and hope stem from their being together and the prospect of a happy life. There are fear and jealousy: fear of losing this person, jealousy that this person may prefer someone to one. In sexual desire, ambivalence is not central since it is concerned with the immediate.

The emotional experience of romantic love is quite different when it is reciprocal and when it is not. When our romantic love is reciprocated, we are happier, more positive about life in general, more outgoing, and even kinder to others. If our romantic love is

not reciprocated, we feel humiliated, angry, anxious, depressed, preoccupied, and unable to concentrate.

There are many kinds of each emotion, and each kind is not the opposite of all kinds of the other emotion. Therefore we should be careful in labelling an emotion as the opposite of another emotion.

Many psychologists distinguish between two forms of love – namely ‘passionate love’ (infatuation, obsessive love, lovesickness, being in love) and ‘companionate love’ (fondness). They also propose that there are five prototypic emotions: two positive emotions – namely love and joy; and three negative ones – namely anger, sadness, and fear. There are also psychologists who propose more elaborate typologies of the varieties of love.

Passionate love is a state of intense longing for union with another. Reciprocated love (union with the other) is associated with fulfilment and ecstasy. Unrequited love (separation) is associated with emptiness, anxiety, or despair. Passionate love is a complex functional whole including appraisals or appreciations, subjective feelings, expressions, patterned physiological process, action tendencies, and instrumental behaviours.

Companionate love (sometimes called ‘true love or ‘conjugal love’) is a far less intense emotion. It combines feelings of deep attachment, commitment, and intimacy. Companionate love is the affection and tenderness we feel for those with whom our lives are deeply entwined. Companionate love is a complex functional whole including appraisals or appreciations, subjective feelings, expressions, patterned physiological process, action tendencies, and instrumental behaviours.

It is interesting to note how the psychologists doing research on both passionate and companionate love have come up with the idea that these two types of love are embedded already in the mother-child attachment experiences as their prototype. Infants’ intense attachment to the mother is the prototype of later passionate love; and parental love for the child is the prototype of the companionate love. Of course, we should remember, that both passionate and companionate love are combined in love relationships.¹⁸

18. PASSIONATE LOVE

1) Evolution of Passionate Love

Triune Brain

It was MacLean (1986) who proposed in the 1940s that in the course of evolution, we have ended up with a brain that possesses a ‘triune structure.’ The triune structure refers to three layers of different types of brain one upon the other. The oldest one is basically reptilian brain. Its main concern is the preservation of the self and the species. The self has to survive and after it its species also should survive. These two are the primary motives of the reptilian brain. The second one is called the neomammalian brain or limbic system. This system of brain is inherited from the early mammals and evolved to facilitate mother-child relationship. Emotions like desire, affection, ecstasy, fear, anger, and sadness depend upon the limbic system. The third one is the late mammalian/early primate brain or neocortex, which is inherited from the late mammals and early primates. It was after the neocortex evolved that symbolic or verbal information became important in shaping emotional experience and expression.¹⁹

Love in Primates

It is not surprising that even primates may experience a primitive form of passionate love, say Rosenblum and Plimpton (1981). In some of the species, infant primates, need to possess a ‘desire for union’ if they are to survive. If they are separated from their mothers by chance, it means death. Therefore, nature has provided that infants are ‘prewired’ to cling to their mothers. That is why when a brief separation happens by chance, infants become frantic and start searching for their mothers. If they find their mothers, they are joyous and cling to them or bounce about in excitement. Should the mothers not return, the infants slowly abandon all hope of contact, and they despair and die. This is certainly a ‘desire for union.’ Thus fervent attachments are not unique to human beings alone, but are shared by primates too.²⁰

Love in Children

There are studies done on the process of attachment, separation, and loss in children. It was typically found by Ainsworth

(1989) and Bowlby (1980) that infants and toddlers react to separation in the same way as their primate ancestors.

Children seem to experience passionate love very early. They could also experience 'sex-love' as early as 3½ years of age. This age coincides with the phallic stage of Freud who said that there are oral stage, anal stage, phallic stage, latency period and genital stage in human psychosexual development. The phallic stage and the sex-love spoken of by later psychologist occurring around 3½ years of age seem the same. When children are beset with anxiety and/or fearfulness they exhibit passionate love. This we notice very well in infants and toddlers of working mothers. The children become aware of the time when the mothers are leaving and they become very anxious and do not let the mothers move away, and later when the mothers return they run and cling to them and would not let them leave even for a while. Children who enter puberty seem to experience passionate love strongly. This may be due to the fact that the teenagers experience the old separation anxieties during the period of adolescence. According to neurophysiologists, passionate love may also be fuelled by pubescent hormonal changes. From these we understand that puberty and sexual maturity may bring a new depth to passion.²¹

Love in Adults

Romantic love in a way is a replica of the pattern of children's early attachment. Romantic love is in fact a form of attachment. Children feel secure, if they are allowed to be both affectionate and independent. They need to cling to the mother and at the same time allowed to move about independently. When the children do that they want to make sure that the presence of the mother is at sight, available and not too far. Thus they happily run away, come back and be in contact with the mother every now and then. Such children in their adult life seem mature and are comfortable with intimacy, can trust and depend on those who care for them. Sometimes children learn to be anxious/ambivalent and thus become clinging and dependent or fearful of being smothered and restrained, or both. Such children become anxious/ambivalent adults who are capable of falling in love easily. They seek extreme levels of closeness with the partner and are afraid that they will be

abandoned. Because of their attitude and behaviour patterns, their love affairs are likely to be short-lived. These are all due to the fact that in the early childhood, these children did not enjoy sufficient closeness and independence. Neither completely close nor completely left out is the healthy way for a child to grow into an adult capable of mature love. There are also avoidant children who had been abandoned early in life. They will in all likelihood become avoidant adults themselves. They are uncomfortable in getting close to others in general and to their partner in particular. They will have, in addition, difficulty in depending on others.²²

2) Antecedents of passionate love

If passionate love is somehow rooted in one's early childhood attachment, certain types of situation are especially vulnerable to passion. There are situations in early childhood, in which children are likely to feel helpless and dependent and are afraid of separation and loss; these children in later adult life will feel an increase in their passionate craving to merge with others and particularly with their partners.

Studies seem to indicate low self-esteem, dependency and insecurity, anxiety and neediness are vulnerable to passionate love. Those who have got low self-esteem falsely think that being passionately attached to someone great will give a boost to their image. That is why they passionately love the partners. Dependency and insecurity are compensated when we are strongly bonded with another person. When we are strongly attached to another individual we have someone on whom to depend and feel secure. When we are ridden with anxiety and fear, we look forward to someone who will alleviate our anxiety and fear. We get a lot of reassurance in the presence and support of another. This is enough reason for us to be passionately attached to the other. Needless to say that neediness sets the stage for passionate love. The more deprived we are, the more we value and cling to the partner. It is like when we have been deprived of food for long time, we enjoy even the ordinary food after the starvation. The deprivation makes the present ordinary food more delicious. In the same manner, those who had been needy for too long a time, without their needs being met, will passionately get attached to their partners.²³

3) Consequences of Passionate Love

(1) Moments of exultation

When love is realized, there is a moment of exultation. The boundaries that separate the lovers are broken and they are easily fused. For a moment at least the defences are broken and the other enters into the unknown territory for the first time and that is exhilarating.

(2) Feeling understood and accepted

Being accepted is one of the basic desires of humans. When lovers are united they feel that they are understood and accepted. They rest secure in the love of each other with the feeling of being understood and accepted.

(3) Sharing a sense of union

In love, because of the fusion, lovers experience a sense of union. They sense that they are one and for sometime at least they do not want the distinction between 'mine' and 'yours.' Love is ultimately for the sake of union with the beloved.

(4) Feeling secure and safe

Those who have been feeling alone and lonely have someone to be with and that person is the beloved. Therefore one feels secure and safe in the presence of someone who loves him\her.

(5) Transcendence

The concept of transcendence typically belongs to humans. We cannot think of animals transcending their limitation. Transcendence belongs to the realm of the human spirit. We may attribute transcendence to humans and whatever we consider as spirits. In the context of love, we may transcend our former limitations. We may feel heroic to go beyond ourselves, or we may feel proud of transcending our limitations and making sacrifices.²⁴

4) Costs of passionate love

Why is passion so passionate? There are two main reasons why passionate love is so overpowering an experience. Firstly it is a basic emotion. Every basic emotion is known to be overwhelming.

Passionate love aims at union, and union was a life-and-death matter for our ancestors who were wandering about in the beginning. In keeping with its primitive nature, passionate love has to be overpowering. The second reason is that passionate love forms part of the mixture with other intense emotional experiences like joy, jealousy, loneliness, sadness, fear, and anger. All these emotions in themselves are intense and added to that, their mixing only adds fuel to the fire. The mixture attains the property of explosives. Therefore such emotional mixtures often trigger strong emotional experiences or reactions. Passionate lovers experience a kind of roller coaster feelings like euphoria, happiness, vulnerability, anxiety, panic, and despair. The element of risk involved in passionate love increases the passion all the more.²⁵

5) Pleasure and pain may fuel passion

Passion and the positive emotions

The joy of love is so diffusive that it cannot be contained in itself. By nature it spills over every aspect of our life. The adrenalin that is being secreted affects our entire body systems and correspondingly our feeling tone. Thus positive emotions can be experienced at a heightened level. Besides, various positive emotions like amusement, erotic excitement, or general excitement can intensify passion.

Passion and negative emotions

Unrequited love (separation) is associated with emptiness, anxiety, or despair. One experiences panic, loneliness and eventual despair when we are separated from those whom we love. Thus various states of arousal can spill over and influence one another. It is surprising and amusing to know that we not only love people in spite of the suffering they cause us, but also we love them just because of the suffering they cause us. The fertile ground for love to spring up and flourish is not only the field of pleasure but also the field of pain.²⁶

19. COMPANIONATE LOVE

Evolutionary approach seems to give an explanation for companionate love. Emotional 'packages' are inherited, adaptive

patterns of emotional experience, physiological reaction, and behaviour. If a species has to survive, it has to reproduce, find food, avoid being killed, and take advantage of reproductive opportunities. According to the evolutionary approach, companionate love is a package we mammals and primates have inherited to mate, reproduce, and care for the young.

1) The chemistry of companionate love

The research of the neuroscientists has identified a hormone named oxytocin, which seems to promote affectionate, close, intimate bonds and sexual and reproductive behaviour. It is known to facilitate tactile contact between animals, and that is an early step in the development of social attachment. Its presence promotes more intense bonds between mothers and infants. Mothers' eagerness to nurture their young springs from the presence of this hormone. It is also responsible for the increased contact between same-sex partners.²⁷

20. INTENSITY VARIABLES

Imagination plays a major role in sexual desire. Imagination is more important than knowledge. Therefore, a novel partner induces greater attraction. In the presence of a novel partner, imagination can run riot and the agent feels all the more attracted. In long-term love, knowledge, not imagination, is more important. That is why marital happiness is positively associated with the length of the courtship period.²⁸

21. HURTING THE ONE WE LOVE

There seem to be two puzzling attitudes in love. There is a strong positive evaluation of the beloved and also a strong negative evaluation expressed in harm to this person. The tendency to hurt can be with intention or without intention. In all likelihood, the lover is hurting without intending to do so. Lovers spend a considerable time together and so many of their activities may have significance for each of them, and in such circumstances the lover is likely to hurt the beloved unwillingly. When we are intensely together what you choose may not be to the liking of your partner. The people we love are both a source of great happiness, and deep sadness; they may benefit us and also hurt us.

In love we need trust and sincerity. These two are essential to love. Sometimes lovers may overlook rules of politeness because of the trust they presuppose in the other. Politeness prevents insults but when it is overlooked because of the familiarity and trust, it may hurt the other. Lovers are less careful in what they say and do, and thus may hurt one another. Because of the freedom we enjoy with our beloved, we may say and do things in a hasty manner and that might hurt the beloved. The third reason for the experience of hurt is, that in intimate love relationship, we have firsthand knowledge about the other person and in conflict that knowledge may be used to fight with each other and so it is another reason for hurting. In couple counselling I have frequently noticed that they tell a number of intimate awkward things about the other person in the presence of the counsellor while quarrelling. The spoken words can remain longer in their mind – hurting them and recollecting their remembrance. In this way truth is more painful than slander, since it is more difficult to dismiss truth than slander.

In love, it is common to experience disappointment and frustration and consequently hurt. That is why it is said that there is no joyous love. Lovers usually speak of passionate love as a 'bittersweet' experience. It has been found that persons low in defensiveness have more experience of love than do highly defensive persons. It only suggests to us that to love is to make oneself vulnerable in ways that enhance the possibilities of pain.

Hurting the beloved unwillingly is rather easy to understand. Hurting the beloved on purpose is more complex. It usually involves ambivalence due to the presence of two conflicting evaluations in the same attitude. Love basically involves a positive evaluation of the beloved, whereas intending to hurt the beloved involves a negative evaluation of that person. This ambivalence is not present when we hurt the ones we love unwillingly. Emotional ambivalence indicates that the same attitude contains (at least) two conflicting emotional evaluations. Let us take for example envy; it involves both a positive evaluation of the other's achievements and a negative evaluation of the other's good fortune. Likewise we experience anger, which implies displeasure with an unjustified insult and pleasure with the anticipation of revenge. People often enjoy a sad movie; the positive evaluation here is the enjoyment of the movie

and the negative evaluation concerns the movie's sad story. Emotional ambivalence does not mean contradictory emotional evaluations occurring at different times. It applies to situations in which conflicting evaluations coexist at the same point in time. It looks as though emotional ambivalence is incompatible with love, but it does exist in love.

When the lover hurts the beloved on purpose, the lover wishes to signal that their mutual relationship, especially their mutual dependency, needs to be modified. Hurting may be the last alarm bell which signals urgency. In hurting the beloved on purpose, lovers either wish to assert their independence or seek further dependency like more attention. In love we find a dynamic process of mutual adaptation, which is painful. There is another consideration for the purposeful hurting. It is associated with the idea of indifference, which is not there by definition in love. In love, lovers care for each other so much that what they do from the partial perspective is likely to hurt the other person. In love there seems more unintentional hurting than intentional hurting.

There is a close connection between vulnerability and love. Vulnerability involves the ability to hurt and to be hurt. In love relationship, some of the hurts are intended and others are not. It is also possible that one could deliberately hurt the beloved and simultaneously claim to love that person. This is due to the emotional ambivalence, arising from the presence of two different evaluative perspectives. The reason why it happens quite frequently in love is that there is mutual dependence and the lack of indifference.²⁹

40

HATE

Hate is a global evaluation. Someone possessing fundamentally evil traits is the object of hate. In disgust, the object is someone possessing fundamentally unattractive traits. Both in hate and disgust what is involved is the global negative attitude or evaluation towards someone. Anger is similar to hate and disgust, insofar as it involves a negative evaluation, but in anger the evaluation is about a specific action rather than a global attitude. Love is like hate, as both of them involve a global evaluation, but love is a positive evaluation compared to the negative evaluation of hate.

Hate is supposed to be a long-term attitude. It is not generated by a personal offence. The negative character of those one hates is perceived to be 'in their blood.' In anger, we believe that 'because they do bad things, they are bad,' but in hate we believe that 'because they are bad, they do bad things.' The object of hate possesses inherently dangerous traits, while the object of anger is guilty of merely instrumental negative actions, not inherently negative traits.¹

1. SPECIFICITY

Though the object of hate is more general than that of anger, there should be some degree of specificity and closeness in order to have a high level of emotional intensity. At its general level, the intensity will be weak and so there needs to be some kind of specificity to feed hate and sustain it. Though terrorists start their activities basing on a unifying general ideal as the basis of their hatred, soon this general ideal turns into more proximate and specific matters. The specificity could be something like revenge for a member of their group, or the humiliation of someone part of their group. For example, when caste groups clash in India, there will be fights between two castes as a revenge for someone of their caste group having been killed or insulted in another part of India. The people who clash may not even know who the person is killed,

but the idea that the dead person belongs to their group is enough to take revenge on the supposed group that is held responsible. In hate, we are not worried about the abstract concern about other's continued power, but rather our concern is that his power will harm us or those related to us. Anger has got personal nature and this personal nature makes it closer to a typical emotion than hate. Hate is often turned into a long-term sentiment. Because of the specific nature of anger, taking a broader perspective by delaying our response is a remedy to deal with anger, but this taking broader perspective does not help us deal with hate, since hate already has a broader perspective and this remedy is less effective.²

2. GLOBAL EVALUATION

When we say that there is a global negative evaluation in hate, it does not mean that the person is considered to be negative totally, but in the sense that the negative aspects are so fundamental that other traits become insignificant. Similarly, the global positive evaluation in love does not mean that the beloved is essentially and totally a positive person, but rather our positive aspect is considered so fundamental that other traits become insignificant. The basic evaluative pattern in grief too is global in the sense that we are dealing with a total loss, which cannot be recovered, and so the grief persists. In grief, there is a partial perspective, which cannot be changed easily so that we could take a more cheerful perspective. For, from every perspective we look at, the object of grief is dead. Only for those who believe in life after death, their belief is comforting.³

3. THREAT

The threat we perceive in hate is often understood as directed at the foundations of the social framework in which we live, rather than merely at our status within this framework. In hate, the threat comes from someone outside the framework; hate is typically directed at those who are socially more distant. That is why in hate we may not confront the other person, but in anger we wish to correct, or give feedback on the person's behaviour, so that we are able to sustain social bonds. The threat we experience in hate can be either in the form of an intended threat by another person, or in the form of an unintended formidable obstacle to our well-being.⁴

4. INTENSITY

The intensity issue of hate is complex. Because hate is general and less personal, the feeling dimension of hate is sometimes of a lesser intensity than that of anger. Since the intensity of hate is spread over a longer period of time, at any given moment it is weaker. That is why actions carried out in hate is done in 'cold blood.' Out of hate, one can kill someone even without intense feelings. If one kills another out of anger, the feeling dimension is quite intense. Nevertheless, we also notice that there can be instances when hate can be quite intense. This comes about because the hope of changing the object is not there, and the situation is seen in extremely negative terms and so these considerations increase the emotional intensity. In conclusion, we can say that whereas anger can scarcely be conceived without having an intense feeling dimension, there are many cases of hate in which the feeling dimension is hardly noticed. There is a saying that an angry man opens his mouth and shuts his eyes. But we know that a person in hate does things with his eyes kept quite open. Most of the actions of hatred in history were carried out with great calculation and efficiency. For example, take the Holocaust, we know how meticulously that was planned and executed.⁵

5. BOUNDARY

The boundaries of anger and hate at times overlap. Therefore, the borderline between anger and hate is not always clear. The central hostile attitude of hate is present in anger; and annoyance typical of anger is present in hate too. Sometimes anger persists in a way that develops into hatred. Anger is directed to specific action, and hate to the person. Sometimes we may evaluate someone's bad action as stemming from that person's basic character, in which case anger turns into hate. Anger at an agent, an institution, and the self or even inanimate objects can generalise so that the object or agent becomes negative. It is then that we can say that the person or object is hated. In a sense, then, hate seems to be generalised anger. It is a strong negative emotion which has ceased to be about one event or one thwarted goal and has broadened to embrace parts of, or indeed all, aspects of the person or object.

There are times when anger will last longer than usual; then revenge is seen sweeter. Similarly when hate stems from a specific case, it may last for a short-term only.⁶

6. HOPELESSNESS

In hate we believe that the situation can be changed only if the other person is avoided or even eliminated. That is why in hate we strive to remove and destroy the thing we hate. In anger, the other person is assumed to deserve to be punished. The objects of our anger have to take responsibility for their action, but the objects of hate cannot take responsibility for their negative traits. This is because we consider that the traits we hate are more or less permanent and so the agent does not bear actual responsibility for the generation of hate. Thus, hate can be directed at different groups regardless of the personal differences between their individuals.⁷

7. LESS BLAMEWORTHINESS

Blameworthiness of the agent is more dominant in anger than in hate. What is presupposed in blameworthiness is the agent's ability to act otherwise. We usually perceive the availability of an alternative more in anger than in hate. In hate, for example, we take for granted that the negative character of the other person is more or less permanent and so difficult to change. Hence there is no blameworthiness or responsibility of the agent for the negative character.⁸

8. LESS PASSIVITY

The desire to become personally involved is much weaker in hate, because we believe that it is difficult to change the undesired circumstances. Hence hate is more passive than anger. Hate is more negative in nature than anger and yet often we are not as aggressive to the object of hate as we are to the object of anger. Nevertheless, in extreme cases of hate, physical elimination may be seen as the most effective way to fight the dangers associated with the hated person. We realize that typical hate implies an extreme type of intolerance and opposition to diversity.

It is not essential that in hate there should be physical elimination or even the wish to hurt the other person physically. If it involves the creation of some psychological distance, that is

enough. That is what precisely takes place in marital relationships. In marriages, hate is expressed by evading the situation and acting coldly as if the partner were no longer within the close relationship, which is not supposed to prevail in any marriage.

Though extreme hate aims at physical elimination, it may not be always possible. At that time emotional tension is created and various substitutes are sought. One of the most common forms of substitution is verbal aggression. This can clearly be noticed in political speeches in which the opponent is vigorously attacked. Since one party just cannot eliminate the other party, verbal aggression is made use of.⁹

9. SUBJECT-OBJECT DISTANCE

Because of the profoundly negative evaluation of the object of hate, we would like to detach ourselves from the object by increasing the subject-object distance as much as possible by avoiding or eliminating the object. If that is possible, our attitude will be one of indifference towards the object of hate. But such detachment and indifference are not always possible in hate. Though we may want to avoid the object, we may be compelled to cope and even communicate with the person we hate. The need for communication and the desire to avoid are in conflict in hate, and so our communication is ambivalent and often negative.

On the one hand we wish to avoid or eliminate the object, and on the other we realize that this is impossible or at least very difficult. This situation generates emotional intensity typical of hate. Intense hate is experienced when we realize that detachment and indifference towards the object of a profoundly negative evaluation are impossible.¹⁰

10. FUNCTIONS

When we consider the functional value of hate, it helps us mobilize resources. But it does not serve any social role insofar as it tries to disconnect all relationships with the object.

We can think of emotions as rational in two basic senses: 1. the generation of emotions involves intellectual calculations; 2. emotions express an appropriate response in the given

circumstances. In such contexts, hate is more rational in the first sense, whereas anger is more rational in the second sense.

Identifying hate is not easy. It is more problematic to identify hate than anger, both for the person who experiences them and for the others who observe them. Anger definitely has more specific evaluations and distinctly public behavioural manifestations than hate. Besides, we often try to hide our hate. It is because of its negative moral value or because it may hurt us in the long run, or we perceive the object to be powerful. For similar considerations in the opposite direction, we do not try that hard to hide our contempt, since it is directed at those who are inferior to us and they may not have opportunities to hurt us.¹¹

PART - III

The Agent as a whole

In this third part dealing with emotions that are generated by the agent as a whole, we have sexual desire, disgust and contempt.

41

SEXUAL DESIRE

When we consider the centrality of emotions in our lives, we notice that romantic love and sexual desire occupy the central stage. They are so vital for human existence. Let us analyse the basic characteristics of each of these emotions and their connection with each other. There are some psychologists who equate these emotions and yet others who consider them to be completely different. We consider them as different emotions. Let us consider the characteristics of sexual desire and compare it with romantic love. In this chapter 'love' means 'romantic love.'

If you take the positive emotions of humans directed at others' actions and personality, there are three major emotions –namely, gratitude, sexual desire, and love. If you consider the basic evaluative pattern in gratitude, it is praiseworthiness of the other person's action; in sexual desire it is appealingness of the other person, and in love we find both praiseworthiness and appealingness. In negative emotions too, we find a similar structure. Anger is concerned about the praiseworthiness of the other person's action; disgust is related to the appealingness of the other person, and hate involves both praiseworthiness and appealingness of the other person. If you consider the specific-global issue, the relation between love and gratitude is similar to that between hate and anger. Love and hate are said to be long-term attitudes referring to another person as a whole entity. However, romantic love is more specific than hate since it requires a more specific knowledge and a more personal relationship. As compared to love and hate, gratitude and anger are short-term states, mainly referring to specific actions of another person. In as much as hate entails a kind of anger at the object, love involves some gratitude for the object. Similar to disgust, sexual desire is based on the other person's appealingness and is also directed at the whole person of the other.¹

1. SEXUAL DESIRE IS AN EMOTION

Though some consider sexual desire as a 'biological drive' like hunger or thirst, it is nevertheless typically an emotion. Like any emotion, it involves instability, great intensity, brief duration, and partiality. The four basic emotional components of cognition, evaluation, motivation and feeling are conspicuously present. The role of change is important in the generation of sexual desire.²

2. IMPORTANCE OF APPEALINGNESS

In sexual desire, the basic evaluative pattern is appealingness. This does not exclude the evaluative pattern of praiseworthiness but it only indicates that praiseworthiness is far less important. Perhaps because of the attractiveness of the other, the other's praiseworthiness of character and deeds increase in the sight of the person having sexual desire. Sexual desire is a more primitive emotion and so intentional capacities are not that complex as is the case in romantic love. Sexual desire is a simpler attitude based on various kinds of perceptions, but love involves capacities such as thinking, and memory, which are required for appraising the object. Sexual desire focuses on a few external parts of the other person's body, which is appraised instantaneously by sense perception. In sexual desire, spontaneous evaluations are more important than in romantic love.

Appealingness is of great importance for sexual desire unlike love for which in addition to appealingness, praiseworthiness is necessary. In a family counselling I met a couple with their daughter. The daughter was well educated and had a lucrative job. She fell in love with a relative of hers who had no any job and did not appear to be having a good standing in society. The parents were resolutely against the marriage of their daughter, but the daughter was very adamant in marrying the man of her choice. She could not win over her parents' consent to marry the man. So she eloped with the man and married him. The parents failed to understand that appealingness, which is attractiveness, is essential in sexual desire.³

3. SEXUAL DESIRE IS PRIMITIVE

Sexual desire is primitive and love is complex. Because of the complex nature of love, it requires far greater personal involvement

than sexual desire. If you compare a relationship of love with a relationship of sexual desire, it is more painful breaking up a relationship based on love than breaking up a mere sexual affair. I know a number of married men who have a lot of sexual affairs as they move about from place to place without any commitment or involvement with the sexual partner. In counselling I met men who have not even asked the names of their transient sexual partners. Sexual desire is in a way an uncontrollable feeling and more primitive. That is why it is less disturbing to discover the sexual affair of our partner than the love affair of our partner. Women usually are willing to forgive their husbands when they discover that they have sexual affair once in a way but unforgiving when they find out that their husbands are sticking to one particular woman, which is interpreted by the wife as having love affair. There are also wives who keep condoms in the suitcases of their husbands as they go for work and replenish the stock when it is depleted. That their husbands may have sexual affairs does not disturb them much. Since love expresses our most profound attitudes, it cannot be simply dismissed as being transient. Sexual desire is primitive, it is easier to artificially induce or terminate it. Love on the contrary is a far more profound attitude. Love is neither easily available on demand, nor terminable at will.⁴

4. EFFORTLESS EXPERIENCE

Unlike love, sexual desire in most cases is an effortless experience requiring no acquired characteristics. This happens just because sexual desire is more spontaneous. Once certain primitive standards are met, then sexual desire automatically emerges. We know that these standards have been shaped by millions of years of evolution and therefore transcultural. They are found all over the world in every group of people. Besides, there are also cultural-bound standards, which vary from culture to culture. The universal standards of sexual desire are full lips, clear skin, smooth skin, clear eyes, lustrous hair, and good muscle tone. Whites and blacks seem to look for the same standards for the face but have different standards for the body. Concerning body shape, liking varies. There is variation from culture to culture regarding female bodily attractiveness like light vs. dark skin, slim vs. plump body. Nevertheless, the preference for a particular ratio of waist size to

hip size is invariant, being about 0.70. Men seem to find woman with this waist-to-hip ratio more attractive, regardless of their being fat or slim. This ratio also is indicative of long-term health status.⁵

5. STANDARDIZED ATTRACTIVENESS

Since praiseworthiness is involved in love, there is also learning involved. For praiseworthiness we go by social standards. This is not the case for sexual desire, which depends upon appealingness. However, sexual desire does not exclude learning and social standards. Due to mass media and communication, ideals of sexual attractiveness may have become more standardized.⁶

6. BOUNDARY

It is difficult to see a clear-cut borderline between romantic love and sexual desire, because sexual desire is an essential component of romantic love. That is why we can see sometimes elements essential for one being present in the other. There are also cases in which we find that sexual desire has nothing to do with romantic love. In the same way, romantic love may involve other types of attraction and not necessarily sexual desire. There are people who say that they had been sexually attracted without feeling the slightest trace of love, and in a similar vein, there are also people who say that they had been in love without feeling any need for sex. All the same, the majority of people, especially women, seem to enjoy sex most when they are in love with their partner. In fact, love and sex can be separated and yet we would like to have them together. That is why we become more threatened when our partner gets involved sexually with our rival than when they are involved in a nonsexual manner. In other kinds of love, it is more evident to see the separation between love and sexual desire. Only in the case of romantic love and sexual desire, we notice that there can be a separation between them in spite of the desire to combine both of them.⁷

7. GENDER DIFFERENCES

There seems to be some gender differences in this regard. Men of course tend to separate sex and love. Women tend to hold on to the belief that love and sex go together. That is why we find a sizable number of men adoring their wives with great admiration

and love and enjoying sex outside marriage, even with prostitutes. When I asked a married man in counselling what makes him to seek prostitutes, in spite of having a beautiful and loving wife at home, he said that he could freely express his sexual desires and fantasies with outsiders than with his wife. Doing the same with his wife, he considered as unbecoming. There is enough evidence to support the view that erotic pictures generate more arousal in men than in women; in women pictures of romantic couples generate much more arousal than in men. Even when women are engaged in extra-marital sexual involvements, it is likely to be love-oriented; whereas men are pleasure-oriented. That is why men are more likely to engage in extramarital sex with little or no emotional involvement. Women on the contrary are more likely to engage in extramarital emotional involvement without sexual intercourse. Men usually commit adultery on the spur of the moment attracted by the physical beauty of a woman, whereas women commit adultery generally only when her feelings are deeply involved or likely to become so.⁸

8. EMOTIONAL OBJECT

Attractiveness is more pronounced in sexual desire and disgust. In sexual desire, the emotional object is basically one-dimensional. In romantic love the emotional object is more complex and may consist of many evaluative concerns. In short-term sexual encounters, what is important is what the other person looks like and if that person is willing. These two things can be discovered instinctively by humans. There is neither the time nor the need to find out what the person is really like, except that there is no danger involved in having a sexual encounter with that person. Of course, the fear of HIV positive and the danger of death or mutilation or betrayal from the object are looked into and not necessarily taken into serious consideration on account of the intensity of the sexual desire and the urgency. In long-term relationships and marriages, partners are chosen more carefully considering many aspects. When we compare with the emotional object of disgust, it is also one-dimensional like sexual desire, and the emotional object of hate is more complex like love though not so complex as in love, since the object is viewed from a distance and with a practical concern in mind.⁹

9. SUPERFICIAL COMPANIONSHIP

Knowledge is important in love; we want to know the beloved and to be known by the beloved. We would like to be with the beloved for prolonged time. Away from the sight of the beloved everything looks empty. We engage in many different types of loving activities like spending time together, having prolonged eye contact, touching and holding, caressing, kissing and making love. We would like to lose our identity and also the boundary and fuse with the beloved. We get involved in the interests of our beloved. In contrast, when it is the question of sexual desire, our need for the companionship is superficial and very limited in the sense that we seek the object of our sexual desire as long as it is required to gratify our sexual desire and then there is hardly any concern. In some marital relationships and in casual sex, I have noticed the female partners complaining that the men partners were inconsiderate in the sense of seeing to their satisfaction, and after that did not even bother to enquire if the female partners would like to be sexually satisfied. These men seem to be vigorously interested in just satisfying their need and do not have the least desire to satisfy their partners.¹⁰

10. GRATIFICATION VS. CONCERN

In sexual desire the major concern, and sometimes the only concern, is gratification of our needs. In love, we tend to be concerned with the attitude of the beloved and want the beloved to prosper. In sexual desire, the attitude or the happiness or prosperity of the object is less significant. Nevertheless, these concerns are not completely absent. Whenever they are present, they are superficial and for egoistic purpose since to a certain extent the object's satisfaction is also our satisfaction. The value we attribute to the sexual object is for the limited purpose of sexual satisfaction. As long as we have the sexual desire, there is a need, which is not satisfied. Once it is satisfied, attraction disappears all of a sudden or is significantly diminished. At times, immediately after the satisfaction, there is a desire to get rid of the object of sexual desire. Often we hear of people raping someone and, immediately after the sexual satisfaction, killing the person. This is not the case in love.¹¹

11. EVALUATION OF LIMITED ASPECTS

In romantic love, the positive evaluation is comprehensive. This evaluation refers to many aspects. In sexual desire, the evaluation is only to a few aspects. Yet, a comprehensive positive evaluation in romantic love does not mean that all the aspects of the beloved are positively evaluated. The lover may be aware of the faults of the beloved. The positive evaluation may refer to some aspects, which are viewed by the lover as significant and they overshadow the shadow side of the beloved's personality. Thus in sexual desire, some aspects are evaluated positively; and in romantic love, many aspects are evaluated positively. In the same way, hate may allow for a positive evaluation of some partial aspects of the object, but as a whole, the other is negatively evaluated.¹²

12. PARTIAL AND TRANSIENT

By nature, sexual desire is more partial and transient than romantic love. It is because of the concern with particular aspects whose impact is limited to specific circumstances. On the contrary, love is an enduring emotion as it refers to global aspects. In fact, it takes time to develop and maintain lasting love, which involves an intimate and reciprocal relationship. Therefore, the enduring attitude towards the beloved is seen as ups and downs of the same loving attitude. But different instances of sexual desire towards the same person should be considered as separate states. Love endures but sexual desire emerges and disappears. A person's love for the beloved may last many years in which case love has become dispositional, but that person need not have sexual desire all those years but only every now and then.¹³

13. NO GUARANTEE FOR HAPPINESS

Not only the beloved but also love in itself has intrinsic value. Love and sex are important factors in determining happiness. Sex is not as important for general happiness as love is. Although sex contributes to our happiness, the number of sexual partner one has got, the number of sexual satisfaction one has, do not matter much. Of course, a different and new sexual partner increases sexual desire and its satisfaction; however this does not necessarily increase general happiness. For, happiness is more complex, and a mere change or greater quantity with regard to sex cannot guarantee it.¹⁴

14. SUPERFICIAL KNOWLEDGE

Comprehensive positive evaluation of the beloved in love does not mean lack of detailed perception of the beloved. In fact, there is so much of detailed perception of the beloved because of the close relationship, personal involvement and personal care. Paying attention to insignificant details indicates our caring and personal involvement in the beloved. Sexual desire involves superficial knowledge and evaluation of many objects. Love implies a more profound knowledge and evaluation of very few objects. Sexuality tends to amplify indefinitely the number of objects which satisfy it, but love tends towards exclusiveness. In love, consciousness contracts and is occupied by only one object. There is indeed depth in love.¹⁵

42 DISGUST

You are walking barefoot on the pavement on a summer evening when it is rather dark. Suddenly you stamp on something soft, and on examination you realize that you stepped over dog faeces. At this moment what you experience is disgust. While you are bathing in a river, an object floats towards you by the slow current. Something is sticking out like a stick. As it approaches you, you extend your hand and touch the stick-like object and realize that it is the hand of a corpse. Now what you experience, besides fear, is disgust.

Our evaluations of emotions can be under three major headings, namely: 1. Fortunes of agents (desirability of agents), 2. Actions of agents (praiseworthiness of agents) and 3. The agent as a whole (appealingness of agents). Disgust comes under our emotional evaluation comprising both the actions of agents, which denotes praiseworthiness and the agent as a whole, which denotes appealingness of the agent. Disgust is one of the most primitive and immediate emotional reactions. Therefore it is closely related to perceptual mode of vision, smell, taste, or touch. Nobody can be sure exactly how or at what point in the evolutionary process the various emotions emerged. In any case, disgust should be among the first. Because biological systems for the motivation of approach and avoidance had to come into existence very early in even the simplest of life forms; for, approach and avoidance behaviours are so fundamental to survival. Approach was largely in terms of consumatory and mating behaviours; and avoidance behaviours served to escape pain or reject distasteful and potentially dangerous substances. Later, what happened was that the primitive system that motivated the rejection of distasteful and potentially dangerous substances evolved as the emotion of disgust.¹

1. THE MEANING OF DISGUST

Darwin (1872/1965) explained disgust as something revolting, primarily in relation to the sense of taste, as actually perceived or vividly imagined. In its simplest sense, it means something offensive to the taste. Secondly, he referred to anything which causes a similar feeling, through the sense of smell, touch, and even of sight. Thus Darwin included in disgust not only the experience of revulsion but also a characteristic facial expression. Andras Angyal (1941) defines disgust as a specific reaction towards the waste products of the human and animal body. Tomkin (1963) speaks of disgust as a reaction to unwanted intimacy. Therefore, for him, disgust is meant to defend the self against psychic incorporation or any increase in intimacy with a repellent object. In short, disgust is revulsion at the prospect of (oral) incorporation of an offensive object. All of these descriptions of what disgust are, focus on the mouth and on real or imagined ingestion. Ekman and Friesen (1975) consider disgust as an aversion that centres on oral rejection. According to Wierzbicka (1986) disgust is a feeling bad about another person's action. This feeling is somewhat similar to what one feels when one has something in one's mouth that tastes bad and one wants to put it out of the mouth. Disgust is commonly known as 'bad taste,' and the facial expression of disgust can be seen as functional in rejecting unwanted foods and odours. The physiological concomitant of disgust is nausea, a food-related sensation that inhibits ingestion. Thus it is clear to note that the mouth and the process of eating is at the core of disgust. There are some who see disgust as primarily a defence against infection. Therefore disgust promotes cleanliness, especially distancing from soft bacteria-generating objects.

Disgust is related to a particular motivation system (hunger) and to a particular part of the body (mouth). Disgust plays an important social role for internalisation of cultural prohibitions and thus it is a major means of socialization.²

2. CONTAMINATION

The core of disgust seems to be contamination. Therefore, disgust is seen as a strong sense of aversion to something perceived as capable of contaminating. This contamination can be either in

physical terms, referring to bodily infection, or in more symbolic terms, referring to violating the boundaries of self. Disgust has the function associated with actual, physical contamination and in particular with food contamination. Therefore eating and taste centre on disgust. Originally, disgust was concerning food, but later in the evolution in humans it has been extended to all kinds of contamination, including mental and moral contamination. Thus food, mental and moral contaminations are experienced as central to disgust. Similarity seems to play a role in disgust. For example, if one has a disgusting feeling towards an object, then another object which is similar to the disgusting one will also be disgusting. For, there is a belief at the back of one's mind that what looks superficially similar is also similar at the deeper level. Let us take an imaginary example. If you dislike lizards and I prepare a chocolate bar resembling a lizard, you may feel disgusted to eat it. This is because of the similarity of the real lizard with the chocolate bar made to resemble a lizard.³

3. CRITERIA OF DISGUST

In accord with Ekman's nine criteria, disgust involves: 1. a universal sign (expression), 2. a comparable expression in other animals, 3. an emotion-specific physiology, 4. universal antecedent events, 5. coherence in response systems, 6. quick onset, 7. brief duration, 8. automatic appraisal mechanism, and 9. unbidden occurrence. We consider here in more detail a set of three properties thought to be essential to the concept of emotion.

Behavioural Component: When we feel disgusted, it is manifested in our behaviour as distancing from the object, event or situation and is characterized as a rejection.

Physiological Component: There are two types of physiological changes associated with disgust. Firstly, only disgust is associated with a specific physiological state. This state is nausea, which is measured by self-report. Nevertheless, nausea is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for disgust, but it is clearly correlated with disgust. Secondly, it is associated with increased salivation (which itself is associated with nausea and as a response to bad tastes) as a concomitant of disgust.

Expressive Component: The expressive component seems to centre on the face. Of course, many identify a family of facial movements even though they are not in agreement about a prototypical disgust face. Darwin spoke of the gape, retraction of the upper lip, nose wrinkle, and dropping of the mouth corners. Izard, Ekman and Friesen all agree with the description of Darwin. What is clear from this is that the activity centres on the mouth and nose, and movements tend to discourage entry into the body or to encourage discharge (gape or tongue extension).⁴

4. ORIGINS OF DISGUST: FAECES AND DECAY

For adult humans – faeces, vomit, and decay are probably associated with disease vectors. Thus there seems to be an innate rejection of these substances. Faeces are disgusting for adults universally. Vomit seems to be a primary substance for disgust. But these three items do not seem reliably present in animals. Interestingly, children are attracted to faeces. It is only later by cultural indoctrination, they learn to dislike it. What was once an attraction turns into an aversion.⁵

5. PROPERTIES AND ACQUISITION OF CORE DISGUST⁶

There are three requisite components for the occurrence of disgust. They are: 1. a sense of oral incorporation (and hence a linkage with food or eating); 2. a sense of offensiveness; and 3. contamination sensitivity. We now consider each, in terms of the nature of the component, its requisites, and its development.

Oral Incorporation

The mouth is the major route of entry of material things into our body; it is the gateway to the body. The act of putting any external thing into the mouth can be highly personal and risky; disgust plays an important role in oral incorporation. In traditional cultures, people believe that you become what you eat. Such a belief makes the individual become aware of the dangerous intake of things.

Offensive Entities: Animals and Their Products

We are disgusted especially with waste products. Body products are considered disgusting because they are also seen as pollutants.

There are taboos about animals. The animals need not be disgusting in themselves, but they are made disgusting because of taboos. There are also animals that are considered intrinsically disgusting either because they bear some resemblance to body products such as mucus (i.e., worms), or because they are most of the time in contact with rotting animals, faeces, or other human wastes (i.e., flies, cockroaches, vultures, and other scavengers). There are animals that resemble humans (i.e., other primates). There are pet animals. These are rarely eaten. There are certain animals that are anomalous in the sense that they produce a mixture of fear (danger) and disgust (i.e., spiders and snakes). They are feared though they may not be particularly harmful. They are considered disgusting, because of the consideration of disgust/disease avoidance, rather than fear of harm.

6. CORE DISGUST

Disgust as a Category of Food Rejection

Disgust has been described as one of four categories of food rejection, the others being distaste (rejection motivated by bad sensory properties), danger (motivated by fear of harm to body), and inappropriateness (culturally classified as not edible). If you take distaste, not every food is palatable to everyone. We have our own preferences, and besides some tastes are abhorrent. Thus disgust may arise when the taste of a particular food is not palatable. Speaking of danger, it is quite obvious that in societies people have identified foods that are harmful for health and even life. Some of them may even look nice and appealing but definitely harmful. We learn about the dangerous types of food as children. Therefore rejection of a certain food may result from our understanding of it as dangerous. Inappropriateness is the last item on account of which we tend to reject a particular kind of food. There are many taboos concerning different edible items. Drumstick leaves are a favourite dish in my culture. When travelling to another country I noticed that people over there having plenty of drumstick trees do not eat the leaves for the simple reason it is forbidden in their culture. In some cultures, people eat dog meat but not in other cultures. Dog meat is meat in every respect like beef or pork but not everybody eats it.⁷

7. OBJECTS OF DISGUST

Paul Rozin proposed a few categories of objects about which we may experience disgust. They are: 1. food – you are given your favourite soft drink. As you are about to drink, you notice a dead fly floating on the drink; 2. body products – you walk into a public washroom and notice that the previous user had not flushed out properly; 3. envelope violations – as you walk in your garden suddenly a nail pierces your sole; 4. hygiene – as you travel in a public transport you realize the person sitting next to you seems to have not taken bath for many days; 5. animals – as soon as you reach your friend's house, it is his dog that comes and licks your hands and welcomes you! 6. death –after the tsunami you volunteer to help bury the dead bodies that are highly decomposed.⁸

8. CORRELATION

The domains of disgust are correlated: those who are easily disgusted by food items are also disgusted by insects, rats, and amputations. What is evident in all these items is the idea of contamination, and in particular an offensive and infective entry into our body. The entry points could be the mouth, the nose, the skin, or the eyes. If you take the category of death, the contamination is twofold namely the bodily contamination that spreads diseases and the psychological contamination of our existence. Encountering the death of someone else, we too are reminded of our own death. Therefore, it is not only the fear of diseases by contamination but also the awareness of death, which is threatening. That is why there are a lot of rituals concerning these two aspects of death. In some cultures, all those who partook of the funeral ceremony take bath, and there are varied ceremonies to mitigate the fear of death. In some civilizations, the dead are immediately taken to the mortuary where they are kept until burial. This is to ward off contamination by contact with the dead body. Psychologically, after the death, the dead person is clearly differentiated and thought to be not belonging to the living. Automatically there is the fear of the dead. In funeral services or ceremonies, disgust functions as a rejection of thoughts or experiences that might remind us of mortality.⁹

9. NEGATIVE EVALUATION

In anger, hate, and fear our negative evaluation of the other persons is that they are dangerous to us. We think that they will hurt us even if we remain quite passive. Therefore, we may wish to punish them in anger, eliminate them in hate, and run away from them in fear. But in disgust, we see that something may disgust us even if it does not become dangerous to us. Therefore, it is enough in most cases, to avoid looking at disgusting things or avoid thinking about them. But this technique cannot be used for anger, hate and fear. Looking away or not thinking about the object does not eliminate the danger in these emotions. But in disgust, avoiding the object may significantly reduce and even eliminate the emotion, since there is no danger involved. But in moral disgust, just averting the gaze does not reduce the emotion of disgust. In moral disgust we discern danger as well. Therefore, ignoring the object of moral disgust is not sufficient for coping with the disagreeable situation.

The experience of disgust is intense and obviously there are facial expressions and bodily behaviours typically associated with disgust. These clearly indicate our aversive attitude. Such clear indication of communication is essential since contamination involves real danger to our existence. That is why disgust is infectious. When we observe disgusting behaviours and facial expressions, we too feel disgusted.¹⁰

10. DISGUST AS A MORAL EMOTION

Anger and contempt are moral reaction to other people. Likewise, disgust can also be a moral reaction to others when others' actions or character have violated normative standards. Anger, contempt and disgust form a continuum of moral response.

According to Darwin, extreme contempt or loathing contempt is not much different from disgust. These two have the same facial expression. Contempt is a way of announcing that a despised person is disagreeable to behold and even smells offensive. Tomkins is of the opinion that both disgust and contempt are originally auxiliary drive mechanisms to the hunger drive, respectively involved with mouth and nose. Thus contempt seems to make use of the oral-nasal rejection response of disgust and applies it to persons whose behaviour or character is considered offensive. Disgust, contempt,

and anger often occur together. These are considered as 'hostility triad' by Izard (1977). When one of them is stimulated, one among the other two is the next most salient emotion to emerge.¹¹

11. FUNCTIONS OF DISGUST

Seen from the perspective of evolution, it makes sense to see disgust as a motivating factor in animals to keep the nest clean and maintain an environment sufficiently sanitary for survival. Instinctively animals have to keep the nest clean so that they are not infected with diseases and die. Most mammals and birds maintain a tidy niche. The animals that lead a nomadic existence excrete their waste regardless of the locale. In our contemporary society too, disgust serves the function of maintaining cleanliness as well as bodily hygiene.

Though emotions in general serve both biological and psychological purposes, either directly or indirectly, in the case of disgust, some of its functions are readily identified as serving biological purposes such as eliciting nausea and avoidance of contaminated substances. This biological purpose is accomplished with such regularity and efficiency that we see no other emotion serving such a purpose. If we are compelled to eat or simply exposed to disgusting food, disgust will activate the physiological reactions of nausea and vomiting.

What is disgusting for one need not be so for another. Disgust for a particular individual is not solely determined by chemical and biological variables. The stimuli that elicit disgust response can be cultural practices and idiosyncratic learning. So the fear of contamination may be due to ideational or chemical factors, or both. Thus in some cases disgust protects people from harmful substances, and in some other cases it protects people from psychological consequences of violating cultural norms.

It has been proved experimentally that certain features of the disgust reaction such as facial behaviour and food rejection can be elicited in newborns. From this we understand that the original and primary function of disgust is to protect the body from substances perceived as harmful. The feared harm can be either real or a learned misconception. It is through conditioning and social learning, a particular real or abstract entity will become

offensive. The offence can be to the sense or to the psychological taste of an individual. It is also possible that one's own self can be the offender, and the disgust can be directed inward.¹²

12. PROTECTION FROM DISEASES

Primarily disgust serves the function of protecting us against bodily diseases. It can also serve to protect us against more symbolic contamination of the self. Some contaminations are more symbolic than physical. In this we can include certain types of sexual behaviours like incest, and pornography. Every society considers what normal sexual behaviours are. But every society also encounters sexual behaviours that are not sanctioned by the society. They are considered as deviance from the narrow class of 'normal' sexuality. So those acts are considered unnatural, inhuman and therefore disgusting. Sexual disgust is one of the largest groups referring to moral offences. There are also other moral offences that are disgusting. We may feel disgusted at the way terrorists torture innocent persons, and the means they choose to kill them. An addict who kills a person to get Rs. 10/ to buy his drug is disgusting. These are morally repugnant and thus disgusting. It is to be noted that not every criminal act is disgusting. Only those criminal acts, which are considered as abnormal, are disgusting. If you take two immoral acts like a person robbing a bank and the same person robbing a beggar, what is disgusting is the latter. Thus not every immoral act generates disgust but only that which is considered abnormal.

Disgust can be quite similar to hate if it is concerned with immoral deeds like rape, child abuse, torture, genocide, sadism, and masochism. The reason for this is that this is not merely repulsive but also considered dangerous as well. Perhaps what is involved, besides the evaluative pattern of appealingness, is the pattern of praiseworthiness.¹³

13. PROTECTION FROM CONTAMINATION

Disgust is meant to protect us from contamination. If we relax or suspend the rules of disgust, in relation to a specific person, it might show that there is some intimacy. That is why a mother changes the diaper of her child or we help a sick person take a bath

or urinate. In overcoming disgust, we express our unconditional love and care of our intimates. Similarly, when we allow others to see us in a disgusting, shameful, or humiliating situation, it may indicate that the other person is our intimate. It could also be due to contemptuous indifference to the other, rather than intimate care. We may overcome disgusting situation because of intimacy or familiarity. Doctors and nurses do overcome disgust because of familiarity. This familiarity may breed contempt as well.¹⁴

14. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES

Some of the activities, which we consider disgusting, were not considered disgusting formerly, and vice versa. This concerns mostly etiquette. Formerly, sneezing without covering the nose with a handkerchief was considered impolite and disgusting. But now everyone sneezes without a handkerchief; others do not consider it as disgusting. The rules concerning etiquette may also differ from society to society. For example, in some societies where dogs are kept at arm's length, persons touching the dog or showing one's hands to be licked by the dog may be considered disgusting when that person serves meals to others. In some cultures touching the dogs and stroking them and with the same hand touching food articles is not considered disgusting. I have observed dogs licking even the face and mouth of individuals without the individuals themselves or the others around feeling disgusted about it. In some societies these are clearly disgusting.¹⁵

15. CONTAMINATION RESPONSE

There is a contamination response on the part of adults: they perceive as disgusting and contaminated any food that has been in contact even for a brief period with a disgusting entity. This response is universal among adults. People have certain magical laws of contagion, according to which one belief is: 'once in contact, always in contact.' Another belief is the law of similarity, according to which if things are superficially similar, then they resemble each other in a deep sense as well. Therefore if one was in contact with a disgusting thing once or one is in contact with a thing similar to a disgusting thing, then these are considered contaminations.¹⁶

16. ANIMAL-ORIGIN DISGUST AND BEYOND

Firstly, the list of things disgusting includes the three core disgust domains (food, body products, and animals); secondly the list includes additional four domains: sexual acts, hygiene, death, violations of the body envelope (e.g., gore, amputations, and surgery); and thirdly, the list includes sociomoral violations (e.g., liars, racists, and Nazis).

There is a cultural evolution of the concept of disgust. Originally it meant a rejection response to bad tastes. Later it develops into a much more abstract and ideation rejection of potential foods. In this oral-centred rejection are body products and animals as potential ingestants. Besides being associated with our animal processes of eating and excretion, disgust can be elicited by other demonstration of our animality such as sex, death, gore, and violation of the body envelope. Then the evolution proceeds to include the fear of the animal properties of mortality and the associated decay. After this, it develops into interpersonal contamination and an association between disgust and immoral actions. Finally, it reaches the point where disgust becomes a powerful form of negative socialization and an abstract moral emotion making us want nothing to do with a particular object.¹⁷

43

CONTEMPT

The group of negative emotions toward someone's whole personality also includes contempt. Contempt expresses the subject's superiority over the object. Any triumph over a competitor may lead to contempt. Triumph could be physical, verbal, or imagined. One way of experiencing triumph over a competitor is to take the vantage point of the winner. Whenever you win, you see yourself as triumphant and superior, at least for the moment and at least in the particular situation you are in. The appraisals of yourself as triumphant and superior can lead you to view the loser with contempt. Contempt can be experienced individually or as a group. Thus it may involve a family, a particular community, a socio-economic class, an ethnic group, or race.¹

1. OBJECT'S INFERIORITY

The basic evaluative patterns differentiate between disgust and contempt. Disgust is associated with appealingness, and contempt with praiseworthiness. In contempt the other person is considered inferior to us in some basic sense, but in disgust the other person is not inferior to us but rather displeasing to us. Both contempt and disgust are more focused on the object rather than the subject. In contempt there is no threat from the object for the subject. By escape devices one can avoid the negative impact of the object.

The consideration of inferiority in contempt need not be global. It can merely be with a few aspects of the other person's characteristics. We may contemptuously consider the look of a person and yet realize that person's superior status.²

2. UPWARD CONTEMPT

Conventional contempt is downward contempt. There is also an 'upward contempt.' It refers to the contempt that people who occupy a conventionally lower social role harbour towards someone placed higher. For example, there is contempt by servants towards

masters, workers towards their bosses, and the poor towards the rich. There are some characteristics of upward contempt. 1. Upward contempt is less likely to be coupled with disgust. 2. It is secure in its legitimacy. 3. It is often coupled with pleasure-in-others'-misfortune. 4. It is more partial than downward contempt. Upward contempt is discerned not only in cases in which the lower may consider himself/herself superior in some respect to the higher, but also when the lower perceives that the higher is below the level, which the higher claims for himself/herself. In upward contempt, the lower considers the higher as inferior in some limited and significant aspect in which the lower himself/herself is superior. In most societies, the upward contempt is directed to lawyers and politicians. These people are called 'moral menials' as they function in the moral order similar to those played by garbage collectors and butchers.³

3. AGENT'S SUPERIORITY

Contempt can have elements of enjoyment as in pity. In contempt, we not only consider the inferiority of the other, but also our relative superiority, which may please us. In this respect, contempt is different from disgust, for, in disgust we do not enjoy the disgusting object. By its very nature, any disgusting object is displeasing to us.

Contempt is similar to indifference because in contempt we are unwilling to elevate the object from his/her inferior status, since the object is perceived to deserve that inferior status. In spite of its similarity with indifference, contempt is considered an emotion, and like other emotions, differs from indifference. Contempt involves a negative evaluation of the object and a positive evaluation concerning our own superiority. There will be an intense disagreeable feeling, and the motivation to avoid associating with the object. Though, by nature, contempt may involve the wish to be completely dissociated from the object, nevertheless, since the object may be needed to maintain the lifestyle of the one despising, this wish is limited to certain activities. Caste system in India is an example to bear on this issue. The lower caste people are considered contemptuously and yet their presence is required for the maintenance of the normal activities of the society; they are not totally avoided but employed to do menial jobs.⁴

4. CONTEMPT VS. DISGUST

When the emotion of contempt is very intense, besides a highly negative evaluation of the object's characteristics, it may involve a highly negative attitude towards the object. In this respect, contempt may involve aspects similar to those found in disgust including the physiological markers typical of disgust. Yet the basic difference between contempt and disgust should be made clear: the object of contempt is inferior to us, but still within some of our frames of reference, whereas in disgust the object is not inferior, but impure and so our fear that it may contaminate us. Contempt refers to social distinctions, whereas disgust refers to boundaries of the self. Therefore, the idea of equality is only relevant to contempt and not to disgust. The issue of equality is totally irrelevant to disgust. Yet, since disgust may be associated with other negative emotions, such as contempt and hate, the issue of equality may be part of the more complex emotional attitude.

Contempt is directed at the whole agent and not merely at a particular action of the agent. In this respect it is like hate. Contempt also is a long-term attitude, but usually less intense than hate. Whereas in contempt the emphasis is on the inferiority of the object, hate stresses the object's dangerous nature. Contempt allows for competitive coexistence which hate does not allow.⁵

5. CLASSICAL EXAMPLES

In history, we have two examples to illustrate hate and contempt. The Nazis' attitude towards the Jews was hate; and the attitude of whites towards blacks during the period of American slavery was contempt. The official doctrine of Nazi Germany held the view that the Jews are irredeemably evil and even their infants were supposed to possess the same evil traits, which were considered inherent and they are incorrigible even if treated early. Therefore the Jewish infants and children were also executed during the Holocaust. But the slaves in America were not considered so: The slave owner's children used to play together with the slave's children.

When we consider some people as inferior, they may develop various negative emotional attitudes towards us, but not necessarily contempt. There is a global evaluation associated with contempt;

this does not mean that the object of contempt is inferior to us in all respects. Certainly the object may be superior to us in certain features, which are considered inessential. In the same way, the global evaluation in hate does not imply that the object has no positive aspects at all; it only means that the object is essentially evil.⁶

6. FUNCTIONS OF CONTEMPT

All our biologically based characteristics serve some adaptive function, or did so in the past. In all probability, contempt emerged as a vehicle for preparing the individual or group to face a dangerous adversary. For this, one has to feel superior and hold in contempt those whom one opposes. That is why even now, in situations of contempt, one feels the need to feel stronger, more intelligent, more civilized, or in some way better than the other with whom one competes. The social function of contempt is to direct it against those who foster waste, pollution, immorality, oppression, crime, or war. When one is contemptuous of another person, that person may experience shame, and shame can be a strong motive for self-improvement. Contempt has its negative function too. Contempt is involved in all kinds of prejudice, such as racial prejudice. Among the hostility triad of anger, disgust, and contempt, contempt is the most subtle, the coldest. When contempt is directed against another human being, it tends to depersonalise the target individual, and makes the person feel that he/she is perceived as something lower than human. That is why contempt motivates murder and mass destruction of people.⁷

4 4

CONCLUSION

Having written this book on emotions, I am left wondering how much more there is yet to know about emotions. Emotions are complex subtle realities of our experience. In our everyday experience we are gripped with emotions. In counselling and psychotherapy, clients and therapists become painfully aware of them, or joyfully acknowledge them.

The phenomenon of emotions is one of the areas that have been seriously neglected by scientific research. That is why we do not have a sizeable body of information to rely on. Even the latest books on emotions rely heavily on materials written long back. This is an indication that much needs to be studied at this level.

In popular parlance, emotions are understood differently. Even in the field of counselling, the notion of emotion is not the same. Emotions are more presumed than studied. That is why even now people have difficulty in understanding what emotions are and what feelings are.

Knowledge is liberating. By this I do not deny the shadow side of emotions. I am only asserting the positive aspects that can actually make our life better. If we know what emotions are, what their nature is and how they are generated, then we are in a better position to handle them. Most people who come to counselling have problems with emotions. They either experience too much of them or too little of them. One of my close associates who suffer from clinical depression complained to me that medication blunts his sharpness of emotional experience. In his case, medication was meant to regulate the negative impact of depression. In one of the group homes where some people live together, a very nice and lovely person helpful at all times had his own time of exploding. When he explodes with anger, nobody can withstand him. The next moment he will be on his knees asking pardon from everybody.

Anger was beyond his control. Once in a session with a couple, the wife was complaining how her husband had no positive emotions to express. When asked, the man said that he is very loving towards his wife and children and yet he was surprised to know that the very people whom he claimed to love did not sense his love towards them.

Most of us have experience over the years, that at such and such time, in such and such circumstances, we are likely to have those negative emotions we are accustomed to have. Therefore by this knowledge we are forewarned and it is possible to take precautions. Do we not at times leave the place or circumstances when we become aware of our vulnerability to express negative emotions?

All these things are meant to underline the fact that the precise knowledge of emotions is for our well-being and betterment. Knowledge of emotions not only enriches our well-being but also improves interpersonal relationship. As we are knowledgeable about emotions and how they are generated both in us and in others, we are able to adjust our reactions to the emotional expressions of others. For example, if you take a worker, the knowledge about the boss who comes down on him/her negatively, will help the person to be prepared to meet the challenge appropriately. We are all in need of appropriate responses to the emotional expressions of others who are very significant to us and whose authority can adversely affect or enhance our life. Besides monitoring our negative and positive responses, we can also try to eliminate at certain times some of the expressions of negative emotions and foster positive emotions. One example will be hiding emotions. There are times when it may not be appropriate to show our emotions for reasons of not hurting the other persons unnecessarily. Unless one has knowledge of one's own emotions, it is not possible to do that.

In conclusion, I recommend that we become well acquainted with the nature of emotions, their characteristics and how they are generated in order to monitor and enhance our lives and those of others.

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